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ABSTRACT 
HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYER PAYROLL TAX EVASION: AN EXPLORATION 
BASED ON IRS DATA AND ON INTERVIEWS WITH EMPLOYERS AND 
DOMESTIC WORKERS 
 
FEBRUARY, 2010 
 
CATHERINE B. HASKINS, B.A., HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Nancy Folbre 
 
 
Although many workers have a private household as their workplace, many 
household employers are unaware of or fail to meet their state and federal payroll 
tax obligations, thus undermining the workers’ retirement income security. This 
dissertation uses sixty interviews with household employers and employees in the 
Washington, DC, area to investigate the causes and conditions of nanny tax 
evasion. Ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured interviews indicate that lack 
of awareness, tax complexity, social norms of noncompliance, and poor personal 
ethics diminish payroll tax payment; concern over one’s job, personal ethics and 
altruistic concern for the employee motivate compliance. An analysis of limited 
IRS data on audits as well as data on Schedule H household employment payroll 
tax returns reveal that although some unpaid tax was discovered, almost as much 
tax paid in error was refunded, confirming the importance of complexity as a 
determinant of compliance. Analysis of results using Kohlberg’s stages of moral 
development and force field analysis of motives provides insight into employers’ 
decisions to pay or evade their nanny taxes. Policy recommendations emphasize 
increasing public awareness, tax simplification, and enforcement. 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................ v 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xiii 
CHAPTER 
 
1. HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE U.S. ..................... 1 
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Background: The Employer’s Decision .......................................................... 8 
1.4 Background: The Employee’s Decision ........................................................ 14 
1.5 Official Labor Statistics on Household Employees in the U.S ..................... 24 
1.6 The Compliance Rate and the Odds of Being Caught .................................. 30 
1.7 Summary of Chapters .................................................................................... 33 
 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT AND  
        TAX COMPLIANCE .................................................................................. 37 
 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 37 
2.2 Migrant Domestic Workers ........................................................................... 37 
2.3 The American Welfare State ......................................................................... 44 
2.4 Tax Compliance ............................................................................................ 45 
3. METHODOLOGY FOR INTERVIEW RESEARCH ........................................ 58 
3.1 The Case for Using Qualitative Methods in Tax Compliance 
Research .................................................................................................. 58 
3.2 Ethnographic Research ................................................................................. 60 
3.3 Recruitment of Participants ........................................................................... 60 
3.4 Interview Procedure and Analysis................................................................. 64 
3.5 Limitations of the Interview Research .......................................................... 66 
3.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 69 
4.  ANALYSIS OF IRS TAX DATA ON  HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT 
        PAYROLL TAXES ..................................................................................... 71 
 
 viii
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 71 
4.2 IRS Records of Household Payroll Tax Payments........................................ 72 
4.3 Tax Return Variables .................................................................................... 75 
4.4 Data Limitations ............................................................................................ 78 
4.5 Comparing Schedule H Filers to the General Filing Population .................. 79 
4.6 Amounts of Household Wages and Payroll Taxes ........................................ 83 
4.7 Time Trend of Schedule H Filings and Tax Amounts .................................. 87 
4.8 Overview of IRS Audit Data ......................................................................... 90 
4.8.1 Implications of overpayment amount ............................................. 92 
4.8.2 Nanny Tax Compliance in the Context of Whole-Tax-
Return Compliance ..................................................................... 93 
 
4.9 Examining Audit Results by Filing Characteristic ....................................... 94 
4.10 Examining Audit Results by Audit Outcome ............................................. 96 
4.11 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 102 
 
5. ESTIMATING HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYER PAYROLL TAX EVASION  
        IN THE U.S. 1996 – 2006.......................................................................... 109 
 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 109 
 
5.2 Government Figures on Household Workers .............................................. 110 
 
5.2.1 The 2000 Census .......................................................................... 110 
5.2.2 American Community Survey Data ............................................. 112 
5.2.3 Household Data Annual Averages ............................................... 112 
 
5.3 Race and Gender Composition of Private Household Employment 
Figures ................................................................................................... 116 
5.4 Calculating the Compliance Rate ................................................................ 117 
5.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 124 
 
6. DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS ................................................. 127 
 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 127 
6.2 Description of Interview Subjects ............................................................... 128 
 
6.2.1 Employer Sample ......................................................................... 128 
6.2.2 Description of Employee Sample ................................................ 130 
 
6.3 Employer Results ........................................................................................ 132 
 
6.3.1 Category 1: The Odds of Getting Caught .................................... 132 
 ix
6.3.2 Category 2: Ignorance and Complexity - the Biggest 
Barriers to Compliance ............................................................. 134 
6.3.3 Category 3: The “Household” Aspect of Household 
Employment Taxes ................................................................... 140 
6.3.4. The Household and the Welfare State......................................... 150 
6.3.5 Summary of Employer Results .................................................... 152 
 
6.4 Nanny Results ............................................................................................. 153 
 
6.4.1 Why Do Employers Pay? ............................................................. 153 
6.4.2 Why Do Employers Not Pay? ...................................................... 154 
6.4.3 Nanny Ignorance of Filing Requirements .................................... 155 
6.4.4 Bad Treatment .............................................................................. 156 
6.4.5 Good Treatment ........................................................................... 156 
6.4.6 Being a Household Employee ...................................................... 157 
6.4.7 Advice .......................................................................................... 158 
6.4.8 The Meaning of Remittances and Social Security ....................... 159 
6.4.9 Summary of Nanny Results ......................................................... 160 
 
6.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 160 
7. COMPLEXITY, ALTRUISM, AND SOCIAL NORMS:   
        AN INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERVIEW MATERIAL ................ 163 
 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 163 
7.2 Categorizing Employer Compliance ........................................................... 168 
7.3 Interview Subject Explanations for Compliance and Noncompliance ....... 170 
7.4 Evaluating the Basic Model of Compliance ............................................... 173 
 
7.4.1 Two Levels of Detection Probability and  Their Associated 
Penalty Levels ........................................................................... 175 
7.4.2 Taxpayer’s Income ....................................................................... 177 
7.4.3 The Size of The Tax ..................................................................... 178 
 
7.5 Other Tax Issues.......................................................................................... 179 
 
7.5.1 Third Party Information Reporting .............................................. 179 
7.5.2 Does DC Matter? ......................................................................... 180 
 
7.6 Lack of Employer Payroll Knowledge ........................................................ 181 
7.7 The Connection between Employer Ignorance, Tax Complexity, and 
Social Norms ......................................................................................... 183 
7.8 Household Issues......................................................................................... 186 
 
7.8.1 Caring Labor ................................................................................ 187 
 x
7.8.2 Bargaining .................................................................................... 188 
7.8.3 Pressure ........................................................................................ 189 
7.8.4 The Mini-Welfare State ............................................................... 190 
 
7.9 Force-Field Diagrams and Analysis ............................................................ 191 
 
7.9.1 Force-Field Analysis of Several Employers’ Nanny Tax 
Decisions ................................................................................... 191 
7.9.2 From Conflict to Moral Development ......................................... 194 
 
7.10 Summary ................................................................................................... 197 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ............................ 200 
 
8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 200 
8.2 Implications for the Traditional Model ....................................................... 202 
8.3 Conflict ....................................................................................................... 203 
8.4 Implications for Household Theory ............................................................ 204 
 
8.4.1 Isolation ........................................................................................ 205 
8.4.2 Privacy, Autonomy, and Interpersonal Relations ......................... 206 
 
8.5 Policy Recommendations ............................................................................ 209 
8.6 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research ...................................... 214 
8.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 216 
 
APPENDICES 
 
A. INFORMED CONSENT LETTERS ................................................................ 220 
B. NTERVIEW QUESTIONS ............................................................................... 222 
C. SCHEDULE H OF FORM 1040 ...................................................................... 229 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 231 
 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
 
1.  Comparison between Social Security Benefits Accruing to Fully-
Covered and Occasionally-Covered Employment Histories ................... 20 
2.  Virginia State Unemployment Benefits, 2009 ............................................. 22 
3.  Women’s Disadvantage with Respect to Poverty and Age, 2009. ............... 23 
4.  Major Occupational Sectors in the Private Household Workforce, 
2006......................................................................................................... 26 
5.  Occupations Representing at Least 1% of  All Private Household 
Industry Workers, 2006 ........................................................................... 27 
6.  Selected Occupations Representing Under 1% of  Private Household 
Industry’s Total Workforce, 2006 ........................................................... 28 
7.  Comparison of Schedule H Filers with All Taxpayers ................................ 79 
8.  Overview of Audit Data by Whether a Schedule H was Filed..................... 92 
9.  Audited Household Employers by Audit Result .......................................... 96 
10.  Income of Audited Household Employers Grouped by Audit Result, 
Ranked by Average Percent Unearned Income ..................................... 100 
11.  Census Estimates of Household Workers, 2000. ....................................... 111 
12.  American Community Survey Estimates of  Household Workers, 
2004-2007. ............................................................................................ 112 
13.  Comparison of Household Worker Estimates from Census, 
American Community Survey, Household Data Annual Averages 
by-industry, and Household Data Annual Averages by-worker-
class data, 1995-2007. ........................................................................... 115 
14.  Household Data Annual Averages Data on Racial and Gender 
Composition of the Private Household Industry, 2007. ........................ 116 
15.  Calculation of Household Payroll Tax Noncompliance Rates, based 
on Household Data Annual Averages, 2000 Census, and 
 xii
American Community Survey Estimates of Private Household 
Employment. ......................................................................................... 123 
16.  Extent of Employer Compliance ................................................................ 170 
17.  Employer Payroll Knowledge .................................................................... 181 
 
 xiii
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
 
1.  Comparison of Social Security Benefits of Hypothetical Work 
Histories .................................................................................................. 21 
2.  Overall Distribution of Total Household Wages Paid in 2006 by 
Household Employers ............................................................................. 83 
3.  Household Wages Reported in 2006 by Employers: Wage Amounts 
under $14,500. ........................................................................................ 84 
4.  Detail of Household Wages Reported: Wage Amounts $200,000 to 
$1,000,000 (2006) ................................................................................... 85 
5.  Detail of Distribution of Household Payroll Taxes Filed: $25,000 
and Under (2006) .................................................................................... 86 
6.  Schedule H Filings 1996 – 2006 .................................................................. 87 
7.  Total Household Payroll Taxes Paid, 1996 – 2006 ...................................... 88 
8.  Mean Schedule H Taxes Paid, 1996 – 2006. ............................................... 88 
9.  Comparison of Household Worker Estimates from Census, 
American Community Survey, Household Data Annual Averages 
by-industry, and Household Data Annual Averages by-worker-
class, 1995-2007. .................................................................................. 115 
10.  Overlay of IRS Schedule H Data on Household Worker Estimates .......... 124 
 
  1
CHAPTER 1 
 
HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE U.S. 
1.1 Overview  
 This study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to examine the 
determinants of employer compliance with household payroll tax obligations in the U.S. 
The qualitative analysis explores the experiences of sixty individuals involved in the 
household labor market in an affluent Washington, DC, neighborhood. I also combine 
an analysis of Internal Revenue Service tax return data – some of it from audits – with 
government figures on the size of the private household workforce in order to estimate 
the amount of payroll tax evasion among household employers. Non-payment of these 
taxes – known informally as “nanny taxes” – has bitter consequences for the retirement 
prospects of domestic employees. However, more employers might comply if it were 
easier for them to do so. The results of this study suggest that many employers 
unwittingly violate the payroll tax laws due to ignorance of the requirements. Many 
employers are also failing to pay due to the time-consuming complexity of state and 
federal nanny taxes, as well as due to their lack of experience or familiarity with payroll 
procedures. This dissertation also studies employers who successfully confronted these 
barriers in hopes of recognizing ways the IRS can support and increase compliance. 
 This is the first intensive quantitative exploration of nanny tax return data. It is 
also the first interview research on the topic. Tax compliance studies have hardly 
touched on the issue of household employment taxes. Nor have scholars of domestic 
labor focused on these taxes. This dissertation therefore makes a contribution to both of 
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these bodies of knowledge. The study is guided by the following sets of research 
questions: (1.) How high is the nanny tax evasion rate? (2.) Why do so few people pay 
nanny taxes? Are existing economic models of tax compliance adequate to explain 
nanny tax compliance behavior? If not, in what ways do they need to be extended? (3.) 
Why do some people pay nanny taxes? What barriers do they face? How have they 
overcome those barriers? (4.) For household employers, how do perceptions and values 
in the context of the household shape the economic decision to pay these taxes? 
This research on household employment taxes presents insights gained from 
open, revealing, and trust-based interviews with thirty household employers and thirty 
household employees under conditions of strictly preserved anonymity. Although the 
availability of undocumented workers is likely to impact the amount of employer payroll 
tax compliance, this study did not address that issue nor did the study include any 
members of the undocumented workforce.   
The quantitative part of the study utilizes several kinds of IRS tax data, some 
aggregate data on all nanny tax filers, some trend data over the eleven years available, 
and some data drawn from a 2001 IRS research sample. I examine the prevalence of 
certain exemptions and credits among nanny tax filers compared with non-nanny tax 
filers as well as examine the shapes of the distributions of nanny tax amounts for a 
specific year. Finally, drawing on Census 2000 data, American Community Survey data, 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the number of household workers in the U.S., I 
compare the number of Schedule H’s filed 1996 - 2006 in order to estimate the nanny 
tax evasion rate for each year. That is, I can estimate the amount of evasion by dividing 
the number of household employment tax returns submitted in a given year by the best 
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available measure of the size of the private household employment industry in that year. 
There are variations in worker counts between surveys (the 2000 Census counted almost 
580,000 while the BLS figures based on the Current Population Survey counted 894,000 
for the same year) as well as the problem of undercounting and survey refusal in some 
low-income areas. Nonetheless, based on most recent available figures, the nanny tax 
evasion rate has a lower bound of almost seventy-five percent. 
 The ethnographic part of the study involved thirty Filipina nannies (I use the 
term nannies to mean private child care providers, not officially trained or accredited 
professionals) and housekeepers employed full-time in an affluent neighborhood and 
thirty household employers of full-time employees. Snowball sampling produced 
potential subjects, who were then carefully informed of the risks, however minimal, of 
discussing tax compliance with the researcher. I conducted sixty in-depth issue-based 
interviews to deepen my understanding of tax compliance behavior in general, and of 
the behavior of household employers in particular. I used the ocular scan method to 
analyze this qualitative data. Both before and after specific themes emerged from the 
material, I reviewed the data meticulously to ensure accurate representation of my 
findings.  
 Basic tax evasion models emphasize detection probability, penalty size, income 
level, and tax size. These make intuitive sense in their context, the economics of crime, 
as well as in the general case of tax evasion. However, not all appear significant in the 
specific case of nanny tax evasion. Briefly, the interview results confirm the importance 
of detection probability and penalty. However, participants appeared to perceive only 
two levels of detection probability and associated penalty. Some employers perceived a 
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high detection probability and paid out of fear that a non-IRS detection would occur and 
they would pay a significant career-related “penalty.” Other employers, perceiving a 
very low detection probability, responded by ignoring the tax because of the small 
chance of IRS detection and the lack of any high-impact penalty unique to nanny tax 
evasion. Tax size and income size, the classic tax evasion model’s other two variables, 
did not appear to motivate or retard compliance. 
 The peculiar nature of nanny taxes gave rise to a number of noncompliance 
drivers not in traditional models. Ambition, personal concern for the worker, personal 
ethics, political views, and social norms all had a determining influence on payroll tax 
compliance. The nanny tax can be seen as a tax on political ambitions, or as an 
insurance policy for a viable political future. The results also showed that altruism was a 
strong motivator. Many household employers derived utility from fulfilling their 
employer responsibilities, including being nanny tax compliant despite there being little 
chance of being caught evading. The dissertation concludes with ten policy 
recommendations. Based on evidence that complexity stymies otherwise willing nanny 
tax payers, some recommendations involve obvious simplifications of the tax code. I 
propose other recommendations aimed at raising awareness of the problem and 
increasing the likelihood that evaders are detected.    
1.2 Introduction 
 According to economic theory, few people should ever pay household employer 
payroll taxes. These taxes are known universally as “nanny taxes” though payroll taxes 
are owed on all private household workers.1 The detection probability, a key variable in 
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the standard tax compliance model, is almost zero, indicating that compliance should be 
extremely low. Most individuals do not in fact file the frequent, complex and onerous 
forms required to carry out this legal obligation of every employer; instead, the public 
associates the term nanny tax with public officials or would-be appointees suddenly 
confronted with omissions in their tax records.2 In 2006, household payroll tax filers, 
who must include Schedule H with their individual income tax returns, represented 
0.15% of the individual income tax filing population. In fact, as Bloomquist and An 
(2006) noted, filings have monotonically declined from 317,010 to 207,111 between 
1996 and 2006. Their study – the only one on the subject of nanny tax compliance – 
explored geographic variation in the rates at which these taxes were filed. 
 What is the most serious consequence of unpaid nanny taxes? It is not the tax 
revenue lost to the government. It is that these workers are not building a Social 
Security earnings record. When an employee works for a household instead of a 
business, they can lose the basic guarantee that they will have earned Social Security 
retirement benefits after ten years (forty quarters) of work, a level that increases with 
each additional quarter of earnings. 
 Missing out on Social Security eligibility also means missing out on part of 
Medicare health insurance. This publicly funded program for those 65 and older is the 
other retirement benefit funded by payroll deductions. 2.9% of the gross wages are 
designated for Medicare, 1.45% from the employee and a matching 1.45% from the 
employer. Forty quarters of covered employment entitle a person to Medicare Part A 
(Hospital Insurance) free of charge. Between thirty and thirty-nine quarters of credit 
entitle them to a compromise: paying only $244 a month for Part A. Workers with less 
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than thirty quarters (seven and a half years) of covered employment must pay $443 a 
month.3  
 No other employment situation relies on the personal magnanimity of the 
employer to provide the employee with their chance to have Social Security benefits in 
old age. In the absence of career consequences, are household employers motivated 
enough to file nanny taxes out of awareness of and concern for the employee’s well 
being in retirement?  Feminist economists, sociologists and historians have long argued 
that the household is a realm apart, bereft of the protections and the entitlements that 
citizens possess in the world outside. Fraser and Gordon (1992), building on the work of 
T.H. Marshall (1950) make this case with specific reference to the United States, 
claiming that our social provisioning has, unlike Europe, moved only partially from a 
charity-based system to a modern citizenship-based entitlement system. Our system of 
social insurance is not universal; it is tied to earnings. Furthermore, for each paycheck 
individual employers write, they owe a federal payroll tax of 7.4% on that amount, just 
as workers owe 7.4% in FICA (Federal Insurance Contribution Amount). For every 
financial quarter that an employer circumvents this obligation by paying under the table, 
their employee’s Social Security scorecard reads zero. The retirement security of each 
household employee depends on the ability and the willingness of an amateur boss to 
come to grips with a clog of obscure paperwork and quarterly state unemployment tax 
deadlines. Payroll taxes are complex and difficult. Because so few pay nanny taxes, the 
know-how is not common knowledge.  
 Although household employers are individually responsible for their own tax 
evasion, there are institutional and social forces shaping the nanny tax decision. One of 
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these is the conflict of labor laws and regulations governing workplaces on one hand 
and resistance to government intrusion into the household on the other. The simple fact 
is that hired help is doing work that in earlier times was largely done by family, by 
unpaid, economically stranded adult women or orphans in exchange for a place to live, 
by girls kept out of school to care for younger siblings, and in the American South, by 
slave labor. Domestic workers are predominantly female (91.2%)  and non-white 
(64.7%), according to 2000 Census estimates.4 Labor economists and sociologists have 
documented the lower pay and poorer status of predominantly female occupations and 
non-white occupations (Lapidus and Figgart, 1998; Bergmann, 2002; Brown and Misra, 
2003). Paid domestic labor is an excellent example of this. 
 Clearly, the availability of undocumented workers affects the tax compliance 
behavior of household employers. Despite the fact that the INS and the IRS do not 
customarily share information, with increasing government scrutiny, neither 
undocumented workers nor their employers are as comfortable filing taxes with a 
Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) to build a record of earnings. Furthermore, since 
undocumented workers normally earn less than legal workers do, the undocumented 
workers crowd out the others, which also reduces household employment tax 
compliance.  
 In this dissertation, I analyze the results of my ethnographic study of sixty 
household employees and employers to determine the drivers of nanny tax compliance. I 
also use the best available IRS data on household employment tax returns in order to 
profile those who do in fact pay these taxes. I analyze 2006 IRS data on all of the 
quarter million or so tax returns containing a Schedule H. In order to examine data on 
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the noncompliant, the study also scrutinizes an IRS weighted-sample data set containing 
pre- and post-audit information. Of the over 40,000 returns in this data set just over 400 
returns contained – or were found to be missing – nanny tax payments. Given the 
existence of only one published study on household employment payroll taxes, this 
dissertation generates new knowledge that can be put to policy strategic use. 
1.3 Background: The Employer’s Decision 
 Paying household employment payroll taxes includes record keeping, 
calculations, check writing, and form completions for filing federal income, state 
income, and unemployment and workers ’ compensation taxes four times a year. Nanny 
taxes are a tangle of federal and state tax obligations. At the federal level, the employer 
is required to file a Schedule H with their Form 1040.5 This reports their household 
wages paid and calculates the employers’ household payroll taxes. These include 6.2 
percent of gross wages for Social Security tax and 1.45 percent for Medicare tax. The 
employee must pay the same amounts. In addition, there is federal unemployment tax, 
FUTA, on the first $7000 of employee wages. The states as well require quarterly pre-
payments of income taxes. Furthermore, states often have workers compensation tax. 
Finally, the employer is required to withhold state income taxes and the employee’s 
share of the FICA taxes mentioned above. These filings are due quarterly. The 
registration process and the paperwork are onerous for businesses and households alike.  
 Whatever the difficulties of keeping up with this routine on a regular basis, it is 
probably even harder for a household employer to learn how to do it in the first place. 
Consider when it is that a nanny usually begins employment. One time is the week a 
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family arrives home from the hospital with a newborn or returns from overseas with an 
adopted child. The worker was likely hired beforehand, but her first week of work will 
ordinarily coincide with the advent of the child. The other very common time is one or 
two weeks prior to the point at which the new mother returns to work after a period of 
maternity leave, a household transition with logistical as well as emotional issues to 
solve. The bottom line is that the new employee is likely entering into the difficulties of 
a household with a newborn or newly adopted child. The amount of physical energy, 
administrative capacity and personal attention available to spend on the new nanny is 
very limited. This is the context in which a nanny’s new employer is making the 
decision whether or not to pay nanny taxes.  
 The requirement for filing nanny taxes begins at the end of the financial quarter. 
The rule is that unless there are less than two weeks left until the end of the quarter, an 
employer must file those three types of tax for a new employee. Stiff penalties start right 
away after a missed deadline.  
 To begin with, in order to file household employment taxes, the employer must 
first obtain an identification number by registering with the state employment 
commission, which oversees unemployment and workers’ compensation taxes. This is 
difficult because the state employment commission is designed for businesses rather 
than households. This makes it hard for a household employer to register. The tax 
collecting apparatus at the state level is set up to handle multiple employees and 
turnover of employees. For example, employers with one employee have usually 
satisfied the financial requirements of a state unemployment commission by March 31st. 
However, they are still compelled to submit an unemployment tax return for the 
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remaining three quarters of the year. These quarterly filings involve paperwork designed 
for businesses with many employees. 
 The second employer tax obligation is the reporting of state (or District of 
Columbia) income taxes, which are levied and administered by the state-level revenue 
and tax departments and the state-level unemployment commissions. Federal level taxes 
are the third type required: federal income as well as the Social Security payroll and 
Medicare payroll taxes mentioned earlier. The household reports the employee’s income 
on the household’s own 1040 form but needs to send estimated payments four times a 
year as well.  
 A common complication arises when an employee lives in one state or 
jurisdiction and works in another one, a common situation in the Washington area for 
example. Some jurisdictions make allowances for this and have reciprocity agreements 
regarding state payroll taxes; some do not. Untangling which taxes must be paid to the 
employer’s state of residence and which must be paid to the employee’s state of 
residence adds one more layer of complication. 
 Household employers need to be researched separately from individual income 
taxpayers as well as separately from business taxpayers. On one hand, household 
employers are not trying to shelter their own income from the tax. On the other hand, 
neither are they a business seeking to shelter profits from tax. Rather, they are failing to 
pay a tax - their fair share as an employer - of the Social Security and Medicare 
obligations. The household lacks many of the supports a business has: expertise or 
institutional memory of how to handle payroll taxes, time and space resources devoted 
to administration, and peer support from other small business owners. In fact, state 
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departments of revenue and state unemployment commissions do not distinguish 
between households and businesses. This causes the forms, instructions and procedures 
to be needlessly complex for the would-be household filer.  
 The details above should make clear that following the routine of compliance is 
hard. There is no special support beyond the lengthy IRS publications, such as the 
Instructions for Schedule H, a very long document. There seem to be two main reasons 
for this lack of assistance, which I will explore in my qualitative research. One is the 
fact that the tax code is law. Because of this, tax regulations cannot be officially written 
up in an easy-to-follow manner. Glossing over exceptions would give grounds for 
loopholes. Another reason is that this is not a commonly accepted tax, even granted that 
the affluent are more likely to incur it. There is simply not a lot of compliance with it, so 
no collective experience or knowledge accumulates in the culture.  
 An excellent analogy from the other end of the economic spectrum is tip income. 
People are generally aware that waiters’ and waitresses’ tips are not exactly tax-free, but 
that it is not the norm for wait staff to file proper tax returns on their tip income. The 
IRS rules for reporting tip income are quite complex, but there is little public pressure to 
overhaul the rules and the forms. The same is true of the seldom-paid nanny tax.  
 A final consideration in the employer’s decision about household employment 
payroll tax compliance might be the personal income tax benefit to themselves. Almost 
anyone going to the trouble of paying nanny taxes is tax-savvy enough to take the Child 
and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCC).  This credit is based on an allowed amount of 
up to $3000 of a dependent’s qualified and properly documented care expenses ($6000 
for two dependents). Based on family income, the CDCC begins at 35% of the allowed 
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dependent care expenses, but surprisingly does not phase out at higher levels of income. 
It declines to 20% of allowed expenses for incomes greater than $43,000 (in 2009), but 
does not phase out entirely regardless of income level. Therefore, this credit ranges from 
$450 to $1050 for families with one child and from $900 to $2100 for those with two or 
more. The cost-benefit analysis of this tax credit for a family with one child paying 
more than $1050 in payroll taxes on a nanny (that is, paying an on-the-books nanny 
more than $14,189) is that they would “do better” by paying under the table than by 
receiving the credit. Similarly, a family having multiple children and paying more than 
$2100 in payroll taxes (paying wages of $28,378) would also have reached that break-
even point at which the benefit of the credit is outweighed by the cost of the payroll 
taxes, all else equal. 
 As examples of household payroll taxes in action, I present three hypothetical 
scenarios. Based on reading and ethnographic research, they typify some common 
experiences. The cases illustrate the diversity of household employment situations, the 
ease of becoming a nanny tax evader unawares, and the challenge of getting the returns 
right.  
 In Case #1, a couple with children has a college student come in Friday or 
Saturday every evening for five hours so they can go out, except for a month in the 
summer when the family is away. They pay him $8 an hour. They owe household 
payroll taxes. ($8 x 5hrs x 48 wks = $1920, which is more than $1600). Their federal 
tax bill is $142.08. Because it never occurred to them to calculate and withhold the 
employee half, another 7.4%, from the two twenties they give him every week, they are 
now responsible for 14.8%, or $284.16. When the wife realizes she may pursue a 
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judgeship, she hires an online company for $525 a year to handle everything properly. 
Unfortunately, her typo as she enters wage information into the computer that year costs 
her the seat two years later. 
 In Case #2, when a sudden opportunity to travel arrives, a woman employs a 
couple to finish putting in vegetable garden in for her and make sure the produce is 
delivered to the food bank on a weekly basis. She also asks them to pull down an old 
shed on her property and carefully dispose of the materials according to her instructions. 
Although they discuss a rate of $15 a piece per hour (she is trying to put some money in 
their pockets), she just gives them $1000 before she goes and another $1000 when she 
returns. She owes payroll taxes because they worked on her property and she directed 
how their work was to be done. As in Case #1, taxes were never discussed, calculated or 
withheld, so the employer owes $296 come April 15th  although neither she nor the IRS 
are ever aware of it. 
 In Case #3, a nanny works ten hours a day Monday through Friday for a two-
earner family. Her hourly rate is $18. Her gross pay is $900. She does not get any paid 
vacation, but was sick for a week thus earning $900 x 51wks = $45,900. Her employer 
deducts her FICA amounts (7.4%) along with state and federal income tax, which are 
based on the exemptions she claimed on her W-4. The employer owes $3396.60 in 
federal nanny tax. Although they could deploy the Child and Dependent Care Credit to 
offset this tax, they would still owe $2196.60. They are also responsible for quarterly 
state income tax filings of her income tax withholdings. In addition, they must file 
quarterly unemployment taxes, although they never owe anything after the first quarter. 
Their $180-an-hour accountant itemizes her bill: 15 hours at $180 were spent on his 
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researching and complying with state and federal payroll tax filings, about 25% more 
than on the taxes themselves. The husband takes over the following year, but spends 
two hours per quarterly filing, for a total of 16 hours at the state level; the Schedule H is 
easy in comparison, one hour, but then he remembers the employee’s raise partway 
through the year, which costs him an additional 3 hours of research and recalculation for 
a total of 20. His wife spends an hour a month keeping track of paychecks and running 
totals. They count themselves lucky to live in a state which does not require Workers’ 
Compensation insurance.  
 The three types of tax due quarterly require significant effort in an assistance 
vacuum. Complexity, the general tax compliance literature indicates, is a major factor in 
compliance behavior. Congress, the IRS, state revenue departments and state 
unemployment insurance commissions each bear part of the responsibility for creating 
such a hard path to household payroll compliance. 
1.4 Background: The Employee’s Decision 
 Most workers are not employed by a household and have their payroll taxes paid 
as a matter of course by the business or institution which employs them. Many legal 
employees are paid under the table by businesses due to employees’ desire to avoid 
taxes. Non-household employees who want to build a Social Security record in order to 
qualify for retirement benefits can easily find a company to work for which pays on the 
books. On the other hand, nannies, housekeepers, and other household employees who 
understand the benefit of a Social Security pension will find it hard to locate a domestic 
employer who knows how to file and is willing to file nanny taxes. The only eligibility 
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requirement for receiving the United States’ old-age income security pension is ten 
years’ worth of covered employment. The ten years can be made up of any forty 
financial quarters that saw earnings above a certain threshold ($1700 for 2009). The 
definition of covered employment has expanded, always due to political pressure, over 
the life of this social insurance program. Employers in covered occupations have to pay 
the payroll taxes for their employees and withhold federal and state income taxes. Most 
notably, agricultural and domestic workers were originally ruled uncovered occupations, 
in order to help the Social Security Act pass a Congress with Southern Congressmen. 
Clearly, the more informally organized and less regulated an occupation is, the closer 
those employers are to being able to escape providing payroll taxes (and the resulting 
benefits) for their workers.  
 Of course, many workers do not want to work on the books but rather under the 
table. That is, many workers prefer to have cash in hand now rather than to build credits 
toward their retirement benefits. There are at least five reasons for this choice. One 
reason would be the lack of permission to work in the U.S., that is, being an 
undocumented worker. In years past, some undocumented workers were glad to have 
taxes withheld – even though they were not going to receive the money back as a tax 
refund -  because this provided necessary work documentation to bolster amnesty 
applications (Mendez, 1998). However, due to the ever-tighter scrutiny of foreigners, 
which includes more vigorous enforcement of employers’ verification processes, 
undocumented workers are now less likely to work on the books.  
 Although low-income taxpayers either owe nothing, or qualify for the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, the prospect of being liable for income taxes can be an additional 
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disincentive. Paying into the Social Security system is inseparable from having one’s 
wages reported for income tax purposes. In other words, payroll taxes are yoked to 
income taxes. There is no way to build up credit towards retirement without 
acknowledging that these wages are taxable income. Whether or not a person chooses to 
have income taxes withheld from their wages, payroll taxes are withheld, and the 
employer duly reports those wages to the Social Security Administration on a W-3 form 
as well as to the IRS. Through a process of matching Social Security numbers and 
Federal Employer Identification Numbers, the IRS and the Social Security 
Administration ensure that they have the same wage information for each employee. 
Therefore, the decision-maker choosing between working under the table or on the 
books faces not only the payroll taxes which promise future benefit, but also the 
prospect of income taxes, which do not.  
 A third issue is that of time preference.6 How steeply an individual discounts 
future income is a subjective, personal question – analogous to risk tolerance, for 
example. The capacity to delay consumption does factor into the employee’s decision to 
work over or under the table, but one also has to respect the impact of severe financial 
need. Employees who have the option of working under the table or on the books face a 
trade-off between cash today and a stream of benefits in the future. That trade-off is 
hard to evaluate properly without a good sense of the importance and value of that 
stream of future benefits. Of course, the future monthly benefit increases with increasing 
income, but it is also determined by the length of time until retirement. Assuming a 
person lives well past retirement age, the trade-off is a good one. However, at the age of 
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25, the cash in hand looks much larger than the future benefit. Of course, this discussion 
rests on the assumption that the Social Security system remains the same going forward. 
 Ignorance of the connection between current income taxes paid and Social 
Security withholdings is a fourth issue. There is no way to accrue credits towards 
eventual Social Security and Medicare benefits without participating in the formal tax 
system. That participation entails payment of federal and state income taxes as well. The 
earning of credits and the owing of regular income taxes are inseparably linked in the 
payroll system. So, paying regular income taxes does automatically help a worker build 
up future benefits. Many workers, of course, do not have a crystal-clear understanding 
of this, but as the great majority of individuals work for companies, their payroll matters 
are handled as a matter of course. This is not the case for those who work in the homes 
of families. 
 A fourth reason for choosing to work on a cash basis is a lack of basic 
knowledge of the tax system. In 2009, an unmarried individual can make $9350 before 
owing any tax; a single parent of one child can make $15,650 and a married parent of 
two can make $26,000. There are tax credits designed to transfer income to low-wage 
workers by being refundable, that is, even if there is no tax liability, this money is comes 
to the individual as a refund check. However, they must file a tax return, and have some 
earned income in the first place, in order to get it. The most important of these, the 
Earned Income Tax Credit or EITC, is a potentially valuable, refundable credit available 
to low-income individuals and families with at least some earned income. The credit 
being refundable means that even if a taxpayer has no tax liability, as is the case at very 
low levels of income, the whole credit will be given to them as a tax refund. Although 
  18
taxpayers with no children qualify for a small amount (currently $438 maximum, 
completely phased out for incomes above $2,880), it is much more valuable for those 
with one child ($2,917 maximum, completely phased out for incomes above $33,995) or 
two children ($4,824 maximum, completely phased out for incomes above $41,646).7  
 At first glance, it seems very worthwhile for those domestic employees with 
children to work ‘on the books’ and file a tax return in order to qualify for the EITC. 
The eligibility rules do not require U.S. citizenship, in fact only six months residency is 
required, (in addition to being 26 years old or above). However, the child or children 
which qualify a taxpayer to be an EITC recipient must be a U.S. citizen, or a resident of 
the U.S., Canada, or Mexico. Even more restrictively, the child must live with the parent 
for more than half the year.8 In this way, migrant domestic workers, even those from 
Mexico whose children remained year-round at home with family, would not be entitled 
to this desirable tax credit. The EITC is essentially an income transfer program 
administered through the tax system, and, as such, its rules are specifically designed to 
target specific categories of people, primarily those who have children living with them, 
and work but do not earn much.  
 Because the EITC is an artifact of the political process that creates tax policy, 
there is a clear slant away from benefiting children living in the home countries of 
foreign workers who are here to earn a living in the U.S. (Ventry, 1999). Migrant 
domestic workers who have their children living at home in their countries of origin 
would not benefit from this credit. However, for those with children here, and for U.S. 
citizens, this would be a good piece of information to share in encouraging workers to 
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make the trade-off of participating in the tax system, or to encourage workers to lobby 
employers for the opportunity to work ‘above the table’.  
 Three other tax credits are available for those who have children who qualify as 
their dependents (by tests involving residency, relationship, support and age). These 
include the dependency exemption of $3650 per child, a Child and Dependent Care 
Credit, a non-refundable Child Tax Credit, and a refundable Additional Child Tax 
Credit. There is certainly a strong case to be made for campaigning to educate low-
income workers about the advantages of filing tax returns, especially if they have 
children (Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, 2006). However, for migrant domestic 
workers from countries other than Mexico, each of these four credits (except the $438 of 
the EITC) disappear if their children do not live in the United States with them. Some 
workers from other countries do not know that they are covered under Social Security 
regardless of nationality, and will receive benefits even if they retire to their country of 
origin as long as they have built up forty quarters of properly taxed wages. (Many 
employers do not know this either.) 
  Employers have a deleterious impact on the Social Security accruals of their 
employees by failing to comply with nanny tax rules. To illustrate the financial 
significance of whether or not an employer pays payroll taxes, consider the projected 
Social Security benefits of six hypothetical minimum-wage workers. Three are retail 
workers, ages 25, 40, and 53, whose payroll taxes will paid until retirement at age 67, 
and three are domestic workers, also ages 25, 40, and 53. The domestic workers will 
only see 9, 11, and 13 years of their wages reported to Social Security because only a 
few of their employers will choose to pay payroll taxes.9 
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 Table 1 and Figure 1 present the projected Social Security monthly benefit for 
each of the six work histories. Notice how for the first set of workers – the workers 
whose payroll taxes were paid – the number of years until retirement drive the benefit 
level. However, for the second set of workers, the reduction in covered years of 
employment significantly diminishes the eventual benefits.10 The worker with only nine 
years of covered employment – regardless of wage level – does not qualify for benefits 
at all.11 
Table 1: Comparison between Social Security Benefits Accruing to Fully-Covered 
and Occasionally-Covered Employment Histories 
  
RETAIL WORKERS 
Hourly 
Wage 
Annual 
Gross 
Salary 
Monthly 
Gross 
Salary 
Current 
Age 
Years 
Payroll 
Tax 
Paid 
on Job 
Projected 
Social 
Security 
Monthly 
Benefit 
$6.55 $13,624 
$1,135 
25 
years 
42 
$796 
$6.55 $13,624 
$1,135 
40 
years 
43 
$814 
$6.55 $13,624 
$1,135 
53 
years 
43 
$1,105 
DOMESTIC WORKERS 
Hourly 
Wage 
Annual 
Gross 
Salary 
Monthly 
Gross 
Salary 
Current 
Age 
Years 
Payroll 
Tax 
Paid 
on Job 
Projected 
Social 
Security 
Monthly 
Benefit 
$6.55 $13,624 
$1,135 
25 
years 
13 
$429 
$6.55 $13,624 
$1,135 
40 
years 
11 
$347 
$6.55 $13,624 
$1,135 
53 
years 
9 
$1 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Social Security Benefits of Hypothetical Work Histories 
 
 As mentioned earlier, Medicare eligibility is tied to Social Security work credits. 
An additional benefit of building up work credits is eligibility for Social Security 
Disability Insurance payments; the rules require that a person have worked for at least 
five of the last ten years. Unemployment benefits also depend on properly reported 
wages. These benefits are calculated on the basis of recent quarterly gross wages. 
Replacement rates and duration vary from state to state, usually reflecting that state’s 
overall political stance towards labor. Table 2 presents a comparison three wage levels 
and the weekly and total values of unemployment insurance benefits, using the state of 
Virginia as an example. Virginia normally provides twenty-six weeks of unemployment 
benefits, which range from $54 to $378 per week.12   
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Table 2: Virginia State Unemployment Benefits, 2009 
 
Annual 
Gross 
Salary 
Weekly 
Gross 
Salary 
Weekly 
Benefit 
Weeks Total 
Value of 
Benefits 
$14,400 $200 $103 26 $2,678 
$16,640 $320 $166 26 $4,316 
$22,880 $440 $228 26 $5,928 
Figures from Virginia Employment Commission, 2009 
 
 Ensuring eligibility for Social Security benefits is especially important for 
female retirees (see Table 3). Older women are more likely to live in poverty than are 
older men. The most recent CPS figures (released in 2008) show that the overall U.S. 
poverty rate is 12.5%.13 For those over 65, the rate drops to 9.7%, indicating that for 
men and women overall, the elderly experience greater income security. However, while 
the male over-65 poverty rate is 6.6%, the female over-65 poverty rate is 12.0%. For 
Asian women, the overall poverty rate is 10.7%. This rises to 12.4% and 15.4% in the 
over-65 and over-75 population. For African-American women, the overall poverty rate 
is 26.5%. This also rises in the older age categories. In contrast, white, African-
American, and Hispanic men all have reduced poverty rates as they get older. Although 
figures are not broken out by gender and race, the poverty rate for all those over 65 born 
outside the United States is 20.4 percent. Extrapolating from the information above, the 
female and of-color poverty rates for those born outside the United States are quite 
likely higher. Hence, those most likely to perform domestic labor are also in the greatest 
jeopardy of income insecurity in old age. 
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Table 3: Women’s Disadvantage with Respect to Poverty and Age, 2009. 
 
Race and 
Ethnicity 
      Women of 
All Ages 
Women Over 
Age 65 
Women Over 
Age 75 
All 13.8% 12.0% 13.2% 
African-
American 
26.5% 27.3% 29.2% 
Hispanic 23.6% 20.0% 21.2% 
White 11.6% 10.2% 11.6% 
Asian 10.7% 12.4% 15.4% 
Race and 
Ethnicity 
           Men of 
All Ages 
     Men Over 
Age 65 
    Men Over 
Age 75 
All 11.1% 6.6% 6.7% 
African-
American 
22.3% 16.8% 11.0% 
Hispanic 19.6% 13.3% 13.6% 
White 9.4% 5.4% 6.1% 
Asian 9.7% 9.9% 12.0% 
Figures from 2007 Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
 
 Finally, although there are significant benefits to being a taxpaying domestic 
worker, many if not most informally hired household workers prefer to be paid under 
the table, receiving higher upfront wages as a direct result. There are no statistics on the 
percentage of domestic workers preferring to work off the books. Simple preference in 
addition to unfamiliarity with the trade-off they are making certainly plays a role. 
However, employers of household labor bear final responsibility for their own tax 
evasion. Because they are less exposed to regulation and scrutiny than ordinary 
businesses, they often ignore their legal responsibilities. Domestic workers often have 
few other job choices. Domestic workers wanting coverage unfairly face a pool of 
prospective employers who quite often sidestep the payroll tax ordeal. The interview 
  24
research in this dissertation confronts the puzzle of why they sidestep it. Are there 
motives beyond stinginess and laziness? Aren’t employers affected by social norms of 
noncompliance? What about misguided altruism helped along by ignorance of tax and  
Social Security rules? 
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ small summary of the nature and employment 
outlook for the private household industry calculates an average annual growth rate 
from 1996 to 2006 of 0.8%, with modest growth predicted for the next decade. The 
summary also states, “Government regulation of the workplace makes the use of 
household workers expensive, relative to hiring specialized firms.” It might more 
plainly have said,  “Government regulation of the household as a workplace makes 
hiring individuals and paying their payroll taxes expensive, relative to ignoring all labor 
laws and evading nanny taxes.”  
1.5 Official Labor Statistics on Household Employees in the U.S14 
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)  compiles the National Employment 
Matrix (NEM) from two establishment-based surveys, the Occupational Employment 
Statistics (OES) and the Current Employment Statistics (CES), as well as from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), the Bureau of the Census’ household-based survey.15 
Neither the OES nor the CES count household workers. Therefore, the household 
worker data must come entirely from CPS data, making the data itself no different from 
the data underlying the Household Data Annual Averages (HDAA)  tables the BLS 
publishes. However, the NEM reports in much finer detail occupationally and does not 
round by thousands as does the HDAA.  
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 By taking into account the overlaps and gaps between these data collection 
efforts, the constructors of the NEM aim to derive total employment. The NEM is based 
on the 2000 Standard Occupational Classification system and the 2002 North American 
Industry Classification System. The BLS and other government labor statisticians 
distinguish between an occupation, “a set of activities or tasks that employees are paid 
to perform” e.g., salesperson or driver industry, and an industry, “a group of 
establishments that produce similar products or provide similar services.” e.g., 
manufacturing or forestry.16 The NEM is called a matrix because employment numbers 
for each of the 300 NAICS-listed industries are broken out by each of the 700 possible 
SOC-listed occupations, for a potential 210,000-cell matrix. The main purpose of the 
National Employment Matrix is to inform the BLS Occupational Outlook report. Of 
course, many cells are blank and some have fewer than fifty workers, in which case 
those numbers are not made public.  
 The NEM data were the most detailed aggregation of  available sources of 
government data. The NEM allows us to examine employment in the industry known as 
Private Households, at the finest level of detail. This industry, number 814000, had a 
total of 888,868 workers in 2006, which represents 0.6% of the U.S. workforce. What 
can we learn from most recent NEM? For one thing, we can see the relative sizes of the 
occupations making up this industry. Although all five major occupational sectors are 
represented, the service sector is by far the largest at 96.31%. The second largest sector, 
at 1.61%, is production, transportation, and materials moving. Table 4 shows the 
distribution of workers among these five sectors. 
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Table 4: Major Occupational Sectors in the Private Household Workforce, 2006 
 
Sector Workers Percentage 
Private Household Industry - All Sectors  888,863 100.00% 
Service Occupations 855,862 96.31% 
Production, Transportation, and Material 
Moving Occupations 14,265 1.61% 
Management, Professional, and Related 
Occupations 8,016 0.90% 
Sales and Office Occupations 5,866 0.66% 
Natural Resources, Construction, and 
Maintenance Occupations 5,059 0.57% 
Compiled from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2006 National Employment Matrix 
 
 Roughly half of the workers counted in the private household industry are maids, 
a third are child care workers, and an eighth are personal and home care aides. Table 5 
shows worker counts for the four largest occupations in the private household industry. 
As we would expect, these are all service sector occupations.  
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Table 5: Occupations Representing at Least 1% of  
All Private Household Industry Workers, 2006 
 
Occupations With At Least 1% of 
Workers 
Number of 
Workers in 
Occupation 
Percentage of 
Private 
Household 
Workforce 
Maids and Housekeeping Cleaners 424,699 47.78% 
Child Care Workers 271,101 30.49% 
Personal and Home Care Aides 110,254 12.40% 
Grounds Maintenance Workers 14,602 1.64% 
Totals for These Occupations 820,656 92.33% 
Compiled from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2006 National Employment Matrix 
 
 There are many more occupations, but all the rest comprise less than 1% of the 
total. Table 6 shows the figures for fourteen of the other Private Household industry 
occupations listed in the most recent National Employment Matrix. These occupations  
include occupations commonly associated with household labor: nurses aides, 
chauffeurs, home health aides (as distinct from home care aides), and cooks. These 
occupations also include such professional occupations as accountant, teacher, and 
lawyer. Examining this table illustrates the diversity of household labor while 
reinforcing the main point: almost all household labor performs service occupations.  
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Table 6: Selected Occupations Representing Under 1% of  
Private Household Industry’s Total Workforce, 2006  
 
Occupations With Under 
1% of Workers 
Number of 
Workers in 
Occupation 
Percentage of 
Private 
Household 
Workforce 
Laborers and Material 
Movers, Hand 8,007 0.90% 
Nursing Aides, Orderlies 
and Attendants 7,621 0.86% 
Taxi Drivers and 
Chauffeurs 3,764 0.42% 
Home Health Aides 3,268 0.37% 
Cooks and Food Prep 
Workers 2,906 0.33% 
Registered Nurses 1,832 0.21% 
Painters and Paperhangers 1,650 0.19% 
Licensed Practical and 
Licensed Vocational 
Nurses 1,355 0.15% 
Nonfarm Animal 
Caretakers 1,192 0.13% 
Food and Beverage 
Serving Workers 1,109 0.12% 
Captains, Mates, and 
Pilots of Water Vessels 658 0.07% 
Lawyers 415 0.05% 
Teachers and Instructors 379 0.04% 
Accountants and Auditors 113 0.01% 
Totals for These 
Occupations 34,269 3.86% 
Compiled from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2006 National Employment Matrix 
 
 The figures above establish that professional jobs are a tiny fraction of the 
household workforce. Most individuals hired by households are performing traditionally 
female, difficult, often tedious work. This work, statistics indicate, is very likely to 
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include one or more of the following: providing personal care to those who cannot do 
these things for themselves, doing a family’s laundry, dishes, and bathroom cleaning, 
and/or shouldering the exhausting, often round-the-clock responsibility for small 
children. 
 In sum, the service sector dwarfs the other four sectors, which comprise only 
7.7% of the occupations performed in the Private Household industry. Four occupations 
account for 92.3% of the workers. In declining order, these are the occupations of maid, 
childcare worker, home or personal care aide, and grounds maintenance worker. Despite 
the fact that other interesting occupations are represented in the industry, such as 
nonfarm animal caretakers and pilots of water vessels, these figures plainly indicate that 
almost all household employees are doing low-status, poorly paid jobs. Although 
included in the media stereotype of staff within an affluent household, such workers as 
drivers, butlers, nurses and tutors each represent less than 1% of the total.  
 The NEM does not have either gender or racial composition data. When a 
specific industry such as Private Household, 814000, is broken down into specific 
occupations, such as those seen above, there is neither gender nor racial/ethnic 
composition data available. The 2000 Census is nearly ten years out of date but does 
provide this information at the six-digit (814000) industry level. The American 
Community Survey has gender composition information but not racial composition at 
the level of Private Industry. (All of these figures are national, as is the IRS data 
examined in Chapters 4 and 5. Analysis of the geographic concentration of domestic 
labor is beyond the scope of this dissertation.) 
  30
1.6 The Compliance Rate and the Odds of Being Caught 
 In 2001, the IRS collected $1.767 trillion dollars in taxes. According to their best 
estimates, which are based not only on ordinary audits but also on extensive research, 
this was close to 84% of what was owed.17 They make this calculation based on 
sophisticated tabulations of the expected filing rates for most types of taxes.  
 It is important to explain the difference between the filing rate and the 
compliance rate. The filing rate refers to the percentage of all tax filers who file a 
certain form, such as the Schedule H. Filing rates for various specific types of taxes 
(capital gains, self-employment, e.g.) are calculated in relation to the overall number of 
tax returns filed. It is expressed in number of returns with that specific tax per 100,000 
returns filed. The compliance rate is the percentage of taxpayers owing a certain kind of 
tax who actually file those taxes. Tax compliance rates are calculated by dividing the 
number of people who paid a certain tax with the number that receive that kind of 
income. In many instances of a specific tax, we know this with near certainty. Using 
third-party reporting records, the IRS can estimate, for example, the rate at which 
taxpayers comply with taxes on bank interest. Estimated compliance rates are developed 
by the IRS based on large, national programs involving auditing. Neither the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program, nor the Market Segment Specialization Program 
which replaced it in the 1990s, nor the National Research Program of recent years, has 
produced estimates of nanny tax compliance.. There are no published estimates of the 
household employment tax compliance rate, neither by the IRS, nor in academic tax 
studies.  
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 The rate of nanny tax compliance remains  a mystery. We know that any 
household employer paying more than $1600 to an employee in any year absolutely 
owes household employment taxes. Although we can know the numerator of this ratio 
with complete accuracy, we do not know how many U.S. households employ people, 
therefore, we cannot calculate the compliance rate. There is no way to determine how 
many households employ household help. The regular Census surveys, the more 
frequent American Community Surveys, and Bureau of Labor Statistics figures conflate 
household employees, independent contractors and those work for an agency.18 Their 
figures are by occupation (childcare, housecleaning, home health care, etc.) rather than 
by form of employment. Furthermore, because so many undocumented workers perform 
domestic work, official figures significantly underestimate the number of individuals 
working for households.  
 The odds of a household employment tax evading taxpayer being audited are 
extremely low. To begin with, only 0.15% of all filed returns are audited every year.19 
However, this figure includes those who filed the simplest tax form, the 1040-EZ, which 
is not of as much interest to IRS auditors as the other two forms, 1040A (the ‘short 
form’) and 1040 (the ‘long form’). The reason for this is that 1040-EZ users have very 
little opportunity to mislead the IRS given the few opportunities for deductions on that 
form. Those who file a 1040-EZ are not itemizing any deductions and – besides 
understating their income – are not able to fool the IRS any further, i.e., with false 
deductions. Therefore, a better estimate of nanny tax filers’ audit probability is the audit 
rate for all 1040A’s and 1040’s. The IRS increases scrutiny as income rises. In 2003, the 
most recent year for which data were available, the IRS audited 0.09% of all 1040 and 
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1040A returns between $50,000 and  $75,000; they audited 0.14% of such returns 
between $75,000 and $100,000, and 0.35% of these returns over $100,000. Not only are 
the audit rates low: they are declining. In 1992, the over-$100,000 audit rate was 2.9%, 
in 1995 it was 1.53%, in 2000 it was 0.47%, and in 2004, as noted above, it was 
0.35%.20 In considering the case of the evading household employer, we must add to the 
statistically low probability of being audited the empirical unlikelihood of an auditor 
finding out about an off-the-books employee while doing an audit. A cash-paid 
employee does not leave a paper trail for even an extensive audit.  
 The fact that an employee may have more than one household employer does not 
obviate the employer’s liability to pay household employment taxes. That is, having 
more than one household employer does not automatically make that employee an 
“independent contractor” and thus exempt from the nanny tax. There is a common 
household employer misconception that their employee is actually an independent 
contractor and as such is responsible for both halves of the payroll tax. Someone who 
engages an independent contractor is only responsible for giving them a copy of the 
year-end summary of wages paid – a Form 1099 – that they file with the IRS. The 
employer files a 1099 to inform the IRS that wages have been paid to the independent 
contractor and signals that self-employment taxes are owed by the independent 
contractor. In other words, the employer of an independent contractor is paying them 
under the table unless they file a 1099 and give that employee a 1099 at year’s end in 
lieu of a W-2 form. However, the employer is not responsible for paying any payroll 
taxes because the independent contractor is not their employee but rather a vendor or 
business owner. A person doing household work is an employee if the employer 
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retained control over the work that was done and how the work would be done. The 
federal guideline from the Household Employers’ Handbook is: 
You have a household employee if you hired someone to do household 
work and that worker is your employee. The worker is your employee if 
you can control not only what work is done, but how it is done….If only 
the worker can control how the work is done, the worker is not your 
employee but is self-employed (2008: 2) (Italics mine)  
 
Under the heading “Who is an Independent Contractor?” The Virginia Employment 
Commission’s Employer Handbook states:  
Some employers consider certain individuals who perform work for them as 
independent contractors, and not as employees. Under the Act, however, this 
may not be the case. Employment usually means service performed for 
remuneration or under any contract for hire – written, oral, expressed, or implied 
unless: (a) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or 
direction over the performance of service under his/her contract, and (b) …the 
individual, in the performance of such service is, engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession, or business. 60.2-212 …The right of 
control includes not only the power to specify the result to be accomplished, but 
must include the power over the performance of such services. If the party for 
whom the work is to be done has the power to direct the means and methods by 
which the other does the work, an employer-employee relationship exists (2008: 
2) 
1.7 Summary of Chapters 
 Chapter 2 reviews the extensive literature on general tax compliance in order to 
place this first exploratory study of nanny tax compliance motives in economic context. 
No other kind of tax evasion is like this one – for example, one’s evasion directly 
impacts another party. I also review recent literature on domestic workers and the 
slippery slope of having a private home function as a workplace. I focus on migrant 
workers from the Philippines as my sample of employees are thirty Filipina nannies and 
housekeepers. Chapter 3 describes my ethnographic approach and addresses some of the 
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issues raised in studying such a sensitive topic. Chapter 4 uses the best available IRS 
data on over 200,000 nanny tax returns from 2006 to establish what kinds of households 
are paying the tax and examines the distributions of tax and wages amounts. The chapter 
also examines pre- and post-audit information on a large IRS sample of income tax 
filers, yielding the surprising fact that while the weighted sample indicates about $12 
million of unpaid or underpaid nanny taxes, there were roughly $11 million of nanny tax 
paid that was not owed. I combine CPS and BLS data with the (ever-declining) nanny 
tax counts over the last ten years in order to estimate household payroll tax evasion rates 
in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the employer interview research results followed by the 
employee interview results. Both sections of material are organized by themes which 
emerged during the interviews. Chapter 7 analyzes this material keeping the traditional 
tax compliance model in mind. I also present a force-field analytic way of examining 
compliance decisions which encompasses the conflicts between motives. Complexity, 
ignorance, irresponsibility and altruism, among other motives, emerge as important 
compliance drivers. Chapter 8 brings together the implications of interview results, 
ethnographic analysis, and what could be extracted from available IRS data. These 
conclusions suggest some policy recommendations to increase compliance by making it 
harder to evade this tax, making it easier for the honest and willing employer to pay the 
tax and to help the affected workers achieve the benefits of full employer payment of 
their Social Security taxes. 
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Notes 
 
1
 This study uses the two terms nanny taxes and household payroll taxes 
interchangeably. 
 
2
 Zoë Baird was the first person to be pilloried in the public arena for failing to 
pay nanny taxes. Investigations during her 1993 Senate confirmation hearings to be 
Clinton’s Attorney General turned up this omission; the accusation was perceived by 
some as cynical posturing, but it ushered in a new era of compliance among the 
politically hopeful. Before this, it was probably the rare male candidate who happened 
to pay his nanny taxes, so it was especially bitter for feminists to see this happen. In 
California, a gubernatorial candidate and a Senate candidate were soon after forced to 
end their races. Most recently, job candidates in the Obama administration have been 
plagued with unpaid household employment taxes. 
 
3
 Medicare Part B (Medical Insurance) works differently. Everyone is eligible 
regardless of work history and pays a monthly premium ranging from $96.40 to 
$238.40, depending on income.  
 
4
 As detailed in Appendix 5, due to sample size limitations, neither ACS nor 
CPS data on racial composition is available at the level of detailed industry, making 
2000 Census figures the only source for this information. 
 
5
 A schedule is a special tax form that reports a certain type of income, 
deduction, credit, or tax liability. Examples include Schedule B, Itemized Deductions, 
and Schedule SE, Self-Employment Tax. These schedules accompany a taxpayer’s 
Form 1040. 
 
6
 Time preference is a subjective concept that varies with the individual. It is 
distinct from the objective concept of present discounted value in which only the 
prevailing interest rate and length of time delay determine the value to the individual.  
 
7
 IRS. 2008. Publication 17. 
 
8
 Ibid. 
 
9
 The hypothetical work histories are not related to the research results. The 
figures assume full-time, year-round work. A person earning the Federal minimum 
hourly wage, $6.55 in 2009, working full-time, year-round, earns $13,624 yearly; an 
hourly wage of $8.00 earns $16,640; an hourly wage of $11.00 earns $22,880. 
 
10
 Amounts are calculated on the SSA online benefit calculator (long version); 
see Appendix 1. Figures are rounded to whole dollars. 
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11
 Of course, those familiar with the OASDI and SSI programs will remark that 
Supplemental Security Income provides an income floor for those whose Social Security 
earnings are too low to qualify them for retirement benefits. In 2009, the minimum 
benefit is $674. 
 
12
 www.vec.virginia.gov/vecportal/unins/handbook.cfm 
 
13
 www.census.gov. Latest figures available are for 2005, weighting updated in 
2006. 
 
14
 See Chapter 4A, Estimating Household Employment Payroll Tax Evasion in 
the U.S., 1996 – 2006. for additional information on these statistics. 
 
15
 Its full title is  “National Employment Matrix, employment by industry, 
occupation, and percent distribution, 2006 and projected 2016.” It is a biennial 
publication.  
 
16
 www.bls.gov 
 
17
 Mazur and Plumley (2008).  
 
18
 www.census.gov. 
 
19
 www.trac.syr.edu. 
 
20
 www.trac.syr.edu. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT 
AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
 A review of the literature on domestic employment and the literature on tax 
compliance demonstrates the need for a study at the intersection of these two subfields. I 
review scholarship on paid domestic labor, which reflects the increasing volume of 
transnational labor flows. I focus on the uniquely vulnerable position of the household 
employee and the peculiar features of the employee-employer relationship when situated 
in a private household. I also visit the issue of American welfare state development and 
its centerpiece, the Social Security system, in terms of valuing paid domestic work on a 
par with other occupations. Tax compliance studies are almost exclusively quantitative 
and focus on the standard elements of taxpayer income, tax and penalty size, and audit 
risk. I present an overview of the basic model and its history to provide context for my 
proposed extensions. I also touch on  selected aspects of behavioral economics, which 
concern motivations for household allocation decisions.  
2.2 Migrant Domestic Workers 
 Much has been written about migrant domestic workers and their vulnerability to 
mistreatment. Studies of the private household employment of migrants focus on the 
problems of these workers (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994, 2003); Wrigley, 1999; Hagan, 
1998). Hondagneu-Sotelo immersed herself in the lives and the organizing efforts of 
mainly Latina domestic workers in the Los Angeles area, performed detailed interviews 
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with them and with employers as well. Her intensive ethnography paints a picture of the 
suffering and the dignity of the nannies and housekeepers, the beginnings of partially 
successful organizing efforts among them, and of the obtuseness, insensitivity, 
condescension, and denial of their employers. She points to the need for further research 
on employers. 
 Private employment relationships, even compared with others in the informal 
sector, are especially unequal and emotionally fraught. Wrigley points to the 
combination of “daily household intimacy with enormous class differences between 
employers and employees” (1999, p.169) as causes. Nannies’ payroll taxes are paid by 
amateurs who lack  assistance or oversight because the home is a private, unregulated 
workspace. The risks  of the private employment relationship include being cheated out 
of already low pay, privacy invasion, extreme workloads, and extreme hours. Private 
household employment for the care of children often ends when the child reaches school 
age. In some situations, parents may employ a nanny until the children are grown. 
Nevertheless at the end of every job the nanny not only must find new employment but 
also carries no benefits to the new position in terms of wages or other favorable benefits 
of the old job (Wrigley, 1999). Migrant domestic workers are especially vulnerable to 
physical and sexual abuse in countries such as Hong Kong and Canada that allow for 
specialized contract workers who have few rights and are especially vulnerable to their 
employers. They seldom enjoy assistance from the government of their home countries 
if things go badly for them abroad. (Gibson, et al., 2001; Parreñas, 2000, 2001a; Pratt, 
2004; Constable, 1997). There are also struggles over citizenship rights, both in terms of 
permanent second-class citizen status and when an attractive opportunity to gain 
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citizenship is tied as a carrot to successful completion of demanding contracts (Stasiulis 
and Bakan, 1997). 
 One important result researchers have found when investigating the household 
employer-employee relationship is that women usually hire, manage, and fire the 
employee because she is framed as replacing the woman rather the man. Hondagneu-
Sotelo (1994) writes that the personalization of the relationship between the private 
employer and employee is very stressful for the worker as well as inherently oppressive. 
In addition, in interviews, nannies and housekeepers report again and again that they 
know from their own and others’ hard-won experience not to transact with men in the 
household. They face problems ranging from unwanted sexual attention to assault from 
the men, and sexual jealousy from the women (Constable, 1997; Wrigley, 1999; Pratt, 
2004; Parreñas, 2000). Pratt’s (2004) study of Filipina nannies in Vancouver found 
“considerable psychic investment in the stereotyping of nannies”. She hypothesizes that 
this devaluation comes from, among others things, maternal guilt. 
 Meagher (1997) and Mendez (1998) each studied household service agencies, 
the former in Australia and the latter in the United States. Meagher interviewed 
housecleaners who were successfully improving the stigmatized status of this type of 
labor by proactively inserting notions of skill and professionalism into the employer-
employee relationship. Often it was men who were accomplishing this, and after 
“professionalizing” they would become brokers (Merry Maids, e.g.) who employed 
women as cleaners and reaped a profit. Mendez studied such household service agencies 
to determine whether exploitation of housecleaners decreased when the informal sector 
employer/employee relationship was replaced by a bureaucratic one involving a profit-
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taking franchisee. Her results were mixed; in fact, some reported trying to mitigate the 
financial downside of working for a cleaning company by trying to connect personally 
with the homeowner. 
 Studies that  focus on the  globalization of this labor force document the 
suffering of the mothers estranged from their children and the suffering of their children 
who thereby become more vulnerable to mistreatment at home (Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild, 2002; Pratt, 1997a, 1997b, 2004; Parreñas, 2000, 2005). Parreñas, who 
interviewed Filipina domestic workers in Rome and in Los Angeles, draws attention to 
both the racial and the international division of labor. That is to say, she discusses and 
documents the phenomenon of women of color disproportionately performing 
housecleaning and child care work the world over. A similar disproportion exists by 
county, in that migrants from poorer countries disproportionately perform low-paid 
work of this kind in the employ of citizens in richer countries. Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild (2002) write about the transnational flow of caring labor caused partly by 
First World women working in greater numbers, which creates a caring labor deficit in 
their homes, which then causes a caring labor deficit in the Third World countries. 
Ehrenreich’s term “global chain of care” captures the irony and misfortune of third-
world children going without mothering so that their mothers can earn money providing 
first-world children with high-quality, individual child care. As a direct result, the 
workers’ third-world children receive scanty, poorly-paid child-care or none at all. 
Although migrant domestic workers get away from male oppression at home and can 
make good money thus giving their children a better life, they miss their children, and 
their children miss out on their protection and nurturing.  
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 From a feminist standpoint, gender inequality is evident in this situation. The 
availability of third-world women’s labor enables some affluent first-world men to 
continue doing less than their fair share of housework and child care; gender norms 
about these responsibilities go unchallenged. From a class standpoint, privilege operates 
to enable some first-world women to ‘buy out’ of some of their gender oppression by 
hiring such workers (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Wrigley, 1999). Wrigley taped 155 
interviews with both employers and employees in San Francisco in order to explore 
class differences between the pairs of women. She argues that in the United States 
women are not making a unified demand for universal daycare precisely because of the 
existence of this migrant labor pool providing  private child-care to those who can 
afford it. 
 Some of the literature focuses on networks and resistance. Anderson (2000) 
gives a detailed account of the horrors of being a migrant domestic worker in the UK at 
the mercy of foreign residents unbound by even the poor protections afforded the 
employees of UK citizens. She also describes the successful organizing in the 1980s of 
Filipinas into a mutual help organization called Waling Waling and its lobbying for 
passage of employment protection legislation. Another organization, Kalayaan, grew out 
of Waling Waling, targeted specifically on helping undocumented workers. Anderson’s 
analysis is class-oriented and focuses on the commodification of domestic work; she is 
part of the third wave of feminist social science analysis referred to by anthropologist 
Aggarwal (2000) among others, the wave that asserts the parity of class and race with 
gender in analyzing the struggles of Third World women.1  
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 Migrant social networks generally provide social, emotional and resource 
support for those who come to host countries for work. Hondagneu-Sotelo’s (1994) 
study of Chicana immigrant domestic workers demonstrates ways in which their social 
network was a significant resource to them as they attempted to solve problems with 
employers. On the other hand, Hagan’s (1998) study of Mayan immigrants 
demonstrated that a network is only as helpful as its economic and social resources; that 
immigrants sometimes exploit one another based on their length of time in the host 
country; that gender matters hugely in the ability of a network to help its members. For 
example, men working in a chain of stores were able to obtain jobs in these stores for 
one another; women, however, were of little use to one another, being isolated in 
household-based employment with no structure to infiltrate for the benefit of the 
network.  
 Those who have extensively interviewed Filipina domestic workers have 
identified many forms of personal and collective resistance. Worldwide, the Tagalog-
language magazines Tinig Pilipino (Filipino Voice) and Diwaliwan provide a forum for 
discussions of the experience of overseas work – the difficulty and loneliness as well as 
the mutual support and self-assertion (Parreñas, 2001b). A remarkable study (Constable, 
1997) of Filipina housekeepers and nannies in Hong Kong reveals their different forms 
of resistance in the face of daunting isolation from the more affluent expatriate Filipina 
community and hostility and sexual jealousy from female Chinese employers. These 
strategies include ‘performative’ large, Sunday gatherings in a Hong Kong public square 
where they dress up and groom one another for relief from forced de-feminization in 
appearance by employers during the week (anecdotes of involuntary haircuts), some 
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even becoming “T-birds” or ‘temporary lesbians.’ This defuses their sexual threat to the 
employer, but increases their rejection by the established Filipino community in Hong 
Kong. 
 Pratt (2004) describes strong and successful political organizing in Vancouver. 
The Philippine Women’s Centre there found that Filipina domestic workers have a 
tendency to identify with the employer’s problems, suppress their own, avoid 
confrontation, frame themselves as “lucky visa holders” or “one of the family”. They 
began to work directly on these issues with consciousness-raising, encouragement and 
role-playing. Campaigns have addressed minimum wage changes and worker protection 
laws. 
 There is also evidence of political organizing in Hong Kong. Gibson, et al., 
(2001) partially refute the globalization victim stereotype of the overseas Filipinas by 
cataloguing resistance and positive self-determined economic action there. Three 
domestic worker unions exist in Hong Kong, including the nation-specific Filipino 
Migrant Workers Union. The Asian Migrant Centre’s ‘Reintegration Programme’ sets 
up savings groups help the women discipline themselves to save more (or allow them to 
set limits with the bottomless demands of wider and wider rings of dependents), then 
pool the capital to invest in assets and enterprises at home.  
 There is a lack of research on the financial problem posed by employers’ 
disregard of the requirement to pay Social Security and Medicare taxes for their 
employees. Although there are more immediate problems facing these workers, in the 
end, they will face the standard problem of elderly female poverty, perhaps exacerbated 
by race and nationality. With the single exception of glancing treatment by Hondagneu-
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Sotelo (2001), compliance with nanny taxes is a neglected topic within the literature on 
transnational care workers. Her concern with these taxes is limited to the issue of the 
extent to which a former employer shares information on treatment of a specific 
employee with the new employer. In fact, focusing on the payoff for domestic workers 
of getting their payroll taxes paid by employers could contribute to organizing efforts. In 
addition, such a focus might tie in well with anti-poverty campaigns to encourage and 
empower low-income workers to file (and thus benefit from) a tax return. 
2.3 The American Welfare State 
 In a way, household employment payroll taxes are a microcosm of the classic 
contract-charity duality described by Fraser and Gordon in their classic 1992 article, 
“Contract vs. Charity: Why Is There No Social Citizenship in the United States?” In 
analyzing why the US is such an under-developed welfare state among industrialized 
countries, Fraser and Gordon describe an American insistence on controlling who gets 
the charity so that means tests and worthiness tests can be applied. They point out that 
historically the U.S. has dealt in private charity rather than in citizenship-based 
entitlements of the sort that T. H. Marshall argued for in his famous essay, “Citizenship 
and Social Class (1950).”2 Nanny tax evasion may be an example of Americans’ 
resistance to paying into a large, impartial system of public provision as they are 
supposed to as household employers. Instead, those who are moved to be generous are 
often generous in a personal way – and in preference to paying nanny taxes. Private 
charity versus public provision is a social welfare theoretical framework into which the 
noncompliant and compliant household employers fall. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey 
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(1990) characterize the American welfare state as “misunderstood.”  The title of 
Jansson’s (2005) social welfare text, “The Reluctant Welfare State,” captures this 
conflict between the system of social provision we have built for ourselves and our 
reluctance to commit fully to funding it.  
2.4 Tax Compliance 
 Tax compliance scholars have not touched on the topic of household 
employment taxes, with the one exception of Bloomquist and An (2006), who focused 
on geographic variation in the incidence of household employment payroll tax 
compliance. My research focuses on who is complying with this tax law, rather than 
where they are located. Recent tax compliance research in economics and related fields 
has investigated a wide array of possible factors in the compliance decision. Major 
themes in this extensive literature include the role of personal ethics and social norms, 
and the role of individual risk analysis. I will begin with a review of the research in 
related fields before covering the pure economic models.  
 Personal ethics and social norms are important determinants of compliance. In 
some studies, ethical position topped both audit probability and penalty level as a 
decisive factor (Keller, 1997). Hardin (2000), a legal ethicist studying taxation, holds 
that the widespread neglect of nanny taxes among otherwise careful and image-
conscious people belies the idea of a generalized norm regarding tax compliance. 
Phillips (1999), however, in experimental work, found strong evidence for the role of 
social consensus guiding compliance choices. Those under the age of 65 are less 
compliant than those over that age (Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg, 1978). Men are 
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less tax-compliant than women (Baldry, 1987). Filing costs – in both time and energy – 
are a significant obstacle facing even the most ethical. Research has evaluated the role 
of the burden of filing; there is evidence for complexity as a factor in noncompliance 
(Mahfar, 1994; Blackwell, 2000) as well as evidence against (Newell, 1995).  
 The power of social norms and of social networks is clear in the results of 
Plumley (1996). This study found that for each additional person audited at the margin, 
up to eleven additional taxpayers are deterred from evading through a ripple effect. 
Plumley’s study also found a significant role for tax preparation assistance and IRS 
communications in reducing evasion.  
 Hondagneu-Sotelo’s (2001) study of employers makes little mention of 
employment taxes, but does include this telling anecdote. A female employer’s attorney 
husband was told point-blank by a judge at a dinner party to file nanny taxes: “[T]hat 
was a conversation between Barry and him. So I didn’t really have anything to do with 
it.” In other words, the employer only began to file nanny taxes at the strong suggestion 
of a judge in a social setting. A nanny employment agency owner’s memoir also 
supports my contention that decisions about nanny taxes reflect many influences. For 
example,  social norms  experienced overseas may deter tax compliance. Barbara Klein 
(2005), the owner of a Washington nanny agency, writes, “Not every client wants to pay 
fair wages, especially Foreign Service, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund 
employees who’ve lived overseas. Clients who had ten (count’em) docile servants do 
everything for them in Thailand are shocked to learn that one Washington nanny costs 
what they paid their entire staff in Bangkok” (2005:20). Some employers who have 
experienced the labor markets in such countries will have resistance to wage levels in 
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the United States. By extension, they likely have resistance to the time and effort 
required to file payroll taxes as well as the additional money costs they impose.  
 Spouses may well disagree about tax compliance. Who gets to decide and what 
factors influence this? There may be a disagreement between the male and the female 
employer regarding the compliance decision. Perhaps women are more risk-averse than 
men making them more likely to file. There is a good deal of literature supporting the 
claim that women are more risk-averse.3 To hypothesize based on the work of Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993) and Pollak (2005), the financial power differential between the 
spouses may play a role. These authors, among others, attack theoretically (with 
subsequent empirical support) the idea that households make decisions without regard 
to the likely imbalance of earning power between the spouses. This supports looking for 
possible gender connections to tax compliance behavior. Perhaps women are more 
likely to empathize with the need for income security in old age due to women’s greater 
life expectancy and lower average economic well-being. This might predispose them 
towards compliance, in comparison with their husbands. On the other hand, since many 
wives have responsibility for everything regarding the household help, including hiring, 
managing, firing, paying and keeping salary records, a woman might be less motivated 
than her husband to go to the effort of doing it. There is no way of investigating these 
issues with tax return data alone.  
 Some studies show that individuals adapt their current year tax compliance 
behavior to the results they received from past filings, for example an audit or a 
successful evasion of tax (Spicer and Hero, 1984; Webley, 1987). On the other hand, 
Long and Schwartz (1987) and Engel and Hines (1994) found evidence to the contrary. 
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Several studies have investigated the role of different types and even the tone of a 
communication from the IRS. Forest (2000) found that it made a difference whether the 
taxpayer received (prior to deciding whether to cheat) a threatening communication, a 
genial, persuasive communication or no communication at all. An experimental research 
study investigated the effects of two types of IRS communications on taxpayers: 
“communication of legal sanctions” vs. “an appeal to conscience” with either type 
written positively or negatively (Hasseldine, 1997). Although both types were deemed 
effective, the second was more effective overall. Interestingly, Hasseldine found 
differences by gender in response to positive or negative tone. There is also evidence 
(Mahfar, 1994; Plumley, 1996) that when specific types of taxpayers are targeted by IRS 
communications, compliance increases.  
 Another important factor is detection probability. One especially important 
detection method the IRS possesses is information reporting: the practice of third-party 
delivery to the IRS of data on taxes owed, e.g., the W-2 wage statement forms submitted 
by employers or Form-1099 interest income statements submitted by banks. This 
information matching deters underreporting of income. Long and Swingden (1990) 
found that the introduction of information reporting on specific line items substantially 
reduced evasion. Employees report 98.5 percent of their income when that income is 
separately reported by employers to the IRS on W-2 Forms (IRS, 2005). In fact, recent 
IRS research found a 99% compliance rate for amounts subject to substantial 
information reporting and withholding; a 95% compliance rate for amounts subject to 
substantial information reporting alone; a 91% rate for amounts subject to some 
information reporting; and a 46% compliance rate for amounts subject to little or no 
  49
information reporting (Bloomquist, Plumley, and Toder, 2004; Mazur and Plumley, 
2007). My research concerns only payroll taxes, not income taxes. However, since there 
is no third-party information reporting in the case of nanny taxes, I hypothesize that the 
household payroll tax is solidly in this category of taxes at highest risk for tax evasion. 
The IRS has no mechanism for learning through a third party that some tax is owed; 
employers in this study appeared to respond to the lack of oversight with the evasion 
predicted by the accountability-spectrum categories above. 
 Clearly individuals – and corporations – weigh numerous factors when 
evaluating how risky would it be to practice tax evasion. Some of the factors influencing 
the decision in a given year include: whether or not they expect a refund, whether or not 
they were audited last year, whether someone they know was audited last year, and 
whether the IRS has contacted them recently. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) describe 
individuals’ non-rational choices under uncertainty using prospect theory. Prospect 
theory predicts what level of risk individuals are comfortable with as they confront 
various future scenarios. The scenarios range from prospective gains to prospective 
losses. Individuals will choose behaviors or make choices that lie along a spectrum from 
risk avoidance (e.g., not investing in the stock market) to risk seeking. The theory holds 
that as a scenario moves from a prospective gain to prospective loss, individuals become 
more and more likely to take a risk. For example, prospect theory suggests that those 
who owe money are more likely to cheat than those who are due a refund. That is, the 
loss of money they face influences the riskiness of their behavior whereas someone 
getting a tax refund is predisposed by the existence of that prospective gain to choose 
less risky behavior, that is they are less likely to evade any portion of their taxes. This is 
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clearly not a rational calculation - the tax being a liability or refund simply alters the 
person’s appetite for risk, There is much empirical support for this theory (Chang, 1984; 
Copeland, 1995; Dusenbury, 1989). This  implies that household employers probably 
evade more than the rest of the population because regardless of their own tax liability 
they face the 7.4 percent federal payroll tax amount on a year’s worth of wages paid.4
 I next turn to the specific economic literature addressing tax compliance. Early 
important research (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973) modeled tax 
evasion as a risky asset in a household’s portfolio, with the results of maximizing the 
expected utility function depending heavily on the risk of detection, the tax rate, the 
penalty rate and income. This model applied Becker’s (1968) economics of crime model 
to the decision facing the taxpayer. Becker’s model posited three factors determining an 
individual’s propensity to commit a specified criminal act: the probability of detection, 
the penalty incurred if caught, and the individual’s income level. Applied to the 
taxpayer, it was refined as follows: the probability of detection in an audit, the penalty 
rate, the tax rate, and the level of income. Pencavel (1979) and Cowell (1981) improved 
the realism of the simple model by assuming that labor supply was endogenous, that is, 
entered the model as a factor itself.  
 Elegant and tractable though they might have been, these early, pre-game 
theoretic models suffered from indeterminacy, that is, empirical testing of them failed to 
produce significant results and changes in one variable could not conclusively predict 
changes in others (Andreoni, 1998). This failure is understandable given how few 
aspects of the tax decision problem they took into account.  
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 Significant problems remain for economists trying to model noncompliance. For 
example, variables that initially seem to be determinants of noncompliance often turn 
out to be proxies for such allowable deductions as those based on age or on mortgages 
(Andreoni, et al., 1998). In addition, the inability of the models to provide either 
theoretically or empirically robust predictions is notable. For example, Clotfelter (1983), 
among others, found that the elasticity of tax evasion rises with the marginal tax rate for 
nine out of ten income classes, while Feldstein (1991) found that it falls. One difference 
between income tax and payroll tax is that income tax rises with income, all else equal, 
whereas the nanny tax itself is not driven by the employer’s income at all; nanny taxes 
are calculated on the total wages paid. Therefore, the employer faces a lump-sum tax 
payment rather than a proportional tax, providing one more reason that nanny tax 
compliance requires a specialized model.  
 The principal-agent game-theoretic models such as those developed by 
Reinganum and Wilde (1985) only worked well when several unrealistic assumptions 
were imposed, for example, that the IRS has a simple, published formula to determine 
whom it will audit. Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986) and Graetz, et al., (1986) built 
several sequential equilibrium models of general tax evasion that take into account the 
impossibility of a taxpayer knowing the audit rate they face. The IRS does change, and 
does not publicize, the frequency with which it audits certain types of returns: for 
example, S corporations, business payroll taxpayers, etc. To date, though, the IRS has 
never made household employer payroll tax an audit focus, which is to say that there is 
no established nanny tax “audit rate” that could be distinguished (and therefore could 
drive compliance) from the ordinary individual income taxpayer audit rate. 
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 How do people learn about detection probability and audit risk? Often it is 
through acquaintances, or more broadly, through perceiving social norms. We know that 
it is not rational to comply with tax laws. The probability of detection is too low to 
impel rational compliance. Yet there is an overall social norm of tax paying in the U.S. 
Computational social scientists have built interesting models of tax compliance that 
seek to transcend analysis of the individual in a vacuum. They aim to capture the effects 
of social networks on the compliance behavior by using linked networks of agents who 
are capable of learning from one another and passing on information about such things 
as audit experiences and penalty levels. As individuals draw lessons not just from their 
own experience but also that of others, it  follows that a low detection rate should have a 
ripple effect among the acquaintances of successful evaders Recent multi-agent based 
simulation research on social networks has shown that when individuals are in networks 
that are smaller, it takes longer for news to travel, but that there is still a point at which 
news will begin to travel effectively (Bloomquist, 2004, 2006; Axtell, Johnson and 
Korobow, 2008).  
 The work of Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2007) on financial aid policy reform 
has relevance for this study. They argue the current application process is flawed in 
ways that skew uptake of student aid away from the intended targets. The central flaw is 
complexity, which then favors those culturally equipped to navigate the long and 
demanding application form. Disadvantaged by this are those whose social cultures and 
norms have not prepared them to do battle with such a process, one that is initially 
intimidating and also requires a student to have completed parental tax forms in hand 
before beginning. These factors caused a surprising amount of failure to complete the 
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form. Analogously, I hypothesize that despite the ultimate feasibility of nanny tax 
compliance, many ordinarily tax compliant people are ultimately defeated by the 
challenge. 
 Noted psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) proposed three stages of moral 
development, based on a progression from concern with punishment to concern with 
social approval to concern only with one’s own core values. This framework provides a 
simple way to categorize the diverse compliance determinants examined in this study. 
Kohlberg’s work has been applied to economic decisions, with feminist updating to 
remove the gender bias critiqued by Gilligan (1982), which demoted compassion-based 
decisions to a level lower than decisions that were based on principles of universal 
fairness rather than on specific-other-based emotional responses. A conflict-based 
model, which privileges the role of altruism, is needed for the analysis of why some 
people pay nanny taxes and some do not. The household is a personal space and one 
whose employees and their management are ordinarily left in the hands of the female 
partner. A recent experimental economics study by Kamas, Preston and Baum (2008) 
demonstrated women’s greater propensity for altruistic decision-making when compared 
with men. Although their work focuses on charitable giving, I would argue that it has 
implications for a tax decision that stands to benefit another person – philanthropy on a 
micro scale.  
 Feminist economists have critiqued the methodological individualism and 
androcentric bias of neoclassical model building in general (Ferber and Nelson, 1993; 
England, 1993; Folbre 1993.). It is to be expected that the general neoclassical model of 
tax compliance might turn out to be insufficient when asked to account for the 
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probability that a taxpayer will pay a tax that affects the good of another human being. 
In The Invisible Heart (2001), Folbre traces the intellectual history of how, in a self-
interest-based free market, women’s supposedly natural altruism was the saving grace. 
As the female complement to male self-interest, it would motivate caregiving, keep the 
household going and temper the market’s effects on men. She argues against a necessary 
sequestering of altruistic behavior within the household and assignment of altruistic 
responsibilities  only to women. Since Becker (1981), economists have spoken of a role 
for altruistic choices on the part of a head-of-household, which can explain away 
gender-based power imbalances in consumption decisions; some have criticized the 
economics profession for allowing Becker’s formulation of household dynamics to 
stand unchallenged for so long (Pollak, 2004). My study of household payroll taxes 
raises the question of whether actors within a household are motivated by altruism 
towards a non-family member. Perhaps the fact that the decision is made from within 
the context of the household alters that decision. Finally, and most closely connected to 
my topic, is a recent study “Geographic Variation in Schedule H Filing Rates: Why 
Should Location Influence the Decision to Report Nanny Taxes?” (Bloomquist and An, 
2006) which is the very first research to make use of IRS data on household employer 
tax returns. For Bloomquist and An, the Schedule H filing rate formed the basis of 
comparison between geographical units as they explored regional differences (see 
Chapter 1 for an explanation of the filing rate as opposed to the compliance rate).  
 The Bloomquist and An study did not find any variables beyond income that 
explained the geographic variation in the household employment tax filing rate. Their 
interpretation: “This is a clear indication that the recent decline in Schedule H filing is 
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linked to a shift away from the employment of household workers by middle and upper-
middle income taxpayers. However, because the data also show filing rates have 
decreased for all income groups, we cannot rule out the possibility that evasion is 
increasing, possibly in relation to the steady influx of undocumented workers entering 
the U.S. (2006: 16).” The size of an undocumented worker population in a given area 
was not a variable used in their study. Certainly, a study of geographic variation over 
time (Bloomquist and An studied 2006 data on all fifty states) would be able to detect 
the effect of a trend towards undocumented employees in such areas as Texas, 
California, Florida and New York on the number of Schedule H’s filed. 
 Their study found that DC, Maryland and Virginia taken together have three 
times the national average of 161 per 100,000 returns, with DC standing alone having a 
rate six times higher. Furthermore, New Jersey and Long Island have below-expected 
filing rates while, as mentioned above, certain small Southern cities have rates higher-
than-expected. (The expected filing rate is based upon per capita income for the area.) 
Bloomquist and An conclude that government employment, the prospect of future high-
profile government jobs, and a higher-than-average legal immigrant population explain 
the higher filing rate in the DC area. They hypothesize that “unique historical and 
cultural factors”  explain the higher filing rate in the certain pockets of the South. 
However, they do not advance an explanation for the lower-than-expected rate in the 
New York City area.  
 My research builds on their work by extending analysis to specific tax 
information contained in the data and more vigorously investigating the profile of a 
compliant household payroll taxpayer. In contrast to Bloomquist and An, who 
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essentially asked why the filing rate varies regionally, my research aims to discover 
what makes an employer decide to file or not file. In other words, what characterizes 
compliant as opposed to noncompliant employers?  The question of what drives the 
aggregate filing rate over time is an issue for a separate study. I was not able to obtain 
individual-level data with which to test the importance of demographic and income 
variables. However, as will be discussed later (in Chapter 4), I was able to obtain 
population data on nanny tax returns as well as excerpts from a dataset on audited 
taxpayers, some of whom were household employers. I was also able to address my 
research questions at length in sixty personal interviews. The next chapter describes the 
methodology used the interview research.  
  57
 
Notes 
 
1
 Second-wave feminist scholars added race as an equally important 
consideration; third-wave feminists make a case for including class and sexual 
orientation as no less important than gender in analyzing the oppression of women 
worldwide.  
 
2
 Fraser and Gordon’s ‘contract vs. charity’ framework is a way of comparing 
social welfare provision on the dimension of the rationale for why people deserve the 
benefits they receive. In some countries, notably England and some European and 
Scandinavian countries, government assistance has historically been the entitlement of 
each citizen. In contrast, the United States has had a tradition of private sector financial 
support of those in need, with public sector financial assistance remaining both residual 
(as opposed to universal) and means-tested (Skocpol, 1990; 1992).  Public support is not 
ordinarily an entitlement but means-tested. (Compare child care in France and the U.S., 
for example.) Although our provision of Social Security benefits is an entitlement, it is 
tied to work history and is unique among transfer payments for being universal. I 
hypothesize that this uniqueness of Social Security among American social programs 
contributes to employer resistance to supporting the Social Security system through their 
mandated employer contribution amounts. Many Americans, especially younger ones, 
seem to feel that they themselves will not need to rely on Social Security – they will 
succeed in building up their personal wealth so that Social Security is actually the safety 
net for other people, not them. Therefore, support for that system is not as widespread 
among younger ages groups as it is among people who are closer in time and in 
economic necessity to relying on those benefits. I hypothesize that these unique features 
of the American welfare system contribute to employer reluctance and resistance to 
participating in their designated role as half-contributors to the public retirement 
pension system.  
 
3
 Palsson (1996), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), and Sundén and Surette 
(1998) exemplify this literature, which finds a gender-based difference, although 
Bajtelsmit and Jiankoplos (2000) found the gap narrowing with time. On the other hand, 
two recent empirical studies, Hibbert (2009) and Hartell (2007), found no gender-based 
difference in risk-aversion. In the first, an examination of financial investment 
decisionmaking found no role for gender in explaining levels of risk-aversion. The 
second study took advantage of a set of pension investment choices presented to the 
entire Swedish population simultaneously to obviate questions of sample 
representativeness and likewise found no evidence of greater female risk-aversion. 
 
4
 This is in addition to other non-federal tax amounts varying by state. 
Furthermore, because they are liable for both the employer and employee contribution, 
unless the employer has properly withheld 7.4% of each paycheck for the employee 
contribution, they effectively pay twice that amount. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY FOR INTERVIEW RESEARCH 
 This  brief chapter provides information on the qualitative methodology 
underlying the study. In the first part of the chapter I discuss the value of a qualitative 
approach to the study of household employment taxation. I then describe how I handled 
recruiting, interviewing, and confidentiality on the sensitive topic of tax evasion. 
Finally, I explain my plan of analysis and acknowledge several limitations of the study.  
3.1 The Case for Using Qualitative Methods in Tax Compliance Research 
 Qualitative methods are especially suited for complex topics involving personal 
interactions and unknown factors. Studying household employer payroll tax compliance 
requires studying relationships and interactions between individuals. It requires studying 
the relations between employer and employee as well as relations within their own 
social networks. For example, among other topics, the interviews focused on how 
employers perceive the influences of their peers and of their employees on their tax 
decisions. The interviews also focused on an employee peer-network, with its shared 
suffering and information exchanges.  
 The complexity of the topic also promotes a qualitative approach. Tax 
compliance is not an all-or-nothing proposition. True, in any given year, a household 
either files or does not. However, employers may underreport the wages they pay. They 
may pay initially then give up the practice; the reverse may be true. Interview research 
illuminated a complicated tax process. Qualitative methodology turns up the unexpected 
and the unimagined. By definition, quantitative research has preconceived axes along 
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which it wishes to make its observations. Qualitative research does not just count and 
measure, or fill in blanks with missing pieces; it provides a holistic picture of a 
phenomenon. A simple survey collecting demographic data – as opposed to in-depth 
interviews - would fail to generate much new or useful information.  Ethnography draws 
strength from the fact that respondents are given an opportunity to enlighten the 
researcher with their own, unprompted ideas. Jaynes (1998) articulately puts the 
argument for qualitative research into economic terms. Research that allows a 
respondent to share their perspective freely, without being prompted, led or influenced 
by pre-constructed questions on a survey, to express their point of view in an 
unstructured way “in effect asks: what are the arguments of the agent’s preference 
field?” (1998: 357). Open-ended research allows us, according to Jaynes, to learn “why 
and how decisions are made in terms respectful to the decision-maker’s perspective 
(1998: 358)”. The problem with surveys is that they are usually based on theory, and 
this means that questions are unlikely to get at the participants’ own perspective on the 
choices they made.   
 Other economists have also pursued their research questions with ethnographic 
methods (Holland and Sutinen, 2000; Jaynes, 1998; Berik, 1996). An example that 
closely parallels my project is Holland and Sutinen’s (2000) research on fishing boat 
skippers in New England, who were consistently making decisions about where to fish 
that were at odds with the standard economic model of firm profit-maximizing 
behavior. These authors used in-depth ethnographic work with the boat captains, 
discovered what motivated their seemingly irrational behavior, and successfully verified 
their ethnographic results with quantitative data on boat movements.  
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3.2 Ethnographic Research 
 Ethnography is a collection of ways of gathering information including 
observation and interviewing; these methods range from structured to unstructured and 
from formal to casual. Ethnographers have developed effective ways of questioning 
people using gradations of focus and techniques to encourage respondents to be as 
comfortable and as forthcoming as possible (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Spradley, 1979). 
One of the best examples of ethnographic research is the work of sociologist Kathryn 
Edin, who has used extensive ethnographic research methods to investigate important 
social policy questions involving poor families. Alternatives to traditional ethnography 
emphasize increased concern about the influence of the researcher on the results, the 
effect of the research on participants, including the issue of power relations between the 
researcher and the researched, and interest in the personal, political, or material benefit 
to study participants (D. Wolf, 1996; M. Wolf, 1996; Aggarwal, 2000).  
3.3 Recruitment of Participants 
 The size of this sample, sixty individuals (thirty nannies and thirty employers) is 
in line with similar studies discussed in the literature review. I recruited thirty of each 
because I was concerned about attrition and wanted to ensure that I had a minimum of 
twenty-five participants of each kind. Fortunately, none dropped out of the study once 
they were enrolled, although several initial contacts changed their minds about 
participating after the first contact. 
 I conducted sixty extensive interviews in an affluent Washington, DC,  
neighborhood. Thirty were conducted with individuals who employ someone to do work 
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in their home, that is, with household employers. Thirty were conducted with household 
employees. There was no overlap between employers and employees;  I avoided 
interviewing either current or former employee-employer pairs, in order to gain the trust 
of participants. I was concerned, for ethical reasons, that this research project could 
otherwise  interfere with the sometimes-delicate emotional ecology of the employer – 
employee relationship. The goal of each interview was to discover how various 
pressures, perceptions, and relationships – the IRS, the employee, fellow employers, 
career aspirations, social norms, personal ethics – affected the employer’s decision to 
pay or to evade nanny taxes. 
 My definition of an employer was one who employs an individual to care for 
children in the parent(s)’s own household or to perform housekeeping services. (Many 
nanny/housekeepers transition between the two kinds of work as jobs come and go, or 
as the employer’s needs change.) I implemented the technique that Hondagneu-Sotelo 
(2001) used to find a diverse set of employers to interview in her study of Hispanic 
domestic workers in Los Angeles. She began with employers who were different from 
one another in several important ways. Then, she snowball sampled. That is, after 
recruiting one such individual, she asked them to recommend several others, who would 
naturally share some of their salient characteristics, such as profession or social 
network.  
 I recruited initial participants by personal contact. Subsequent employers were 
recruited through the activation of my personal, social, and professional networks, 
combined with referrals of others by the initial participants. I chose to recruit by spoken 
word and personal contact only. I used in-person conversations and telephone calls to 
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recruit individuals, rather than using letters or electronic mail. Neither I nor the potential 
participants would have been comfortable with an internet trail regarding their potential 
participation in a study of tax evasion. There are online membership sites for parents 
(primarily mothers) of young children organized geographically. However, utilizing that 
platform to advertise for participants potentially could have linked that internet 
membership list to the study in the very unlikely event of press or government 
investigation of nanny tax evasion. It could also have distorted the results by igniting a 
group discussion of the nanny tax issue that could have altered the participants’ points 
of view prior to the interviews.  
 Small (2005) argues that because of the holistic nature of qualitative research, 
the “representativeness” of a collection of participants would be hard to establish a 
priori. It requires ranking characteristics and selecting which ones to use as markers. 
For example, a study of the U.S. population might be representative in terms of race and 
gender by being proportional to the population percentages. However, this sample might 
not then be representative by age or income. Any group of women is both representative 
and unrepresentative at the same time, depending entirely on how we bound the total 
population and how we perceive what would be ‘representative.’  
 The group of employers I interviewed was not very representative if the total 
population is defined all household employers. In fact, there is no way to know the 
boundaries of the universe of household employers well enough that a statistically 
meaningful standard of representativeness could be reached by any sampling procedure. 
I did strive for diversity, however, among the employers. They are diverse in terms of 
gender, marital status, age, number of children, political affiliation, sexual orientation, 
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and to some extent, income level. I believe that my personal experience with household 
payroll taxes and my resulting empathy helped me both in recruiting employers and in 
gaining their trust. 
 I studied a network of Filipinas employed in households who comprise a distinct 
social group because of their occupation, employment location, and Filipina identity. I 
analyze the ways that this particular group perceives and  responds to the payroll tax 
decisions of their employers. For the study,  my definition of an eligible household 
employee was an individual who worked for households in the capacity of a private 
provider of child care or housekeeping services. My sample selection protocol excluded 
undocumented workers for two reasons. Being illegal to work and having no Social 
Security number confounded the tax compliance issue for private child care. There is no 
tax credit for privately hired child care unless the employer provides the Social Security 
number of the worker on Form 2441. Furthermore, not accepting undocumented 
workers also helped convey to potential participants my concern for protecting their 
privacy and well-being thus increasing their likelihood of participation.  
 The recruitment and enrollment process of employee participants went as 
follows. First, I explained why I was doing a research project and that the project was 
about payroll taxes. Then I explained the nature of the question I was trying to answer 
(what made people willing/unwilling to pay payroll taxes for nannies and housekeepers, 
etc.). Next, I explained my commitment to guard their privacy and anonymity and how 
this would be done. I explained that no negative consequences would result from halting 
the interview at any point, or from calling later to ask me not to use their interview 
material. I went out of my way to assure them that there would be no hard feelings and 
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that there was no shortage of candidates to interview; their own individual participation 
was not crucial to the success of the project. Appendix A contains the Explanation of 
Study letter and the Informed Consent Form. None of these interviews would have been 
possible without several informal intermediaries becoming familiar with me and being 
able to vouch for me as a sincere person of good will, as well as a respectful person 
trying to make a contribution to the welfare of people doing domestic work for a living. 
These women were the key to my gaining the interest and trust of additional 
participants. They held positions of informal power in the network. They directed social 
activities, helped others find jobs, roommates and other resources; other women tended 
to follow their advice and guidance.  
 I began by recruiting and interviewing the social leaders. This allowed the other 
potential participants to learn indirectly that I was trustworthy and that, as some 
interviewers have been told, the interview process can actually be an enjoyable and 
cathartic process for a person who is not normally valued for their life experience. As 
mentioned earlier, I did not interview employer-employee pairs. This choice clearly 
allayed anxieties that would otherwise have arisen.  
3.4 Interview Procedure and Analysis 
 Appendix B contains questions used in the structured part of the interview. I did 
not ask all participants all of the questions, although by keeping a separate list of issues, 
I was able to address each key topic with each subject. Regardless of how many 
preliminary conversations we may have had on the topic of my research, I reviewed the 
scope of my study, its purpose, the fact that their names would not be used, offered them 
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the opportunity to decline to do the interview, and officially ask for their permission to 
do the interview. Next, I focused the discussion on the nanny tax question. From there, I 
let the conversation go where the participant took it. I prompted for the experiences of 
others as well as of the participant. If the conversation digressed too far, I asked another, 
more focused question. Spradley (1979) gives many examples of differential use of 
question types to draw out an interview subject. Because the interviews took place over 
many months, I was able to learn lessons from the earlier interviews. 
 The Filipina nannies in this network gather almost daily in casual group settings, 
at the park in good weather, or at an indoor the mall, or at the houses of amenable 
employers. Hence it was not hard to contact and recruit interview subjects. Scholars 
interviewing women involved in child-care often go to lengths to make it convenient for 
the respondent, for example, meeting at a playground, or offering to help with 
entertaining children at the participant’s home while they prepare dinner (Wrigley, 
1999; Parreñas, 2001, 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001). Because of the workday 
gatherings described above, I also was able to arrange times and places for interviews 
without inconveniencing interview subjects. 
 I processed the results of my interviews several times, first with a strict focus on 
my tax compliance research questions, and later with a softer focus to discern nuances I 
might have missed. Bernard (2000) describes this method of diffuse attention to the 
interview material as the ocular scan method as well as the pawing method. In 
contrasting the issue-focused approach with the case-study approach (mine is the 
former) Weiss (1995) makes the point that unless one knows what one is reading for, 
one cannot properly build a construct capable of organizing a large, unwieldy amount of 
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interview research material. In this case, the material consisted of sixty narrative 
interview reports as well as corresponding numerical representations of the subjects’ 
demographic information.  
 Because I frame the tax compliance decision as the outcome of a complex 
conflict of opposing motivations impacted by demographic, sociological, and personal 
factors, I utilize Kohlberg’s moral reasoning apparatus described in the review of 
literature. I sorted out respondents’ motivations for tax compliance and noncompliance 
into the several stages of moral development: fear of detection probability fits solidly 
into the first, that is, pre-conventional stage.1 The impact of social norms fits into the 
conventional stage. Altruism, concern for social justice, and identification with the aims 
of the welfare state fit clearly in the third, that is, post-conventional stage. So, in 
addition to the existence of conflicts between motives, the reasons given by taxpayers 
can be viewed in the context of moral development.  
3.5 Limitations of the Interview Research 
 Regarding the specific issue of household payroll tax compliance, my 
perspective since becoming liable for household employer taxes myself has expanded 
beyond considering it a matter of ethics and politics. I am aware of the factors of 
complexity, filing costs, peer pressure and self-advocacy on the part of household 
employees. Being aware of my own impact on an interview subject was the first step in 
mitigating that impact. Beyond a certain point, we must accept that all research is 
inevitably influenced by the researcher. I tried during the interview process to keep an 
open mind. I understood that there would be ethical diversity, so to speak, among both 
  67
nannies and employers. Weiss (1995) warns those doing interview research to be aware 
of this. I also tried hard not to idealize the nannies nor prejudge the employers. Parreñas 
(2001, 2005) at times found some nannies demonstrating such common human frailties 
as greed, manipulation, dishonesty, and materialism, qualities, which were sometimes 
exacerbated by their circumstances.  
 One limitation of the study is the comparatively small number of interviews I 
conducted. Ethnography usually involves more extensive study of a smaller number of 
people than does a quantitative study and often focuses on subjects’ inter-relationships. 
Another inescapable limitation of the study was my own subject position as an outsider, 
and moreover, as a former household employer. Feminist qualitative researchers try to 
address issues with ourselves: how we take into account our subject position, that is, our 
own effect on the things we observe and the way we present them to others. This type of 
research is also concerned with power relations between ourselves and those 
participating in the study, with how we treat them and what they are left with after the 
fieldwork is done (Wolf, 1996). 
 The ordinary power differentials are augmented by my subject position. 
However, awareness and sensitivity are the best ways to address these problems. My 
results may differ from those potentially gathered by a non-employer, but they will be of 
higher quality in some ways as well. For example, I enjoyed greater access and trust 
with employers by being one of them. In addition, the groundwork had been laid for this 
project over several years of frequent contact with the Filipina social network I worked 
with.  
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 Trust can be an issue in researching a topic like tax compliance. In addressing 
the issues of gaining access and trust when performing ethnographic research, there are 
many lessons to be learned from both Edin and Lein (1997) and Edin and Kefalas 
(2005).2 Learning the answers to the major question in each project took a tremendous 
feat of accessing, engaging, and empathetic interviewing of the women who participated 
in the studies. In my own project, I found that establishing that rapport with subjects 
was sometimes a lengthy process. However, this rapport made possible a body of 
interview material characterized by depth, intimacy, candor, and vividness. 
 To what extent should we be concerned about the truthfulness and accuracy of 
employers’ responses? Employer reluctance to reveal unattractive personal traits could 
motivate respondents to lie. Limited self-awareness and rationalizing could both 
generate inaccurate explanations of their tax choices. For that matter, how can we rely 
on the truthfulness of the nanny interview material? Indeed, one risk which all interview 
research runs is that untruthful responses will reduce the value of the interview material 
and the conclusions drawn based on that material. It is within the researchers’ control to 
explain carefully the aim and the possible benefits to others of the study, to build 
rapport with a respondent, and to engage the respondent in the process of discovery. 
However, despite ensuring everything possible is done to maximize respondents’ 
willingness to be open and honest in their responses, ultimately the researcher will not 
know whether or not certain responses are truthful or mendacious. By extension, the 
consumers of conclusions based on those responses will not know whether or not the 
conclusions are valid.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 My primary purpose for interviewing not just employers but a sample of 
household employees as well was to uncover new anecdotal material from which I could 
potentially generate new hypotheses about the determinants of employer tax compliance 
with payroll taxes. These employees were ordinarily in a home for upwards of forty 
hours, often for several years.3 Presumably the employee had many domains across 
which to observe employer behavior both related to the employee and unrelated 
(household purchasing patterns; wages paid; handling of time-off, etc.). I conjectured 
that their position in the household gave them a unique and perhaps valuable  
perspective on the drivers of employer fulfillment or neglect of payroll obligations.  
 Because the norm is noncompliance, I sought especially hard to understand 
compliance. Poor personal ethics regarding tax returns, financial self-interest and 
administrative laziness do appear as ready explanations for tax evasion in the case of 
household payroll taxes. However, I hoped to learn more from the thirty nanny 
interviews about why compliant employers were compliant.  
 Ultimately, an employee has value as a sentient witness involved in the payroll 
tax situation, however uninformed the employee may be about payroll tax rules. 
Regardless of their power position in the employment relationship, the worker is aware 
of an explicit or tacit initial agreement regarding working on the table or under it. 
Therefore, I reasoned, household employees might have information regarding the 
factors contributing to compliance or noncompliance.  
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Notes 
 
1
 See Chapter 2, p. 16. 
 
2
 These two studies of low-wage and welfare-dependent mothers exemplify the 
effective use of ethnographic research. Edin and Lein (1997) interviewed several 
hundred women in several cities intensively enough and in enough financial detail to 
construct budgets, which revealed the extent to which informal work arrangements and 
social network support bridged the gap between their official income and their monthly 
expenses. Edin and Kefalas (2005) studied 162 unmarried mothers in order to discover 
the reasoning behind the mothers’ choices. They found surprisingly clear and realistic 
decision-making. Not marrying their children’s fathers turns out to have been more 
sensible in most cases than marrying them. Having children – given the limited 
opportunity these women had to dream and to prepare themselves for careers – assumed 
a higher priority and held greater meaning for them than is widely believed among 
critics of welfare mothers. 
 
3
 The average job spell appeared to be two to three years, although I did not 
collect data on employee subjects’ employment episode length.  
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CHAPTER 4    
 
ANALYSIS OF IRS TAX DATA ON  
HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT PAYROLL TAXES 
4.1 Introduction 
 There is no publicly available data on household employment payroll tax 
payments1. Although one can become an expert in the abstract on the complexities of 
the household employer section of the federal individual income tax return – the 
Schedule H – this tax makes up such a small percentage (0.08%) of the overall tax 
revenue collected and such a small percentage (0.15%) of returns that there has 
apparently been little research demand for this information.2 I spent over three years 
obtaining the data, incomplete though it may be, for this chapter. In it, I examine this 
best available IRS data on tax returns containing Schedule H. I first describe the process 
of getting the IRS data, provide variable explanations, and mention some of the 
limitations of the data. Next I discuss tax and demographic characteristics of the 
household employer payroll taxpaying population as seen in 2006 summary data on all 
returns filed. I then analyze data from 2001 on the several hundred household employer 
tax returns that, fortunately for this project, happened to be selected for audit when the 
IRS drew a research sample of over forty thousand returns. In the next chapter, I will 
show that when we compare the number of Schedule H’s filed with official statistics for 
workers in private households we see a significant shortfall in compliance for every year 
examined. 
 Since 1996, household employers have reported and paid their federal payroll 
taxes once a year on their individual income tax returns through the use of Schedule H – 
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described in detail in Chapter 1.3 Yet all of the IRS data available to me was aggregate 
data, preventing analysis at the level of the individual tax return. IRS confidentiality 
practices also reduce the research value of the information I was able to obtain. 
However, scrutiny of the distribution of payroll tax amounts paid shows that most 
Schedule H filers are paying small amounts of tax on very low annual wage totals. Also, 
examination of demographic characteristics of Schedule H filers shows that although 
this tax is called the nanny tax in common parlance, just over half of Schedule H 
households have no indications of caregiving on the return. That is, over half of these 
households take neither a child at home exemption nor take the credit available for child 
and dependent care expenses, which is available to some extent to all taxpayers, 
regardless of income.  
 In addition to this cross-sectional data for 2006, I examine eleven years of 
longitudinal data on Schedule H filings counts and amounts of Schedule H tax paid. I 
note the downward trend in returns filed identified by Bloomquist and An (2006). I find 
that despite fewer returns filed each year, the overall amount of real household wages 
paid rises, and propose some explanations for this.  
4.2 IRS Records of Household Payroll Tax Payments   
 When I began researching this dissertation, no scholarly articles or dissertations 
touched on household employer payroll  taxes. During my initial research stage, 
Bloomquist and An’s paper (2006) appeared on the web after the 2005 National Tax 
Association conference. In my subsequent contacts with the IRS Office of Research, 
economist and computational social scientist Kim Bloomquist very graciously explained 
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his research, including the fact that he had compiled the data himself from raw IRS 
masterfile records unavailable to the public. I wrote a data request to the IRS in 2006, 
made a small informal presentation at the IRS Office of Research in 2007 in support of 
my request, and pursued my request into 2008 through contacts with several Office of 
Research staff members. 
  During this process, I came to respect and appreciate the great effort made by 
the IRS to protect the confidentiality of each taxpayer’s information. In 2008, the Office 
of Research was able to give me certain segments of Schedule H data appropriately 
anonymized or blurred with the consequence of having ranges or buckets for variables 
without the specific values themselves, thus protecting taxpayer confidentiality. In 
addition, I was provided with certain aggregate values for a time series of variables 
concerning household wage and tax amounts. Finally, a small subset of audit results 
which concerned household employer payroll  taxes from the National Research 
Program data was made available. Because this was an exploratory study, all of this 
information was of great interest to me, being a first look into the darkened room of 
household employment taxes. Although falling short of the research ideal of individual 
tax records required for modeling household employer payroll tax return correlates, this 
data allows significant descriptive insight into and analysis of the filing of household 
employment taxes.  
 The IRS has two kinds of data that provide some information on household 
employment tax compliance. The first is the complete set of tax records of everyone 
filing in a given year. This is not sample data – all tax filers, including those who filed a 
Schedule H with their return – are included in it. Some quarter million or so of these 
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returns – 0.15 percent – include a Schedule H. These data are exciting for the complete 
picture they afford of filing trends and distributions. This information includes types and 
amounts of income, and credits and exemptions based on children and child care; there 
is a wealth of information about the tax-relevant features of these compliant employer 
households.  
 The second kind of data offering insight into household employment taxes is 
National Research Program (NRP) data, a large sample of audited returns. The IRS 
obtained the NRP data set by drawing and auditing 44,768 returns from a total 
population of 125,791,000 tax returns filed for 2001. The rigorous representativeness 
and careful weighting of the sample returns enables researchers to generalize from their 
analyses of the material.  In other words, the NRP data provides population estimates 
based on the weighting of the sample. Therefore, the data set allows us a fairly good 
estimate of how many dollars were paid, how many dollars were owed but not paid, and 
how many dollars were overpaid, that is, paid in error. Of these over forty thousand 
returns, luckily for household employer payroll  tax research, over four hundred returns 
had either filed an H or were found by the audit to be required to file a Schedule H. That 
is, these returns either reported household employer payroll  taxes to begin with, or the 
post-audit return – the corrected return – reported household employer payroll  taxes. 
The NRP data set is the only information the IRS has on taxpayers who were found not 
to have been paying these taxes. The second half of this chapter analyzes these audit 
findings.  
  The NRP data are broken down by type of tax owed. Therefore we can examine 
Schedule H payments in these terms. One startling result is that despite an estimated 
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twelve million dollars in additional household employer payroll  tax being collected 
because of the audits, eleven million was returned to different Schedule H filers for 
paying too much in error! This statistic alone confirms an important result in my 
interview research: that many filers don’t fully understand the law.  
4.3 Tax Return Variables 
 The IRS provided me with information on five Form 1040 variables and four 
Schedule H variables. The Form 1040 variables are all dichotomous. Specifically, these 
variables contain information on whether the tax return has or does not have the 
following characteristics: married filing jointly (MFJ), taxpayer age sixty-five or over, at 
least one child at home exemption, the Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC), or 
adjusted gross income (AGI) over $150,000. This amounts to a seven way cross-
tabulation of the complete set of 2006 returns, the seventh variable being whether or not 
the return included a Schedule H. In IRS data, filing status is an ordinal variable with 
five possible values: Married Filing Jointly, Married Filing Separately, Single, 
Qualifying Widow(er), and Head of Household. This variable contains information 
about the number of dependents a taxpayer may legitimately claim. There is a clear 
hierarchy of tax advantage in the statuses, and taxpayers are motivated to file for the 
most favorable, the support, the presence, and the type of dependents being the most 
important determining factors. In future research I would like to examine how filing 
status impacts Schedule H filing. Unfortunately, my data indicates only whether or not 
the filing status of the tax return was MFJ or was not MFJ. The age 65 and over variable 
is based on a box checked on the first page of the tax return. The finer points regarding 
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eligibility to claim a dependent child are spectacularly complicated.4  Although the 
number of children is known to the IRS from information on Form 1040, the data I have 
only contains a true or false value for the presence of a Child at Home Exemption. The 
Child and Dependent Care Credit offers up to $1600 credit against care purchased by 
the taxpayer. Although it is reduced as income rises, it is still available to those with the 
highest incomes. I chose to use the child at home exemption but not to use the Child 
Tax Credit as a proxy for children in the home because the Child Tax Credit is not 
available to taxpayers with more than $75,000 AGI ($110,000 filing jointly). Adjusted 
Gross Income represents the sum of taxpayer income prior to taking deductions for such 
things as mortgage interest, business and medical expenses. Although flawed for 
intertemporal comparisons of household income due to the changing tax code governing 
what is and is not excluded from AGI, this number is an accepted measure of household 
income (Petska and Strudler, 2000). I have only a dichotomous variable for AGI – over 
$150,000 – or not. AGI appears as a line item on the tax return. 
 The remaining four variables come from the Schedule H and are continuous 
rather than dichotomous. I drew the following descriptions of the official IRS variable 
descriptions.5 (a.) Wage_med: the variable “Schedule H Wage Subject to Medicare” is 
the amount of total cash wages subject to Medicare taxes, as opposed to Social Security 
taxes, which are limited to the first $102,000 of wages per employee. It is the total wage 
bill: there could be more than one employee. It is reported on Schedule H, Line 3. The 
amount of gross wages paid is closely related but not precisely proportional to the 
amount of federal (as opposed to state) nanny taxes paid by that employer. This is 
because the Federal return gives credit for state unemployment taxes paid, which vary 
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by state. The wage amount tables and figures in this chapter are based upon this 
variable. (b.) Hld_empc: the variable “Schedule H Household Employment Computer” 
is the computer calculation for the amount of household employment tax reported on 
Schedule H, Line 27. This variable represents the total amount of household 
employment tax to be paid. It is not the precise sum of total Social Security, Medicare 
and Unemployment tax, although it is very close. It gives credit for any advance Earned 
Income Tax Credit payments made by the employer. However, to get a sense of 
perspective on how minor the perturbation caused by including any employer-made 
advance EITC payments, consider the following statistic. Per IRS records for 2003, the 
only year for which this particular statistic is available, there were only 418 out of over a 
quarter million cases of a household employer providing advance EITC payments to an 
employee.6 (c.) Futa_txc: the variable “Schedule H FUTA Tax Amount” represents the 
total amount of federal unemployment tax paid. It has been adjusted by credit for state 
unemployment tax already paid, where applicable. There is a ceiling on the amount of 
FUTA because the wages on which unemployment taxes are owed are capped at a 
certain amount. It is reported on Schedule H, Line 17 or Line 25, depending on whether 
state unemployment taxes were filed in more than one state. (d.) Tlssmedc: the variable 
“Schedule H Total SS Medicare Tax Computer” is the computer calculation for the 
amount reported on Schedule H, Line 8 and Line 26. This means it does not include 
FUTA, as described above, so state-by-state variation in FUTA credit amounts does not 
affect it. In future research, I hope to use this variable in geographic analysis as it 
removes variation introduced by state-level decisions about unemployment tax rates. In 
this study however, the tables and figures displaying household employer tax amounts 
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are based upon (b.), the IRS’s variable labeled “Schedule H Household Employment 
Computer” because this is the bottom line amount of household payroll taxes the 
employer owes.  
4.4 Data Limitations 
 As mentioned earlier, the data are highly aggregated. For example, rather than 
having the constituent individual records underlying a distribution of household 
employment payroll taxes paid for a given year, I was only given buckets, that is, 
numbers of records within uniform ranges. IRS confidentiality practices are so stringent 
that, for example, I was never allowed to have the range of any variable, for that would 
be revealing specific taxpayer information. Although I was able to examine frequency 
distributions in the Schedule H variables of amounts of household wages paid and 
household employment taxes paid for 2006, I do not have data at the level of individual 
records. Similarly, although I have cross-tabulations for 2006 for the four Form 1040 
variables described above for both Schedule H filers and non-Schedule H filers, I do not 
have access to individual records and therefore cannot yet build a model of household 
employment tax payment correlates at the individual level. Regarding NRP data, ideally 
I would like to have compared the compliant and noncompliant  returns on demographic 
variables and on income measures as well to see if any meaningful differences exist. 
However, the inability of the IRS to release individual tax records to me remains the 
greatest limitation of the quantitative aspect of this study. 
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4.5 Comparing Schedule H Filers to the General Filing Population 
 In this section, I examine the four variables characterized above as the “Form 
1040” variables. These variables are drawn from information on the general tax return 
as opposed to the Schedule H used for household payroll taxes. Table 7 compares 
household employers with other taxpayers, finding them to be older, more likely to be 
married, and far likelier to have at least middle-class incomes.7 As Bloomquist and An 
(2006) noted in their perusal of TY2003 data, this stands to reason. That study 
calculated an average number of Child at Home Exemptions for each group, finding that 
the general population had 0.6 such exemptions and the Schedule H population had 0.9 
such exemptions, on average. My data does not allow that calculation, but does reveal 
the following: 33.6% of the general population took at least one Child at Home 
Exemption, while 48.1% of the Schedule H population did so. Finally, I also look at the 
Child and Dependent Care Credit: 4.8% of the general taxpayers took it, but 22.7% of 
the Schedule H filers did, over five times as many. 
Table 7: Comparison of Schedule H Filers with All Taxpayers 
 
Characteristic All Taxpayers Schedule H Filers 
Age Over 65 12.9% 37.3% 
Married Filed Jointly 38.6% 70.3% 
AGI Over $150,000 5.2% 65.3% 
Child-at-Home 
Exemption(s) 33.6% 48.1% 
Child and Dependent Care 
Credit 4.8% 22.7% 
 
 Recall from the review of literature that the latest year available to Bloomquist 
and An (2006) was 2004. Using that data, they established the significance with regard 
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to Schedule H filing of four demographic variables. These were the characteristics of 
age over 65, married, took the child-at-home exemption, and AGI over $150,000. Using 
new data from 2006, I was able to establish that the five dichotomous categorical 
variables of Married Filing Jointly, Age 65 and Over, AGI over $150,000, child at home 
exemption, and Child and Dependent Care Credit were all significantly related to 
whether or not the tax return contained an employment tax return by using a Chi-square 
procedure.8 
 It makes sense that nanny tax filers are significantly more likely to have a child 
at home, to have child and/or dependent expenses they can claim on a tax return, and to 
have an over-65 year-old person in the household. Presence in the household of the 
young, old and ill or disabled would be a natural correlate of a need for caregiving help. 
The marriage variable makes sense due to the probability that families with higher joint 
incomes could better afford to hire services, as well as the increased likelihood of 
children in the home when compared to all single adults. Likewise, an adjusted gross 
income of over $150,000 makes it more likely that a taxpayer could hire household help, 
care-related or not. 
 Let us look more closely now at the households that have a child at home 
exemption and claim child and dependent care expenses. Claiming the expenses implies 
that care is purchased on the books. The reasoning here is that to claim the credit, the 
taxpayer must provide either the daycare center’s tax identification number or the 
individual care provider’s Social Security number. No one paying under the table can 
claim the credit due to this check against fraud. Furthermore, day care expenses paid to 
relatives are not eligible for this credit. Among the 135,811,098 non-Schedule H 
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households, 4.6% claim both the exemption and the credit. However, among the 
208,962 Schedule H households, 22.4% – over four times as many –  claim both the 
exemption and the credit. 48.4% claim one or the other. This may seem obvious – of 
course households hiring help are more likely to have children or to have others needing 
care services. However, it then follows that 51.6% of the Schedule H households do not 
appear to be paying those wages for caregiving. This we know by calculating what 
percentage of these households neither take the child exemption nor take the Child and 
Dependent Care Credit (CDCC). This is an important distinction because the tax rules 
allow non-custodial parents to take a credit for childcare expenses, despite their 
ineligibility for the child exemption. (The child exemption is given only to parents 
living with the child.) Since the examination of demographic variables above had led us 
to conclude that the presence of those needing care was significantly associated with 
filing a Schedule H, this fact is important. It stops us from forming a false impression of 
the Schedule H filing households as hiring primarily caregiving labor!  
 As I have argued above, a close reading of the tax regulations regarding claiming 
child and dependent care expenses indicates that the CDCC credit should be a reliable 
indicator that on-the-books wages are being paid. Therefore, it would be illogical for 
someone who is already nanny tax compliant to forego the tax benefit afforded by the 
CDCC. Therefore, I would argue that the 48.4% of the Schedule H households not 
taking either the exemption or that credit are purchasing services such as housekeeping, 
cooking, and the like as opposed to care for those who are children, who are elderly, 
who are ill or who are disabled.  If true, this has implications for the comparison of 
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compliant and noncompliant household employers. That is to say, those employing 
caregivers appear to be quite underrepresented among the nanny tax compliant.  
 If we examine the Schedule H filers who took the CAH as well as the CDCC, 
we see that 46.6% of all the Schedule H filers with kids in the home also took the 
CDCC.9 Now, that means that 53.4% of these Schedule H filers with the CAH did not 
take the CDCC. In this group are both the people who hired for non-caregiving work, 
e.g. housecleaning or yard work. Wouldn’t this group also include people with 
household help that paid under the table? No, it would not; those going to the trouble of 
filing payroll taxes are very likely to take advantage of a well-known tax credit. Once 
they have decided to file Schedule H, those wages are visible to the IRS and to the 
Social Security Administration, so there would no longer be an incentive to forgo the 
credit.  
 However, of all 46 million individual taxpayers who took the CAH exemption, 
how many also took the CDCC? 13.7%. That means that of all filers with at least one 
child at home, 13.7% also took credit for day care of dependent care expenses, but 
86.3% of taxpayers with kids did not take the CDCC. Of course, the vast majority did 
not have household employees working under the table, but all households paying for 
childcare off the books are located somewhere within this group of taxpayers. Although 
lacking the data to perform these calculations, in future research I would hope to isolate 
those returns in this category – no H, the CAH, but no CDCC – that report two six-
figure incomes and have just begun to claim the CAH in the past three years. This is the 
tax profile of a couple who both work, have a young child, and can afford a private child 
care worker, but are choosing to skip payroll taxes. 
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4.6 Amounts of Household Wages and Payroll Taxes 
 I turn next to the overall distribution of wages reported paid in one year, 2006. 
Figure 2 shows the first 99.56% of this very skewed distribution. This data represents all 
but 914 of the 207,111 Schedule H filers that year. (I present a close-up of the extremely 
long flat right-hand tail shortly.) From the illustration below, we can see that the vast 
majority of household employers are paying a very small overall wage bill. The first 
column represents returns showing less than $5000 of wages paid; the second column 
those showing between $5000 and $10,000, and so forth. Notice the very steep drop-off. 
Since 2006 mean household wages reported were $18,790, (not shown), and since the 
median figure (rounded for anonymity to the nearest thousand) was $10,000, this 
indicates the presence of some extremely high wage bills at the opposite end of the 
distribution.  
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Figure 2: Overall Distribution of Total Household Wages Paid in 2006 by 
Household Employers 
 
 Figure 3 shows a close-up of the wage amounts under $14,500. When we 
disaggregate the returns in steps of $1500 (as opposed to $5000 above) it allows us to 
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see the preponderance of returns at the low end of the scale. In fact, one quarter of the 
returns report under $4000 of wages paid. 
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Figure 3: Household Wages Reported in 2006 by Employers: Wage Amounts 
under $14,500. 
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 It is interesting to zoom in on the long, flat, right-hand tail of the distribution. 
Figure 4 shows the 899 returns filed with between $200,000 and one million dollars in 
household wages. 
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Figure 4: Detail of Household Wages Reported: Wage Amounts $200,000 to 
$1,000,000 (2006) 
 
 Recall that there is no way of knowing from tax data alone how many employees 
a household employs. These returns almost certainly represent large households with a 
considerable number of workers. Data on the 914 tax returns reporting over $200,000 in 
household wages is range information alone. In providing the data to me, the IRS Office 
of Research was required to blur precise amounts into dollar ranges in order to prevent 
the release of actual amounts.  
 Finally, Figure 5 presents a close-up of the amounts of nanny tax reported in 
2006 by those households owing under $25,000 in tax. As we would expect, given the 
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proportional relationship between wages and taxes, the distribution of household 
employment payroll taxes paid has an extremely long right-hand tail. The following 
figure is a close-up look at the lower end of the distribution, with a cut-off amount of 
$25,000 in tax paid. 98% of the 207,111 returns filed in TY 2006 are represented here. 
Only 4242 returns contained nanny tax amounts over $25,000.  
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Figure 5: Detail of Distribution of Household Payroll Taxes Filed: $25,000 and 
Under (2006) 
 
 These charts of the household wage and nanny tax distributions for 2006 tell us 
two important things about Schedule H filers. First, some individuals are paying 
sizeable amount of nanny tax. A wage bill of $100,000 carries a payroll tax liability of 
close to $10,000; in addition, the maintenance of that tax compliance for a number of 
employees may well require some outlay for accounting services.  
 A second lesson is that the majority of the compliant Schedule H filers overall 
have low wage bills. They are in all likelihood employing part-time workers. Consider 
these figures: 62% are paying less than $15,000 for household help. Half are paying less 
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than $10,000; a quarter are paying less than $4000. Although some of these are probably 
paying full-time, year-round workers a salary that is below the minimum wage, most of 
these wage amounts are likely to come from the compliant employers of part-time 
caregivers and yard workers. Remember that all of these data are collected from the tax 
returns of employers who paid their taxes. One finding in the tax compliance literature 
reviewed earlier is that the lower the tax, the likelier it is to be paid. Therefore, the 
actual household wage distribution, and therefore the actual distribution of nanny taxes 
owed, is likely to be higher.  
4.7 Time Trend of Schedule H Filings and Tax Amounts 
 In 1996 there were 317,010 nanny tax filings; by 2006 that number had shrunk 
to 207,111, a drop of 35%. Figure 6 shows the steady decline. 
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Figure 6: Schedule H Filings, 1996 – 2006 
 
 Total household payroll taxes paid rose from $682,423,940 to $857,552,158 in 
the same period (see Figure 7). Adjusted for inflation, this represents an increase of 
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about 10%. Interestingly, the average household tax paid, $2,153 in 1996, by 2006 had 
risen to $4,141 (see Figure 8). This represents an inflation-adjusted increase of almost 
20%. 
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Figure 7: Total Household Payroll Taxes Paid, 1996 – 2006  
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Figure 8: Mean Schedule H Taxes Paid, 1996 – 2006.  
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 The Schedule H time series show that constant-dollar household taxes collected 
grew by a tenth, with the average tax amount rising 20%,  at the same time that the set 
of taxpayers filing them shrank by over a third. Since it is unlikely that wages rose by 
50%, or that the composition of the household workforce changed dramatically to 
include higher-paying professions, we must seek another explanation. Perhaps a third of 
households stopped hiring help while another third decided to double their number of 
employees. This would explain the drop in filing while the inflation-adjusted mean 
household tax amount almost doubled. The data does not allow us to test this 
hypothesis, as Schedule H does not identify employees or even how many employees a 
household is paying tax on. However, the demand for household employees has grown 
along with greater income inequality and the associated demand for luxury goods. That 
is, fewer employers per employee may be filing. After consideration of the distribution 
of tax amounts paid in 2006, however, I consider it more likely that many of those 
employers at the low end of the tax amount distribution have dropped out, causing the 
average to rise. Another possibility is that there has been an increase in illegal 
immigrants doing these jobs, and since legal workers tend to get higher wages than they 
do, the average wage of reported workers has gone up  
 The larger question of why filing dropped in the first place is a separate 
question. To begin with, I concur with Bloomquist and An (2006)’s tentative conclusion 
that it may have dropped due to the increase in the proportion of domestic labor 
provided by undocumented workers. It may also be a reflection of the erosion of the 
gains of the labor movement; concern for the economic well-being of workers seems to 
have given way to greater concern about the costs of those workers to the company and 
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its shareholders, as evidenced by the successful growth of temporary labor agencies in 
the last two decades. Perhaps the increasing failure to pay household payroll taxes is a 
sign of diminishing respect for individual workers and their jobs overall.   
4.8 Overview of IRS Audit Data 
 The National Research Program data set, described at the beginning of this 
chapter, contains information about the selected returns both before and after the audits. 
Of the 44,768 tax returns in the sample, only 429 reported Schedule H tax, less than a 
tenth of a percent. In this data set, the IRS provides population estimates based on the 
sample information, but does not release the actual information. All figures in this 
section are taken from these population estimates, which are the best available 
information for studying household employment payroll tax returns.  
 Taxpayers submitted returns with payments of just under a trillion dollars. After 
the audits, an (estimated) additional $74.7 billion was found to be owed, for an overall 
tax evasion rate of  7.5% Schedule H filers reported $840 million dollars in household 
payroll tax on their returns. An additional $1.7 million was collected through the audit 
process. At first glance, this $1.7 million (or  0.2%) of additional household 
employment tax would seem to be the estimate of nanny tax evasion, a rate which is 
very low. However, let us unpack that number.  
 Actually, the audits reveal unpaid Schedule H tax to the tune of  $12.8 million, 
for a nanny tax evasion rate of 1.5%. On the other hand, the same audit process found 
that other taxpayers had calculated and paid $11.1 million of household payroll tax 
which they did not owe at all! That is, some of the original Schedule H filers were found 
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not to be in need of filing a Schedule H; the nanny tax paid-in-error rate was 1.3%. 
Therefore, the $1.7 million positive gain in Schedule H tax represents the net after 
additional taxes collected and overpayments are refunded.  
 It is remarkable that the IRS refunded 87% as much nanny tax as they collected. 
Table 8 presents the totals of all tax and of Schedule H tax on the return as submitted as 
well as the changes in these totals indicated by the audits. The top row gives the total 
amounts “per return,” that is, what the original return showed. The bottom row, “per 
exam,” shows the total amounts on the corrected return. Of course, some returns did not 
need to be changed, and some changes were in the taxpayer’s favor. The pre- and post- 
audit information in this table is broken down by whether or not Schedule H was 
included in the return.  
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Table 8: Overview of Audit Data by Whether a Schedule H was Filed 
 
 Tax Return Before Audit 
 All Taxpayers 
Except Schedule 
H Filers 
Schedule H Filers Totals 
Total Tax Paid $968,074,662,000 $31,492,522,000 $999,567,184,000 
Change in Total 
Tax Paid $74,429,946,000 $273,648,000 $74,703,594,000 
Total Schedule H 
Tax Paid $12,810,000 $829,050,000 $841,860,000 
Change in 
Schedule H Tax 
Paid $12,810,000 -$11,150,000 $1,660,000 
Number of Filers 
in Population 125,500,100 290,900 125,791,000 
Number of Filers 
in NRP Sample 44,339 429 44,768 
 Tax Return After Audit 
 All Taxpayers 
Except Schedule 
H Filers 
Schedule H Filers Totals 
Total Tax Paid $967,226,942,000 $32,340,242,000 $999,567,184,000 
Change in Total 
Tax Paid $74,410,731,000 $292,863,000 $74,703,594,000 
Total Schedule H 
Tax Paid $0 $841,860,000 $841,860,000 
Change in 
Schedule H Tax 
Paid -$14,150,000 $15,810,000 $1,660,000 
Number of Filers 
in Population 125,492,800 298,200 125,791,000 
Number of Filers 
in NRP Sample 44,322 446 44,768 
 
4.8.1 Implications of overpayment amount 
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 The fact that so much money was returned because taxpayers had overpaid their 
nanny taxes (or mistakenly paid any nanny tax at all) is consistent with what my 
qualitative research showed: that ignorance and complexity are significant barriers to 
nanny tax compliance. The audited taxpayers discovered to owe nanny tax include both 
cheaters and the genuinely confused or ignorant. Audited taxpayers who overpaid are 
clearly uninformed or bested by the Schedule H complexity. That eleven million dollars 
was overpaid or paid in error illustrates the argument that Schedule H confusion is a 
stumbling block for many.  
4.8.2 Nanny Tax Compliance in the Context of Whole-Tax-Return Compliance 
 The overall noncompliance rate in this audit sample data set was 7.47%. That is, 
the additional tax collected overall – 74.4 billion – represented 7.47% of the total final 
tax collected – just under one trillion dollars. In comparison, as we said above, the 
Schedule H noncompliance rate was 0.20%. So household employers appear more 
compliant when compared to the whole-tax-return underreporting rate in the overall 
sample.  
 To put the overall 7.47% NRP misreporting rate into perspective, consider the 
whole-tax-return noncompliance rates in the general population (as opposed to in the 
NRP sample). A good benchmark for this compliance rate can be found in recently 
published research by the IRS Office of Research’s Mazur and Plumley (2008).They 
found that individual tax returns had a compliance rate of 99% on income with 
withholding and substantial third-party information reporting, e.g. wages and salaries. 
They also found a rate of 95% on income with substantial information reporting, e.g. 
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bank interest and dividends; 91% on income with some reporting, e.g., S-corporations; 
and 46% when the income was not subject to any third party reporting and therefore 
virtually untraceable, e.g. sole proprietorships.  This means that the NRP misreporting 
rate of 7.47% is higher than the estimated rate of the average taxpayer whose income 
has information-checking, but lower than that of the unsupervised self-employed 
earners, which stands to reason, as NRP data would contain all four types of return. 
 There is, however, a very low ratio of discovered unpaid nanny tax to owed 
nanny tax in the NRP data: 0.2%. In other words, very few are found to have been not 
paying their nanny taxes, or not paying enough nanny tax. Before we conclude that we 
have overestimated the problem of widespread nanny tax evasion, consider why that rate 
might be so low. When wages are paid in cash as they so often are in households, 
evasion is easy and detection is hard. In addition, the IRS auditors were not looking 
specifically for households with employees. At any rate, for a number of reasons, I 
maintain that the low rate of nanny tax evasion found in the NRP sample audits is 
woefully inadequate as an estimate for nanny tax evasion in the population as a whole. 
4.9 Examining Audit Results by Filing Characteristic 
 In this section and the next, we have an opportunity to investigate the question of 
who is more likely to skip household payroll taxes – the affluent or the middle-class? 
On one hand we might expect that higher-income households would be more likely to 
evade because they likely hire more help and consequently have a larger payroll tax bill. 
On the other hand, we could imagine lower-income households being more likely to 
evade because they have less income to spend. Remember, some economists have 
  95
modeled the nonpayment of taxes as the purchase of a “risky” good, risky because of the 
possibility of owing a penalty for evasion if caught. In turn, we can think of paying taxes 
as a the purchase of a good providing, say, peace of mind or the satisfaction of an ethical 
imperative. Then, a household with less income would have less to allocate to such a 
purchase. In economic terms, we seek to know which is stronger here: the price effect or 
the income effect.  
 After examining the audit data for general and Schedule H filers and noticing the 
remarkably low percent increase in Schedule H tax collected overall, I then requested 
the aggregate audit results for household employers broken down by each of the four 
categorical variables examined above (MFJ, CAH, CDCC, and AGI $150K+). These 
audit results simply consist of four numbers, each representing the aggregated net 
change in Schedule H tax for returns with that categorical variable. As we saw before, a 
small net change may mask a large overpayment counterbalancing a large 
underpayment. I calculated the percent aggregate net change in Schedule H tax paid 
separately for each of those four characteristics. The overall change in the MFJ group 
was a drop of 1.28% - that is, Married Filing Jointly returns among the four hundred 
involving household payroll taxes collectively had overpaid 1.28% of their Schedule H 
taxes. Child at home exemption returns had overpaid by 2.48%, returns with the CDCC 
by 6.92%. However, those returns with AGI over $150,000 had collectively underpaid 
by 2.73%.  
 Put differently, the group of those filing with a spouse, of those able to claim a 
child or disabled household member, and of those with deductible caregiving expenses 
all paid too much. However, the group of those with AGI over $150,000 paid too little. 
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Bear in mind that the change in Schedule H tax is not per household. That information 
is not available. If we had per household data, we could test whether or not that upward 
or downward movement in H tax was statistically significant. At best, with this data, we 
can say that of the four variables examined, only those returns with AGI over $150,000 
had an aggregate underpayment of Schedule H taxes.  
4.10 Examining Audit Results by Audit Outcome 
 The IRS also provided a disaggregation by audit outcome of the same 452 
household employers’ returns in the NRP data. The Schedule H tax amount on each of 
these audited returns was the correct amount, was an underpayment, was an 
overpayment, was not reported at all (evaded), or was paid but not owed (paid in error). 
Table 9 shows the percentage of household employers in these categories.10  
Table 9: Audited Household Employers by Audit Result 
 
Audited 
Household 
Employers 
Percentage 
of Total 
Payment 
Correct 70.3% 
Overpayment 8.9% 
Payment in 
Error 4.6% 
Underpayment 9.2% 
Nonpayment 7.0% 
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Earlier we examined audit results in dollar terms. Now we can examine the number of 
tax returns or households identified as failing to pay Schedule H tax. The percentage of 
taxpayers paying Schedule H tax after the audits (7.0%)  was almost five times higher 
than the percent increase in tax dollars collected (1.43%). This means that the 
noncompliance rate for this tax would be much higher were we to measure it in 
households caught rather than dollars collected. 
 Compare the proportion of returns that overpaid (8.9%) or paid in error (4.6%)  
with those that underpaid or did not pay. The summed percentages of overpayments and 
erroneous payments (13.8%) is almost as great as the summed percentages of 
underpayments and nonpayments (15.9%). In other words, the IRS is refunding money 
to almost as many taxpayers as those from which it collects additional tax! In terms of 
households, this means a Schedule H tax give-back rate of 86.8%.  
 Based on this remarkable give-back rate, I would argue that the NRP data could 
not possibly be an accurate reflection of how much nanny tax evasion (accidental as 
well as purposeful) there is nationally. However, it certainly paints a picture of a 
Schedule H filing process that produces confusion and mistakes as well as evasion.  
 The NRP data also provides amounts of Schedule H tax change for each 
category of audit result. The average refund to those who paid by mistake was almost 
twice the size of the average amount collected from nonpayers. The weighted mean 
complete refund to those who paid in error was $978; the weighted mean amount 
collected from those who failed to pay was $589.11 This is further evidence to support 
my contention that, while NRP data does not provide much evidence of Schedule H tax 
evasion, it does imply that many taxpayers are confused by the complexity of this tax. 
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 These five groups differ greatly in AGI as well (see columns one and two of 
Table 10). The median AGI on returns which failed to pay Schedule H tax was the 
lowest of the five groups, at $30,066. The next lowest median AGI ($63,893) belonged 
to the group paying Schedule H in error. The correct filers fell in the middle with 
median AGI of $123,439, followed by the underpayment returns with a median AGI of 
$167,457. The highest median AGI among the five groups belonged to returns with 
overpayments: $242,315. What can we make of this information? Without statistics on 
the results of individual audits among the Schedule H population, we cannot pursue the 
relationship between AGI and filing behavior further. However, it does seem odd that 
those with unpaid household payroll taxes discovered in an audit, as a group, had the 
lowest median AGI.  
 Half of this group had less than $30,066 adjusted gross income on their tax 
return. They cannot have been hiring very much household help – they would not have 
had the resources to do so. Therefore, they cannot have owed much payroll tax. Yet they 
comprise half the returns auditors flagged as evading the tax. Another possibility is that 
these households have more assets than their AGI indicates; 2001 may simply have been 
a year of low net income from all sources. Doing some theoretical tax detective work, 
could we devise a way of turning up households with the means to hire help but perhaps 
misleadingly low AGIs in the year of audit? To this end, I constructed a new variable, 
Percent Unearned Income (PUI), to measure the proportion of income on a tax return 
that is not wage, salary, self-employment, or retirement income. I maintain that this is a 
less volatile measure of financial security and socioeconomic status than AGI, 
especially since these data are based on a single year rather than a time series. I 
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requested values for this variable for each of the five audit result groups. The Office of 
Research kindly calculated values for this variable based on my specifications. My PUI 
variable measures the proportion of interest and dividend income (as reported on 
Schedules B and D) to the whole AGI, as reported on Line 37 of the Form 1040. 
Schedule B reports all interest income regardless of whether or not it is taxable. Going 
back to the general compliance rate discussion, compliance is highest when there is 
third-party information reporting, as there is with bank interest. Banks submit year-end 
interest income information on 1099-B Forms to the IRS. Therefore, we can safely 
assume a very high accurate reporting rate. The same is true of the dividend income 
reported on Schedule D. Brokerages report the year-end Form 1099-DIV information to 
the IRS as well as to their clients.12 
 Although far from perfect, this variable does give us an idea of how much of a 
household’s income came from investment portfolios as opposed to all other sources. 
When I ranked the groups by PUI (see column three of Table 10), I found that the group 
paying Schedule H in error had the lowest percentage of PUI. This was also the group 
with the second lowest median AGI. The group of those who failed to pay Schedule H 
tax had the second-lowest PUI at 15%. The group of returns with Schedule H 
overpayments had a PUI of 27%. The group of returns with correct payments had the 
second highest PUI, 35%. The group with the highest PUI, 42%, turned out to be the 
households underpaying the tax.  
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Table 10 Income of Audited Household Employers Grouped by Audit Result, 
Ranked by Average Percent Unearned Income 
 
Group Weighted 
Median AGI 
Weighted 
Mean AGI 
Average 
Percent 
Unearned 
Income 
Underpayment 
$167,457 $537,032 
 
 
0.42% 
 Payment 
Correct 
$123,439 $388,147 
 
 
0.35% 
 
 Overpayment 
$242,315 $618,837 
 
 
0.27% 
 
Nonpayment 
$30,066 $206,008 
 
 
0.15% 
Payment in 
Error 
$63,893 $118,547 
 
 
0.00% 
 
 What can we make of these results? Those who paid in error ranked second 
lowest in terms of median AGI and lowest in terms of their percentage of income that 
was unearned. In other words, the households most motivated to figure out and pay their 
payroll taxes – to the extent of paying when not even over the threshold to owe the tax – 
were on the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum, using AGI and PUI as measures. 
On the other hand, the nonpayers were also low, having the lowest median AGI and the 
second-lowest PUI. The most affluent group based on both mean and median AGI 
consisted of returns with overpayments! Evidently these results will not help us answer 
the question of whether household payroll tax compliance is associated with affluence 
or with relative lack of affluence.  
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 The reader may wonder whether the overpayers were overpaying out of 
scrupulousness, but I believe that their overpayments constituted calculation or 
comprehension errors; similarly, I believe the underpayers were also either 
miscalculating or misunderstanding the Schedule H directions. My reasoning is based 
on the fact that the median overpayment was less than a dollar and so was the median 
underpayment. 
 Returning to the overall question of income levels and compliance levels, we see 
that the data barely allows us to confirm either conjecture. In Section 4.9 we saw weak 
evidence that relative affluence is associated with Schedule H underpayments and/or 
nonpayments. In contrast, in Section 4.10 we can see some evidence that relative lack of 
affluence is associated with Schedule H nonpayments and that affluence is associated 
with correct payments and overpayments. Based on all that I have learned through 
examining this aggregate data, I conclude that the NRP audit data indicates that failure 
to pay household payroll taxes occurs at a greater rate among lower income tiers than 
higher, as measured by AGI. In other words, at least based on the available IRS audit 
data, the income effect appears to outweigh the price effect. The interview results in the 
next chapter did indicate that being pressed for money motivated some otherwise 
willing taxpayers to skip paying taxes on needed babysitter services early in their 
careers. One consideration is whether lower AGI indicates not less income but less 
participation in the formal economy. The lower AGI may be a result of the cash 
character of some lines of work, such as contracting or the bar and restaurant business. 
In that case, these lower mean AGIs may be somewhat misleading as to the true income 
level of these households. 
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 A second consideration is that the IRS may have a bias towards well-executed 
tax returns; that is, towards returns completed by professional-level people on 
computers rather than by hand, with evident erasures and math errors.  As in grammar 
school, neatness counts. If this hunch is correct, and I have no evidence to suggest that it 
is, then the tax returns of the lower AGI families may have come under greater critical 
scrutiny during the audits than the others. This might have led to a greater detection rate 
among the lower AGI households. Furthermore, we might expect the higher AGI 
households to be better able to prepare and defend themselves in the face of IRS 
auditors.  
4.11 Conclusion 
 Examining IRS data on all of the just over 200,000 returns containing a 
Schedule H in 2006 allows me to distinguish several important characteristics of this 
segment of taxpayers. First, most people are paying very small amounts of household 
wages and therefore owe concomitantly small payroll tax amounts. A majority pay less 
than $15,000 in household wages. The average household employer tax is $4141, a 
statistic certainly pulled upward by outlying large tax amounts. Sixty percent are paying 
tax amounts under $2500, whereas only 4242 households paid more than $25,000 in 
nanny tax.13  
 Examination of several variables related to the presence of dependents in the 
home reveals that over half of the returns had no caregiving expenses claimed, which 
means that the wages were very likely not paid for either children or sick or older people 
needing care or else that credit would have been taken. I proposed the argument that a 
  103
taxpayer who is paying payroll taxes properly for an employee would be tax-savvy 
enough (or be paying for the expertise of someone else who would be) to take that 
credit. Exemptions for children in the home and indications on the return of the filer’s 
(or filers’) age as 65 or over also implied the possible need for caregiving in some but 
not a majority of the returns.14  
 The 2006 population data also allowed comparison of Schedule H filers to all 
other taxpayers. As would be expected, they are older and more affluent (65.3% had 
AGI over $150,000 compared to 5.2% of other taxpayers) and more likely to be married. 
However, interestingly, although they were four times as likely than the other taxpayers 
to take the Child and Dependent Care Credit (22.7% compared to 4.8%), less than a 
quarter did take this credit. Again, this indicates that those household wages are likely 
paid for work other than caregiving.  
 The number of returns filed each year continues to drop, but the overall amount 
of real wages paid per household has risen. This may mean that the level of 
compensation rose, the number of hours rose, or that the overall number of employees 
rose relative to the number of households.  
 This chapter also utilized IRS audit result data. The National Research Program 
audited returns drawn from year 2001 filings, of which a small subset (452) either paid 
nanny taxes or should have paid them. Examining the limited data released to me 
regarding these returns allowed me to draw several conclusions. 70.3% paid correctly, 
although 7.0% did not pay at all. Another 8.9% paid more than they owed and 4.6% 
paid despite not owing. It is important to note that the noncompliance rate of 7% for 
household employment payroll taxes was almost five times higher when expressed as a 
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proportion of additional households required to file as opposed to a proportion of 
additional dollars collected.  
 Most importantly, since the IRS gave back in refunds 87% as much money as 
they collected in underpaid or unpaid nanny taxes, clearly the nature of the calculations 
and/or the nature of the instructions misled or confused a large proportion of the 
relevant population. We can only wonder how many people, initially motivated to pay, 
are stymied by the process of doing so. Given only quantitative data regarding the 
audits, it is impossible to assess whether confusion, genuine ignorance of the law, 
laziness, or greed were at work. Investigating the relative importance of these motives is 
the purpose of the in-depth interviews which are reported and discussed in later 
chapters.  
 Based on IRS-calculated weighted population figures, the net dollar amount that 
would have been collected through the NRP audit process was $1.66 million, or just 
under two-tenths of one percent (0.19%.) of the total dollars owed. The figure combines 
underpaid, overpaid, paid-in-error and nonpaid amounts. However, the proportion of 
dollars collected solely from nonpaid amounts was $12.8 million, or a shortfall of  
1.43% of the proper Schedule H tax total. In other words, the news is seven times 
“worse” when the overall audit results regarding Schedule H are disaggregated; even the 
small amount of Schedule H noncompliance unearthed by IRS auditors in the NRP 
study is all but cancelled out by the refunds of overpaid and erroneously paid household 
employment tax. Of course, these auditors were not specifically looking for household 
employees paid under the table. Many of the audits were correspondence audits as 
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opposed to face-to-face audits. However, future research must address the low detection 
rate of Schedule H noncompliance in IRS audits.  
 This chapter also analyzed the IRS audit data in terms of audit results 
(overpayer, underpayer, payer in error, correct payer, nonpayer) and examined the AGI 
levels of these groups. Seventy percent of these taxpayers filed correctly, roughly a tenth 
overpaid, and roughly a tenth underpaid. More interestingly, seven percent failed to file 
household employer payroll taxes altogether and about five percent paid these taxes 
while not needing to – that is, filed in error. The average refund to those who paid by 
mistake was almost $1000 while the average non-filed nanny tax discovered in the 
audits – whether unfiled by mistake or conscious tax evasion – was under $600. Those 
found during audits to have unpaid nanny taxes had the lowest median AGI of all five 
audit result groups. They also had the second lowest percentage of unearned income (as 
opposed to interest or dividend income, e.g.). In contrast, those who paid correctly had 
twice the median AGI and reported an AGI that was composed of 35% unearned 
income. Although this information raises more questions that it answers, this research 
does provide a first look into the previously unexamined world of household 
employment payroll tax payments and nonpayments.   
 The analysis here is based on the best available government data on household 
employer payroll taxes, within the limits on its usefulness that IRS privacy and 
confidentiality demand. Properly, we do not have much information about these returns. 
The IRS would be derelict to allow us to infer very much about these households. 
However, as a result of these precautions, conclusions I draw from the NRP data may be 
of only footnote value in the long run, unless individual-level records become available 
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someday. Given that nonpayment of Schedule H taxes directly affects the future 
retirement benefits and financial security of hundreds of thousands – if not millions – of 
domestic workers, many with family members on the other side of the world, that day 
cannot come soon enough.
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Notes 
 
 
1
 The data underlying all figures and tables in this chapter was extracted and 
compiled by IRS Office of Research senior economist Kim Bloomquist, whose 
expertise and generosity enabled me to add this chapter, although all errors are my own. 
 
2
 Recall from Chapter 1 that household employers use Schedule H to report 
wages paid and employer payroll taxes owed on those wages. 
 
3
 Until 1995, household employers filed quarterly federal payroll tax returns on 
separate tax forms. 
 
4
 IRS. 2008. Publication 17. 
 
5
 For the sake of exactitude I give the IRS variable names, which do not follow 
normal capitalization, e.g., “futa_txc”. Variables ending in “c” are usually line items 
that required taxpayer calculations that have been redone by the IRS computer for the 
sake of accuracy. 
 
6
 www.irs.gov. 
 
7
 Whereas 12.9% of the filing population is over 65, 37.3% of the Schedule H 
filers are over 65. Whereas 38.6% of the filing population submitted joint returns, a 
proxy for being married, 70.3% of the Schedule H filers did so. Whereas only 3.2% of 
taxpayers have AGI over $150,000, 65.3% of the Schedule H filers do. 
 
8
 I tested the cross-tabulation data for all TY 2006 tax filers for association 
between the two variables “filed a Schedule H” and “Age 65 and Over”. Chi-square 
testing showed the association significant at the 0.01 level. As we might expect, testing 
of the other four Form 1040 variables also confirmed their statistically significant 
association with Schedule H filing. 
 
9
 As detailed earlier, the CDCC does not phase out completely regardless of 
affluence. However, the return must provide the worker’s valid Social Security number 
or Tax Identification Number, meaning those wages will then be on the record for both 
parties. 
 
10
 For the sake of accuracy, note that these percentages are based not on the raw 
counts of returns in each category in the sample, but on the IRS’s weighted population 
estimates for each category.   
 
11
 Median figures are $702 and $344, respectively. 
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12
 The AGI component of my Percent Unearned Income variable’s main 
limitation is that although much of the wage and salary information is subject to 
withholding and to information reporting, with its attendant high compliance rate, the 
self-employment income is not. Schedule Cs, on which sole proprietors report their 
income, are notoriously misleading. Research demonstrates that unscrutinized income 
has a much higher tax evasion rate. Underreporting of Schedule C income would 
therefore cause the AGI of such returns to be inaccurately low and in turn cause the 
Percent Unearned variable to be too high. 
 
13
 Figures 4.1 – 4.3 illustrated these wage and tax distributions.  
 
14
 One significant problem with this argument is that to take the credit one does 
need to be working and if married the spouse must work as well, earning at least as 
much money as was paid out in child/dependent care. Therefore, some households 
employing a nanny or other caregiver might not file for the credit if the taxpayer(s) was 
(were) not employed and making at least as much money as the employee. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ESTIMATING HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYER PAYROLL TAX EVASION 
IN THE U.S. 1996 – 2006 
5.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter I estimate private household payroll tax noncompliance rates for 
the years 1996 through 2006 by calculating the percentage gaps between Schedule H’s 
filed in a given year and government estimates of private household employment for 
that year. These represent the very first household employer payroll tax noncompliance 
estimates. Chapter 1 established that there are no official estimates of household 
employment payroll tax compliance either by the IRS or by other tax scholars. We need 
to know how many household workers there are before we can use IRS information to 
discern how many household employers are dodging their payroll taxes. My estimates 
are lower bounds only – true evasion rates are likely much higher because official 
survey data on domestic workers likely suffer from undercounting.  
 Of the total population of 63 million tax filers in 2006, just over two hundred 
thousand filed Schedule H with their income tax return, down from over three hundred 
thousand in 1996. Aren’t there more than 200,000 household employees, especially 
since taxes are owed on any part-time employee earning over $1700 per year? Has the 
private household industry really shrunk by a third in just eleven years? Not according 
to government figures on household employment. Despite between-survey differences, 
all data sources indicate that a good deal of tax evasion is going on. 
 Most employment data surveys omit private household workers because they are 
establishment-based rather than household-based surveys, meaning that researchers 
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contact business establishments, i.e., firms, factories, and companies, to ask about their 
workers as opposed to contacting individuals at home to ask about their jobs. Since the 
private household industry – labeled 814100 in the industry classification system –  by 
definition has only private households as workplaces, no workplace-based survey will 
pick up these private household workers. The following major sources of employment 
statistics have no data on industry 814100: the Occupational Employment Statistics 
(OES), the National Compensation Survey (NCS), and the Current Employment 
Statistics (CES)1.  
 The Census, the American Community Survey (ACS), and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) are the only surveys that identify true household employees: 
those who work directly for households (as opposed to agencies). Even the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics must rely exclusively on CPS data in constructing its estimates of 
industry 814100 for both the Household Data Annual Averages (HDAA) and the 
National Employment Matrix (NEM)2. The 2000 Census is out of date. The HDAA data 
is based on the relatively small sample size of the CPS. However, I have chosen to take 
the data at face-value and to report estimates from each of the three data sources to 
calculate compliance estimates. 
5.2 Government Figures on Household Workers  
5.2.1 The 2000 Census 
 The first of the three sources of private household worker estimates is the 
Census, which surveys every possible household every ten years. Nineteen million 
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receive the “long” form; the rest complete the short form. Only the long form covers 
employment information in detail great enough to provide household worker data. As a 
result, labor figures based on Census data are sample data, but the sample is quite large. 
Note that at the finest level of detail, “private household” is considered an industry – 
industry 814100 – so we can find a figure for individuals who work directly for a 
household, rather than for a housecleaning company or home health agency, e.g. The 
Census estimated just under six hundred thousand private household workers in 2000 
(see Table 12). Household workers made up 0.6% of the total working population. Of 
these, 90.9% were female. 64.7% listed a race or ethnicity other than white.3  
Table 11 Census Estimates of Household Workers, 2000. 
 
  Female   Male   Total   
All 526,817 100.0% 52,737 100.0% 579,554 100.0% 
White  339,768 64.5% 35,358 67.0% 375,126 64.7% 
African 
American 79,671 15.1% 7,232 13.7% 86,903 15.0% 
Hispanic 
or Latino 151,909 28.8% 12,063 22.9% 163,972 28.3% 
Asian  18,716 3.6% 2,748 5.2% 21,464 3.7% 
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5.2.2 American Community Survey Data  
 The second government data source for private household employment estimates 
is the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, a mini-Census to bridge the gap 
between decennial Census surveys. It covers about three million households. Like the 
Census, the ACS provides industry detail down to the six-digit level which enables it to 
report information on employment in the private household industry. In 2007, the ACS 
estimated 794,836 household workers, representing 0.6% of the 143 million workers 
overall. Table 13 shows figures for the years 2004 through 2007.  
Table 12: American Community Survey Estimates of  
Household Workers, 2004-2007. 
 
  Female   Male   Total 
2004 682,385 92.7% 53,835 7.3% 736,220 
2005 666,297 90.9% 67,103 9.1% 733,400 
2006 727,705 90.6% 75,497 9.4% 803,202 
2007 724,620 91.2% 70,216 8.8% 794,836 
 
 
5.2.3 Household Data Annual Averages 
 The third source of data is the Household Data Annual Averages (HDAA). The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics compiles these tables from its own above-mentioned surveys 
as well as from the Census Bureau’s CPS. Because none of the Bureau’s surveys 
include household workers, the compilation of private household industry worker 
estimates relies almost entirely on CPS data. A limitation of the CPS, of course, is that it 
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includes only 50,000 households in rolling monthly surveys. Both Bureaus are aware of 
and generate scholarship on the discrepancies between establishment-based and 
household based surveys. The factors which seem to account for differences include 
different universes, definitions, controls, and analytic methodologies. As well, surveys 
may differently reflect the impacts of real-world events such as increases in 
immigration, overall population growth, and periods of substantial economic growth or 
contraction (Bowler, Kirkland, Kropf, Nardone, and Wetrogan, 2003).  
 The HDAA has estimates for household workers both by industry and by class of 
worker. The figures drawn from HDAA’s “Employed persons by sex, occupation, class 
of worker, and full- or part-time status, and race” categorize employed individuals as 
belonging to one of five “classes” of worker (see Table 15, column three). The five 
classes of worker include private enterprise workers, nonprofit organization workers, 
government workers, self-employed workers, and household workers. A discussion of 
the changes in these categories through time is outside the scope of this project, but 
would be very fruitful because these changes reflect changes in American attitudes 
towards race and towards social class. The Census Bureau, not the BLS, collects the 
class of worker information. In the earlier part of the period, the estimate fluctuates 
quite a bit, bouncing between the low eight hundred thousands and the mid-nine 
hundred thousands. The average for the period is 841,000. Current and prior year figures 
are reported annually. After analyzing all available year pairs, I calculated that the 
correction is always a downward correction, has an average value of 9000, and moves in 
a three-year cycle. 
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 The figures drawn from HDAA’s “Employed persons by detailed industry, sex, 
race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity” report the estimate of workers for each industry 
(see Table 15, column four). These by-industry numbers are available for the years 1995 
though 2007. Over this 13 year period, according to the HDAA data, the number of 
household workers declined.  
 Table 15 and Figure 9 present a collection of all available official estimates of 
private household employment. The three sources are the 2000 Census, the ACS, the 
HDAA class-of-worker statistics, and the HDAA by-industry statistics. Observe how the 
two HDAA numbers converge in 2003 and remain identical. Taking the Census and the 
ACS figures together, household employment seems to be rising. Taking the two HDAA 
series together, household employment seems to be falling. Despite the clear differences 
in levels and direction of trend, we shall see in Section 5.4 that the filing of nanny tax 
returns never reaches even half of the level of household employment. Therefore, 
regardless of which survey or which year is taken as a benchmark, a large amount of 
nanny tax noncompliance can be calculated.  
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Table 13: Comparison of Household Worker Estimates from Census, American 
Community Survey, Household Data Annual Averages by-industry, and 
Household Data Annual Averages by-worker-class data, 1995-2007. 
 
  
 2000 
Census ACS 
HDAA: 
Class of 
Worker 
HDAA: 
Industry 
Year         
1995     821,000 971,000 
1996     928,000 936,000 
1997     795,000 921,000 
1998     962,000 967,000 
1999     933,000 940,000 
2000 579,554   792,000 894,000 
2001     803,000 816,000 
2002     829,000 844,000 
2003     764,000 764,000 
2004   736,220 779,000 779,000 
2005   733,400 812,000 812,000 
2006   803,202 803,000 803,000 
2007   794,836 813,000 813,000 
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Figure 9: Comparison of Household Worker Estimates from Census, American 
Community Survey, Household Data Annual Averages by-industry, and 
Household Data Annual Averages by-worker-class, 1995-2007. 
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5.3 Race and Gender Composition of Private Household Employment Figures  
 This section provides a brief look at race and gender composition of the private 
household industry based on HDAA data and Census data, which, unlike the ACS, has 
racial composition information specifically for the private household industry.4 In Table 
16 we see that most workers in private households are women. The gender composition 
of the private household industry does not change much between the 2000 Census (91% 
female) and the 2007 ACS (91.2% female), and the latest available 2007 HDAA 
estimate (90.7% female).  
Table 14: Household Data Annual Averages Data on Racial and Gender 
Composition of the Private Household Industry, 2007. 
 
All Household Workers 813,000 100% 
Female 737,000 91.7% 
Male 76,000 9.3% 
      
White 635,000 78.1% 
Black or African American 97,000 11.9% 
Asian  27,000 3.3% 
Other5 54,000 6.7% 
 
However, in the 2000 Census figures, non-whites account for 64.7% of private 
household industry workers, while in these HDAA figures, non-whites account for only 
21.9% of workers in this industry. I would argue that it is unlikely that non-white 
household workers fell from two thirds to a fifth of the household workforce between 
2000 and 2007! This discrepancy raises some doubts about the representativeness of the 
HDAA data; or, points to a difference in assignment of occupations to the service sector 
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between BLS and Census Bureau practice of which this researcher is unaware. That is to 
say, if the 2007 HDAA data pegs non-white household workers at only 21.9% while the 
Census seven years earlier pegged that statistic at 64.7%, then perhaps the HDAA data 
are not reliable estimates of the private household industry, which has an anecdotally 
large non-white component. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the 
HDAA data on household workers is not based on a sufficiently ethnically 
representative sample. Perhaps undocumented workers are such a large a proportion of 
household workers that their increasing reluctance to participate in government surveys 
during this decade caused these figures to skew white.  
 To sum up, workers in the private household industry are over 90% female and 
65% non-white, according to 2000 Census figures. These are certainly the most reliable 
data due to the large Census sample size. ACS and HDAA data for 2007 confirm that 
the proportion female continues to top 90%.  
5.4 Calculating the Compliance Rate 
 I now compare Census Bureau and  BLS data on workers employed by private 
households with IRS counts of household payroll tax returns in order to estimate 
household employer tax compliance. To derive compliance estimates, I combine the 
Census and BLS estimates of household workers just discussed with IRS data on 
number of household payroll tax returns filed that year. That is, the gap between tallies 
of household workers and the IRS count of households paying household employment 
payroll taxes is a rough estimate of how many noncompliant household employers there 
were in that year. I use these estimates for the years 1996 – 2006 to derive the percent of 
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household employers failing to file payroll taxes. At the very least, this work establishes 
an evidence-based lower bound for estimates of this kind of tax evasion. 
 The noncompliance, or evasion, rate for a given year is simply the ratio of the 
gap between the number of returns that should have been filed (based on government 
estimates of private household workers for that year) and the number of returns that 
were filed (counted by the IRS).6 We have eleven years of data for the number of returns 
actually filed: the IRS counts of returns which include a Schedule H, 1996 through 
2006. Remember, across the eleven year period 1996 – 2006, Schedule H returns 
declined in each year, reaching just over two hundred thousand, a decline of 35%. The 
true number of households who owe nanny taxes is unknown.  However, Chapter 4 
above presented several government estimates of the number of household employees. 
There is Census data for 2000, ACS data for 2004 – 2006, and HDAA data to match all 
eleven years of the available IRS data. We have discussed the wide between-survey 
variation in official government household worker estimates. This naturally affects our 
noncompliance estimates. However, regardless of year or survey, the count of household 
payroll tax returns is never more than half and sometimes only one quarter as large as 
the estimate of household employees. For example, in 2000, Schedule H’s numbered 
268,055, yet the Census counted 579,554 household workers, leaving a difference of 
311,499. This represents a noncompliance rate of 53.7%.  Turning to the American 
Community Survey data, in 2004, we have an estimate of 736,220 workers, the IRS 
Schedule H count was 224,265, for a difference of 511,955. This produces a 
noncompliance rate of 69.5%. Based on ACS data, the next two years,  2005 and 2006, 
had noncompliance rates of 70.2% and 74.2%, respectively. Finally, let us look at 
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noncompliance rates based on the HDAA by-industry estimates of private household 
workers. From 1996 to 2006, the HDAA estimate moved from 936,000 to 803,000 with 
a high of 967,000 in 1998 and a low of 764,000 in 2003. Nonetheless, when we 
calculate the household employer noncompliance rates based on these eleven years of 
data, they climb fairly steadily from a low of 66.0% in 1997 to a high of 74.2% in 2006.  
 Finally, I averaged the three years of ACS data (2004-2006) and averaged the 
corresponding three years of IRS data in order to calculate a noncompliance rate based 
on all available ACS data. The result is an overall noncompliance rate of 71.3% for that 
period. I also performed the same calculation for all eleven years of HDAA data and the 
corresponding eleven years of IRS data, finding an overall 70.0% noncompliance rate 
for that period. I maintain that these two figures are better estimates of the true current 
noncompliance rate than the 53.7% rate based on Census data for 2000, given that both 
surveys contain data more recent than the 2000 Census. 
 These calculations are based on government estimates of private household 
industry employment and are therefore estimates themselves. Given that many 
demographers consider government survey estimates to be biased downward by the 
persistence of undercounting, it is reasonable to presume that these noncompliance 
estimates are also biased downward. Therefore, these results should be considered as 
reasonable lower bound estimates of household employer payroll tax noncompliance.  
 The reader might counter with the objection that some household employers 
have multiple employees and therefore the number of employees is rightly greater than 
the number of returns and causes the appearance of noncompliance. There is no way of 
knowing how many Schedule H returns are for multiple household employees,  but we 
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saw earlier in this chapter that affluent households with large household labor bills are 
in the extreme minority. Recall from earlier in the chapter the low average amounts of 
Schedule H tax. Recall as well the very right-skewed shape of the distribution of tax 
amounts paid. Based on available information, I am convinced that the number of 
multiple-employee returns is small enough relative to the whole that one worker per 
household is a plausible assumption after all.  
 Furthermore, some employees may have multiple employers. Anecdotally, we 
know many employees work part-time for multiple employers. However, given the 
paucity of data on private household employment, there is no way to gauge how many 
employees have multiple nanny tax compliant employers. At any rate, relaxing the 
assumption that each employee has only employer filing taxes on them would make my 
estimates of nanny tax evasion even more conservative. 
 Many scholars have found evidence that government employment survey data 
are dogged by undercounting, even after implementing good-faith efforts to compensate 
for it. Causes and motivations abound (Nguyen, 2004; 2007). Undercounting bias is 
stronger in counts of African Americans and Hispanics than in counts of whites; 
undercounting bias has also intensified overall between 1985 and 2006 (Schmitt and 
Baker, 2006). To the extent that individuals are complicit in their own undercounting by 
dodging or misrepresenting, this residual undercounting may be more likely to occur 
when either party to the employment relationship has something to hide, such as 
working under the table or immigration status. Informal estimates by those who 
organize domestic workers and by those who make a living helping household 
employers file their payroll taxes suggest that government statistics understate 
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household employment substantially. In 2003, Ai-Jen Poo of Domestic Workers United 
estimated 600,000 such workers in the New York metropolitan area alone (Middlekauff, 
2003). In 2008, Angelica Sala of CHIRLA (La Coalición Pro Derechos Humanos del 
Inmigrante en Los Ángeles) estimated 900,000 domestic workers in the LA 
metropolitan area (Crary, 2008). These city-based estimates imply a national domestic 
worker population in the millions. Off the record, an executive with a prominent nanny 
tax agency estimated national domestic employment at ten million. 
 If we consider the possibility of survey undercounts, the numerator (the number 
of returns filed in 2006) remains the same while the denominator (the number of actual 
household workers) would be larger. Hence the noncompliance rate would rise. The 
final section of Table 18 calculates noncompliance estimates for hypothetical levels of 
household employment for 2006.7 See Figure 10 for a graphical comparison of the 
number of Schedule H’s filed in each year (white bar) with any of the three government 
survey estimates of employment in the private household industry (Census, ACS and 
HDAA). Some years have data from only one survey. The year 2000 has all three. 
Examination of this graph provides a clear picture of nanny tax noncompliance. 
 As discussed earlier, the government estimates of  household employees – all 
under one million – may well be undercounts. The table shows that if there were in fact 
one million household workers in 2006 then (given the 207,111 Schedule H returns) the 
true noncompliance rate would have been 79.3%. If there were three million household 
workers in 2006, the true noncompliance rate would have been over ninety percent. 
These speculations notwithstanding, more research is certainly needed to capture the 
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size of the domestic worker population, especially the undocumented domestic worker 
population. 
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Table 15 Calculation of Household Payroll Tax Noncompliance Rates, based on 
Household Data Annual Averages, 2000 Census, and American Community 
Survey Estimates of Private Household Employment. 
 
Year 
Number of 
Workers: 
HDAA (by 
Industry) 
Schedule H 
Returns Difference  
Noncompliance 
Rate 
1996 936,000 317,010 618,990 66.1% 
1997 921,000 313,360 607,640 66.0% 
1998 967,000 297,851 669,149 69.2% 
1999 940,000 280,460 659,540 70.2% 
2000 894,000 268,055 625,945 70.0% 
2001 816,000 253,810 562,190 68.9% 
2002 844,000 242,185 601,815 71.3% 
2003 764,000 230,632 533,368 69.8% 
2004 779,000 224,265 554,735 71.2% 
2005 812,000 218,712 593,288 73.1% 
2006 803,000 207,111 595,889 74.2% 
Year 
Number of 
Workers: 
2000 Census 
Schedule H 
Returns Difference  
Noncompliance 
Rate 
2000 579,554 268,055 311,499 53.7% 
Year 
Number of 
Workers: 
ACS 
Schedule H 
Returns Difference  
Noncompliance 
Rate 
2004 736,220 224,265 511,955 69.5% 
2005 733,400 218,712 514,688 70.2% 
2006 803,202 207,111 596,091 74.2% 
Year 
Number of 
Workers: 
Hypothetical 
Schedule H 
Returns Difference  
Noncompliance 
Rate 
2006 1,000,000 207,111 792,889 79.3% 
2006 2,000,000 207,111 1,792,889 89.6% 
2006 3,000,000 207,111 2,792,889 93.1% 
2006 4,000,000 207,111 3,792,889 94.8% 
2006 5,000,000 207,111 4,792,889 95.9% 
2006 6,000,000 207,111 5,792,889 96.5% 
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Figure 10: Overlay of IRS Schedule H Data on Household Worker Estimates  
5.5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have brought together IRS data on household payroll tax returns 
and private household employment estimates to calculate noncompliance rates for 
individual years. These estimates are lower bounds for household employment payroll 
tax noncompliance rates because noncompliance is almost certainly much higher, given 
the issues of sample representativeness and undercounting of domestic workers. Within 
the eleven years for which we have federal tax data, arguably the most accurate estimate 
of household employment was the 2000 Census, given its large sample size of one-in-
six U.S. households.8 Using that figure, the evasion rate estimate for that year is 53.7%. 
However, in the most recent year for which I have data, 2006, the American Community 
Survey estimated just over 800,000 household workers, yet the IRS counted only 200 
thousand nanny tax returns (Schedule Hs), indicating a noncompliance rate of 74.2%. 
Based on the analysis in this chapter, I am confident in my conclusion that no fewer than 
three-quarters of all household employers are currently failing to pay their nanny taxes.  
 Anecdotally, taxpayers are aware of widespread nanny tax evasion through news 
reports and the lack of social norms regarding payment of this tax. This estimate of 
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noncompliance with household employer payroll taxes is the first of its kind. The value 
of the benefits lost to employees in retirement through nonpayment of Social Security, 
Medicare, and unemployment payroll taxes is huge, scandalous, and remarkably 
unnoticed. Furthermore, given the ordinarily high compliance rate with individual 
income taxes, this level of noncompliance is an aberration. It demands further 
investigation because complexity and social norms play such a large role in deterring 
compliance. The next chapter presents the results of in-depth interviews with household 
employers and employees.  
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Notes 
 
 
1
 The Quarterly Census of Employed Workers (QCEW) would seem to be a 
viable source of household worker data, as it is not a survey but rather an aggregation of 
data collected at the local level based on the payroll taxes and unemployment and 
workers’ compensation taxes paid by about ten million business establishments, that is, 
on the over 100 million jobs covered by unemployment insurance law, as well as almost 
thirty million local, state, and federal government jobs. However, the QCEW 
specifically excludes farm jobs, unpaid family workers, certain railroad workers, the 
self-employed, and those employed by private households. 
 
 
2
 Chapter 1 presented detailed information from the NEM in order to convey the 
proportions of employees doing various occupations within the private household 
industry. Tables 3 through 6 in Chapter 1 present an occupational outline of the industry 
based on the 2006 NEM. See pp. 21-28.  
 
3
 Census table PCT85 “Sex by Industry for the Civilian Population 16 Years and 
Over.” 
 
4
 The aggregate employment figure for all service occupations in all industry 
sectors is just over 24 million. 714,000 of the private household industry workers are in 
service occupations. Therefore, about 3 percent of all service workers are employed in 
private households. 
 
5
 BLS Household Data Annual Averages tables at this level of industry detail do 
not provide information on Hispanic workers. I calculated and labelled the difference 
between identified categories and total workers as “Other.” 
 
6
 Tax research customarily phrases results in terms of compliance rather than 
noncompliance or evasion; of course, subtracting the compliance rate from one yields 
the evasion or noncompliance rate.  
 
7
 I use 2006 because it is the most recent year of IRS Schedule H data. 
 
8
 Recall that only the long Census form asks for detailed employment 
information; this form goes to about 15% of households.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents and discusses, in thematic style, the interview research 
results of an exploratory study of household employment and payroll tax compliance. 
The sixty study participants, thirty household employers and thirty Filipina household 
employees, lived in the Washington, DC area. The experiences, attitudes, perceptions, 
and insights of these two sample groups were collected during the academic year 2007-
2008. Because the research was limited and exploratory in nature, it should not be 
considered representative of all household payroll tax compliance experiences. The 
following research questions guided the collection of data: 
 (1.) Why do so few people pay nanny taxes? Is the economic model adequate to 
explain nanny tax compliance behavior? If not, in what ways does it need to be 
extended? 
 (2.) When some people do pay, what is motivating them? What barriers do they 
face? How do they overcome those barriers? 
 (3.) Do men and women exhibit different compliance behavior? Are the 
determinants of their compliance different? Do spouses agree and what happens if they 
do not?  
 (4.) How do employer identities and attitudes shape the economic decision to 
pay taxes on a household employee? Is class background a factor? 
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 (5.) How much does the employee affect the employer’s decision? What can we 
learn from employees’ lived experiences as domestic workers about the payroll 
compliance decision-making process?  
 Documentation and discussion of the employer interview results follows a 
description of the sixty study participants. A shorter section concerning the smaller 
corpus of nanny interview results concludes the chapter.  
6.2 Description of Interview Subjects 
6.2.1 Employer Sample 
 Employers were recruited through a network of personal and professional 
contacts; each subject lived for at least part of the year in an affluent section of 
Washington, DC. (See Chapter 3 for details regarding methodology.) The average age of 
the employers was 51.5, with a range of 25 to 71. Of thirty participants, 22 were female 
and 8 were male. Twenty-eight had at least one child, with an average of 1.9 children 
and a range of  0 to 9. At the time of the interview, 24 were married or lived with a 
domestic partner; 4 were divorced, 1 was widowed, and 1 was single. Three husband 
and wife pairs were interviewed as part of this study. That is, six individuals were 
married to another participant in the study. 
 Of the 30 employers interviewed, 23 were working professionals, 3 were 
homemakers, and 3 were retired, and 1 was a student. Their professions included 
attorney,  journalist, scientist, artist, doctor, investor, writer, business executive, federal 
worker, and political consultant.  
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 The study participants ranged in highest degree earned from high school to 
doctoral degree. 1 had no college experience, 2 had some college experience, 8 had 
college degrees, 3 had some graduate school experience, and 16 had at least one 
graduate or professional degree. Thirteen of the interview subjects had an Adjusted 
Gross Income of over $150,000, ten had an AGI between $100,000 and $150,000, seven 
had an AGI below $100,000, and three declined to give an estimate.  
 A rough measure of percentage income unearned divided the study participants 
into less than one third unearned, between one third and two thirds unearned, and over 
two thirds of income unearned. Participants were asked to consider their total yearly 
income; then, they were asked to consider how large a part of that income came from 
wages, self-employment and retirement benefits, (including Social Security), as opposed 
to income from interest, dividends, and other assets. They were asked to estimate 
whether the unearned income formed less than a third of their income, more than a third, 
or somewhere in between. This measure is crude, but successfully separates those who 
live primarily on their earnings from those who live primarily on non-work-related 
income.  19 employers had less than a third of their income as unearned income; 3 
employers estimated their unearned income to be between one and two thirds of their 
total income; 5 employers stated that unearned income made up over two thirds of their 
annual income. 
 Of the 30 participants, 12 grew up in families which employed at least one full-
time household worker (as opposed to, e.g., “growing up with a weekly cleaning lady”). 
18 grew up in families which did not have a full-time employee. As employers 
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themselves, they had employed an average of 3.1 employees, with a range from 1 to 6. 
Overall, they reported 93 specific instances or episodes of household employment. 
6.2.2 Description of Employee Sample 
 The thirty subjects in the sample were all working as nannies, housekeepers, or 
both. Many women were expected to perform housework concomitantly while holding 
the job title of nanny. All of the women self-identified as nannies rather than 
housekeepers. Many moved between the two types of employment, with nanny the 
preferred type. Some held two or more part-time jobs while looking for full-time 
employment. None were undocumented workers. 
 The thirty nannies in the sample were all from the Philippines and, unlike the 
employers, were all recruited through snowball sampling. Again, unlike the employers, 
they were all members of a loosely formed social network, which functioned both as a 
social unit and as an informal “union” in the sense that their group norms and their 
communications network enabled them to keep most job openings filled from within 
and enabled them to have knowledge of current wage norms. 
 They ranged in age from 31 to 71, with an average of  51.5 years old. On 
average, they had been in the United States for 13.6 years, with a range of  from 6 to 29 
years. 19 were married, 9 were single, 1 was widowed, and 1 was separated. Of the 20 
who were still married, 10 had left their husband in the Philippines and 10 had been 
joined by, or had married, a husband in this country. Twenty had at least one child, with 
an average of 2.3 children, and a range from 0 to 7. Of the 20 who had children, only 3 
had been able to bring any children over to join them. 
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 The nannies were here in the United States an average of 6.4 years before getting 
their green cards, with a range of 0 to 20 years. At the time of the interviews, they had 
been here for 4 to 14 years, with an average of 7.9. All were currently legal to work in 
the U.S. These domestic workers had ordinarily entered the U.S. legally on temporary 
visas; several were brought with Filipino diplomatic families. Holding expired visas, 
they were then faced with the impossibility of visiting their families back home and 
being able to reenter the U.S. 
 Their average hourly wage was $16, with a range of from $8.75 to $22.50. They 
worked an average of 42.4 hours per week. The nannies interviewed had an average of 
7.5 dependents at home, that is, people receiving most of their support from the nanny’s 
remittances. A  third of the nannies had ten or more, although the range was from none 
to twenty. The dependents consisted not only of children, grandchildren and parents, but 
also of nieces, nephews, and their children.  
 On average, nannies reported sending these remittances 12.1 times per year, with 
most nannies sending money once a month. Only 4 of the 30 sent money less often than 
monthly. They reported sending amounts ranging from a low of $150 three times a year 
to a high of $2200 every month. The average remittance reported, normalized to a 
month, was $545. When calculated for each individual, these remittances represented an 
average of 20% of earnings, with a low of 5 percent and a high of 64 percent. Ten 
nannies lived in the District of Columbia, 14 lived in Maryland, and 6 in Virginia. Of 
the thirty interviewed, 28 were renters.  
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6.3 Employer Results 
 From the thirty employer interviews, I identified  three salient issues: detection 
probability, barriers to compliance, and the fact that the workplace was a private 
household as opposed to an office or store, for example.   
6.3.1 Category 1: The Odds of Getting Caught 
 Concern with detection probability in connection with the employer’s job was 
the most important reason given for paying nanny taxes. Both employers and nannies 
laid emphasis on this in the interviews, that people are strongly motivated by the 
prospect of being caught insofar as it relates to their careers. This was true not only of 
employers’ current positions, but of their future career prospects as well.  
 “All of our friends at the [World] Bank have to.” 
 “You never know what your next job is going to be.” 
 “Since [her friend’s husband] worked in the White House, we both had to pay.”1 
  
The following two quotations are from nannies:  
 “She had to. Her husband worked for the government.” 
 “That employer, the husband is working at the IRS.” 
 In contrast, employers without a current or prospective career that could be 
jeopardized by nonpayment of nanny taxes were not motivated by the possibility of 
being caught. None of the thirty interview subjects gave concern about being caught as a 
reason for noncompliance unless they were specifically discussing job security or career 
prospects. In other words, fear of the detection of tax evasion was raised only in the 
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context of an employer being vulnerable to losing a job or failing to gain a desired job in 
the future.  
 No respondent had had nor had they even heard of an instance in which a 
household employer had experienced such a detection, let alone any negative 
consequences arising from that situation. In fact, several employers made specific 
references to the fact that their retirement meant freedom from filing nanny taxes. The 
following excerpts illustrate this: 
 “But of course I’m retired now, so all that is irrelevant for us.”  
 “I stopped doing all that [nanny taxes] the minute I retired from being the [high-
 visibility elected position]”  
 
The vulnerability of an employer to the consequences of a case of discovered tax 
evasion was a recurring theme in the interviews. Most of the employers raised the 
subject, either in reference to themselves when relevant or in reference to their peers’ 
experiences when it was not. In addition, in explaining why some employers do pay 
nanny taxes, nannies gave the nature of the employer’s job as the most important factor. 
 Interestingly, detection probability – one of the four key determinants in 
traditional economic theory on tax compliance – was never a motivator, unless detection 
would specifically threaten the employer’s job security or career prospects. The 
interviewees demonstrated a lack of concern about detection in the absence of any 
career vulnerability. 
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6.3.2 Category 2: Ignorance and Complexity - the Biggest Barriers to Compliance 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, it is thought that nanny tax compliant household 
employers represent well under ten percent of the population of actual household 
employers. Much of the gap is due to simple lack of awareness that they do owe taxes.2 
Many household employers interviewed did not realize that they owed household 
employment taxes at all. They viewed the arrangements with their employees as 
informal, contingent, and temporary. They did not know that the requirement to file 
household employment taxes began at under two thousand dollars of wages paid. 
Several such misconceptions emerged in the interviews. Some employers incorrectly 
thought that they owed no tax when employees work for others as well; that accountants 
would alert them if they owed; and that giving a1099 form (independent contractor 
form) to a household employee at year’s end was a viable alternative to paying nanny 
taxes.  
 Any individual who pays $1600 or more in a year to any one household 
employee must pay household employer payroll tax by filing a Schedule H with their 
regular annual individual income tax return. In fact, as explained in Chapter 1, $133 per 
month, $62 every other week, or $31 per week is enough to trigger liability. The 
following excerpts on the topic of owing household employment taxes demonstrate the 
ignorance among employers: 
 “Not even on the radar screen.” 
 “I had no idea about any of this until I met you [the interviewer].” 
“I’m sure if I had a full-time employee I’d start to worry about it, but no, not 
with just a part-time employee. But sure, if I had someone who was my 
employee in actuality, then I’d find out how to do it.” 
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 “You have got to be kidding me. This is a lawn guy we’re talking about!” 
 “But she only comes for a very few hours a week right now. We only go out 
 once a week, so we don’t do any of that for her. “ 
 
 “For the first two nannies, I didn’t know about it [the nanny taxes], which is 
 strange when I think about it, because the woman I was sharing this nanny with 
 was an immigration attorney, and you’d think if anyone were going to be up on 
 this, an attorney working with immigrants would be, but no.”  
 
Employers also said that their tax professional would certainly have told them if they 
were supposed to have been paying nanny taxes all these years. Many interview subjects 
were at pains to establish that being tax compliant was important to them, that they 
would have been paying nanny taxes if they had owed them. In other words, some were 
surprised to hear (as well as reluctant to believe) the filing requirement information 
presented in the course of the interview. The myth of the maid-as-independent-
contractor is one more of these points of ignorance. Recall the discussion in Chapter 1 
about the strict and little-known definition of who is a household employee. To review, 
the federal guideline from the IRS  Household Employers’ Handbook is 
“You have a household employee if you hired someone to do household work 
and that worker is your employee. The worker is your employee if you can 
control not only what work is done, but how it is done….If only the worker can 
control how the work is done, the worker is not your employee but is self-
employed (p. 2).” (Italics mine)  
 
An excerpt from the Virginia Employment Commission’s Employer Handbook backs 
this up: unless the worker under discussion is “engaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, profession, or business,” they are not an independent contractor but 
rather a household employee. In addition, the fact that an employee may have more than 
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one household employer does not make them an independent contractor either. The 
following excerpts illustrate this how employers misunderstand these points: 
 “I would definitely have been paying them [household employment taxes] all 
 along, if my accountant even mentioned it to me once. He knows everything 
 about me, he has all my checks, I would know from him if there was anything I 
 was supposed to do about this.” 
 
 “There are about a hundred tax guys [tax attorneys] in our firm and I’ve never 
 heard anything about this [that nanny taxes are owed at the $1500 threshold and 
 owed for yard work].” 
 
 “Well, it’s just a very informal arrangement. There’s no contract or 
 commitment.  Either of us could just stop doing it [the employment 
arrangement]  any time we  wanted – next week!” 
 
 The following words were from an accountant, a non-study participant, whose 
clients are affluent and usually have individuals working in their homes. This is an 
example of incorrect information on the part of a tax advisor. 
“Well the first thing to do is establish if they really have a household employee. 
If that individual works for anyone else besides yourself then they’re not your 
employee. They’re an independent contractor and all you owe them is a 1099, 
which you definitely should do because if the employee doesn’t file their taxes, 
the IRS can come to you looking for it.” 
 
 Study participants also found it difficult to learn how to file even when they 
wanted to. They described a steep learning curve regarding how to calculate and 
properly withhold the income tax from their employee’s paycheck. Although some 
understood that they were responsible for paying household employment payroll taxes 
as a line item on their annual federal income tax return, they were surprised to learn 
about state income tax and state unemployment tax laws, especially when the worker 
lived in one jurisdiction and worked in a second one. They did not find it easy to obtain 
either the federal or the state employer identification numbers, which are needed at the 
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outset. When employers described their levels of comprehension, they often 
simultaneously referred to the difficulties of performing the actions required as a 
significant barrier despite their reasonable efforts. Participants referred to the 
complexity of beginning to file as a separate issue from the complexity of keeping up 
with the ongoing process.  
 “I think my lowest point [during the registration process] was when the state 
 website demanded that I select the best description of the nature of my business 
 for which I had employees. Because I didn’t know anything about being on the 
 hook for these unemployment taxes, I was really quite nervous and had a lot of 
 misgivings about registering as a business owner. I finally selected ‘domestic 
 services provider’ as the best description of my household, but I still remember 
 how stupid they were.” 
 
 “You need a college education just to understand what they’re asking you to do 
 – no, wait, I have a college education and I couldn’t do it. You need a math or 
 accounting degree!” 
 
 “Getting started was very hard. I’m a journalist. I find things out for a living and 
 explain them to others. It was a real challenge, especially because I had just had 
a  baby, I’m a single mom, and I was going back to work – I was in a fog.” 
 
 “I’m all about doing the right thing – and we just couldn’t do it. It was too hard. 
 The irony is – right – the whole reason we’re in this position [of needing to pay 
 nanny taxes for multiple simultaneous employees for their two disabled 
children]     is because we’re overwhelmed and need the relief. It’s hard enough just 
trying to  make the money to pay for the caretakers we need.” 
 
 “At the time my son was born, my husband had just gotten very ill. He had 
 cancer.  And we were told to go to [medical center] for six weeks. The new 
 nanny  and the details of her employment were the least of our concerns.  So, no, 
 we never got started [doing payroll taxes].” 
 
 Finally, several times it became clear during an interview (both to me and to the 
interview subject) that he or she was not meeting all tax requirements, despite thinking 
that everything was properly paid. Ignorance of the full scope of the requirements was 
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the cause. The first quotation is from an employer who was omitting state taxes and the 
second is from one who was omitting federal taxes: 
 “Oh, really…no, know I don’t think we do that [state unemployment taxes].  We 
 don’t do anything quarterly.”  
 
 “I pay her DC unemployment taxes quarterly and do her withholding and 
 quarterly estimated tax for DC, but I don’t know anything about this Schedule H 
 you’re talking about.  I’ve never heard of that.” 
 
 
 The IRS estimates the time necessary to comply with different tax requirements, 
broken down into time required for learning about the law, recordkeeping, and filling 
out the form. For Schedule H, the estimates are: “Recordkeeping, 1 hr. 38 min; Learning 
about the law or the form, 30 min; Preparing the form, 54 min; Copying, assembly, and 
sending the form to the IRS, 34 min.” “2007 Forms and Instructions for Household 
Employers.” These estimates are laughable. Consider weekly employer recordkeeping 
for salary and withholding, just at the federal level, for fifty-two weeks. According to 
this estimate, it would take under two minutes a week, including time spent adjusting 
exemptions and recalculations whenever hours or wages changed. Time spent per week 
on tax matters was not one of my interview questions, nor do I have quantitative time 
use data from employers. However, time spent was one of the favorite topics in the 
interviews. Keeping up with nanny taxes is a burden.  Participants related frustration 
and resentment about the ongoing process. In particular, they complained about the time 
and energy consumed by it, or the money spent to outsource it.  
 “I never failed to appreciate the irony of not being able at times to spend time 
 with my daughter or my husband because of a pressing nanny tax demand. I 
 hated it. It made me resent our nanny.  It seemed I’d no more than get one 
 squared away, sometimes overdue ones, when the next quarterly deadline would 
 be upon us.” 
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 “I don’t spend any time at all on it.  It’s all done by [Houston company] but we 
 pay dearly for being able to forget about it.” 
 
 “When I moved out of my house to [her new residential community] I took over 
 all of the taxes from my accountant because I finally had the time to apply 
myself  and figure out how to do it. It was awful, but I do it all now, I’m quite proud of 
 myself.” 
 
 Disputing taxes owed with the IRS and with state tax agencies represents 
another feature of ongoing compliance. Employers also described seemingly adversarial 
and tenacious bureaucratic hassles. About half of the household employers who had any 
experience with nanny taxes described one or more incidents of this nature. The 
following excerpts illustrate this point: 
 “Those bastards. I hope they rot in hell.” 
 
 “When my husband was taking care of an elderly aunt, he had some terrible 
times   with the nanny taxes… at the federal level.  The correspondence went back and 
 forth for years.  It soured us on the whole thing [nanny taxes].” 
 
 “The worst part was the unemployment people. I was always getting something 
 in the mail from them disputing the amount owed and I had so many 
 responsibilities at the time.” 
 
 On the other hand, a common thread was the ease of handling nanny taxes when 
there was a third party wholly responsible for all aspects of compliance. To be clear, this 
is not the same thing as having an accountant. A majority of those with an accountant 
still reported effort and difficulty. 
 
 “There’s an online service we found through a friend. They do all of it for  you. 
 It’s hundreds of dollars a year, but they even cut her paychecks.” 
 
 “I never really had to think about it because [name of nanny share employer] did 
 all of it. I just gave her however much money she asked us for.” 
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 “I sent an email to all my friends who work and have small children basically 
 asking them, ‘what do you do? [about going back to work and childcare] Several 
 of my friends all told me about [name of agency], I think they’re in Houston. I 
 actually did all of it online. No, I guess I had to fax them something, but 
 otherwise, I just filled in our information and we were set. It’s a great service.” 
 
 The study revealed numerous instances in which household employers were able 
to overcome the lack of knowledge and difficulty factors. These experiences may be 
particularly fruitful of implications for nanny tax policy. The following excerpts 
illustrate “what worked”:  
 “I just kept plugging away.  I was very motivated.  I did it step by step.  
 Sometimes I had to leave it alone and go complain about it and come back the 
 next day and pick up where I left off.” 
 
 “I went on the [IRS] website and I had them send me stuff about employer taxes 
 and I just remember having to spend a lot of time with it but you figure it out … 
 eventually!” 
 
 “It was very bad but I guess I felt like I was being a grown-up, a ‘good doobie’ 
 by managing to do this for her [the nanny].” 
 
 “It was a learning process.  I kept calling my accountant - who had been doing 
 the filing - with questions until I got the hang of it.”  
 
 “Back when I was paying [the housekeeper’s] Social Security taxes -  this would 
 have been back in the mid-60s to early 70s it was very simple. You just paid one 
 thing.  I remember I went down to the Social Security office in [her town] and 
 they set me up to do it. But nowadays forget it. It’s just too much. I’m sorry.” 
6.3.3 Category 3: The “Household” Aspect of Household Employment Taxes 
 Study participants varied in the extent to which they identified with the role of 
household employer. The first descriptions below are from study participants who did 
not accept the household employer role. These people realized that they had a household 
employee and were technically obligated to pay nanny taxes. However, they did not 
think of themselves as household employers. They felt this designation was thrust upon 
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them from outside, either incorrectly or unjustly, or both. Those that rejected the role 
were of course less likely to acknowledge and fulfill the responsibilities of being a 
household employer. Some of these employers expressed disengagement, denial, 
distaste and resentment.  
 One woman, who was planning to be home with her newborn, hired her nanny 
overnight due to an extreme health crisis. The nanny’s employment was an annoying 
inconvenience, since the whole family was out of town due to medical treatments, yet 
she was paying the nanny to keep her. Having begun that way, that is how the 
employment relationship continued. Another woman gave birth while holding down a 
medical residency at a demanding, nationally known hospital. The hiring of the nanny 
was naturally given the same short shrift as every other part of her life outside the 
hospital.  
 Other employers, who unlike the two employers above, did not hire in a crisis, 
evinced a sense of disengagement from the employee – as though there were no overlap 
or point of tangency between them. This could be perfectly appropriate in a cultural 
setting in which a house manager was in charge of hiring and managing the other 
household employees, however, in this situation, there is no professional who takes on 
this role. One woman who had had four nannies over a period of seven or eight years 
did not express any sense of responsibility or report any interaction with them. In her 
interview, she made no distinction between the four women factually, in tone, or non-
verbally. Her remarks focused on her job, work-family challenges, and her law partners’ 
attitudes towards detection probability. It was as though a different individual had 
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managed the employees, although her spouse had not played any part in hiring, paying 
and managing the nannies.  
 A fourth respondent had a similar lacuna in her remarks. She was silent on the 
subject of interacting or engaging with a series of four prior employees, although she 
had a relationship with her current employee due to that woman being a basement tenant 
who “cleaned the whole house as part of her rental arrangement.”  
 Seven other employers – six female and one male – also revealed this apathy or 
disconnection from not simply the employee but from the activity of employing a 
human being. This was regardless of whether or not the employer was meeting the 
nanny tax obligations. These eleven individuals did not identify as employers in their 
households; interestingly, none of them was nanny tax compliant. This indicates that 
perhaps the employers’ perceptions and attitudes towards the employment relationship 
itself is a determinant of nanny tax compliance. 
 Moving on to those who did appear to identify with the employer role, other 
interview subjects spoke of their household employer role, how their family background 
had shaped them, and their self-assessment as an employer. They shared many thoughts 
on being a household employer, and were interested in describing how they experienced 
that role. (The non-identified individuals were no less talkative or forthcoming, they just 
focused on other aspects of their experiences.) The following excerpts are from 
employers who had a firm household employer identity. 
 “There are a lot of us that she’s working for now, some are relatives of mine. We 
 all stay in touch and check things out with each other. It’s a good system because 
 there’s a lot of trust. There’s a lot of accountability. She could never steal 
 without losing all her jobs, for example. And I’d never give her a raise without 
 talking it over with everyone else cause it would affect them too.”  
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 “We had been raised with the thought that we should pay workers comp, etc.” 
 
 “I felt a great sense of responsibility to her.”  
 
 “We were never certain that she was legal even though she said she was and 
 that’s basically why we never pursued it [nanny taxes]. We were determined not 
 to get  her into any trouble.” 
 
Employers also discussed how they viewed the individuals who came to perform labor 
in their homes. I was able to distinguish four employer orientations or points of view 
towards employees.  
6.3.3.1 Orientation 1: Resentment and Annoyance 
 
 These women saw the employee as an unwelcome intruder. There was a failure 
to accept the employee as deserving of employment rights because the worker was 
already imposing on, taking advantage of, or ‘coming out ahead’ with the employer. 
Although no one specifically referred to shirking behavior, some of the employer 
comments revealed irritation that the employee was being overpaid for the work he or 
she were performing. One woman spoke very coldly about all three of her successive 
live-in nanny/housekeepers. She saw them as “takers” who were getting a good bargain.  
 “Yes, that’s right, the minimum wage. But consider the fact that these women 
are  all living in my house. They’re eating my food. They can put absolutely all of it 
 [their wages] in the bank every month.” 
 
 “It’s really quite a cushy job. She just comes in the morning, straightens up,
 and  does the dogs and that’s pretty much it. We usually let her go home early, 
but  she gets the whole amount every week.” 
 
 The employer above had seen a daughter off to college, thus reducing the 
workload of the nanny/housekeeper over the years, without making changes to her hours 
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or salary. Another employer complained that, although the employees did yard work, 
they did the wrong yard work tasks despite clear instructions, thus giving little value for 
the money. In one instance, part of her garden had been ruined by zealous but misguided 
gardening.  
 “I don’t know why I let them keep coming every week. I spend all morning 
 telling  them what to do and when I go away they do exactly as they please – like 
 the rock garden incident I told you about.”  
 
Some respondents just felt that the negative aspects of having their household employee 
challenged the positive ones: 
 “I was working at home, it was a small place, and I tried to secrete myself away 
 and wore earphones to block the sound of my son and his nanny. I resented every 
 minute away from my own work having to do her paychecks every Friday, the 
 endless accounting. The whole point of the nanny was supposed to be so I could 
 work. It was really the time and energy a lot more than the money [that bothered 
 her].” 
 
 “She [the nanny] was just a reminder of a bad time in our lives.” 
 
6.3.3.2 Orientation 2: Disregard or Denial of Employees 
 
 Some employers expressed willful disregard or denial of their employee. They 
didn’t resent them, collaborate with them, or condescend to them. They just didn’t 
acknowledge them. This is important because this attitude, of course, leads to 
abnegation of all payroll responsibility. They felt that the people they had hired were not 
employees, but rather something else. These individuals knew enough to know that they 
looked like they had an employee, but they also had a ready explanation for why they 
didn’t. One employer used the phrase “provisional arrangement,” one used the phrase 
“not contract,” and one used the word “temporary.” Following are additional quotations 
representing this attitude: 
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 “Well these people come in and do everything. They’re in teams, and I can only 
 assume that one of them’s in charge and is taking care of all that [payroll 
taxes].” 
 
 “I only took her on for six months. It was a mutually provisional arrangement – 
 she was trying us out too.” 
 
 “[name of employee] is not an employee, she’s a renter. She just does 
housework  for me  as part of the rent.” 
 
 “This guy is really someone who works for [husband’s business]. [Husband] 
 sends him over every Friday afternoon to take care of the lawn and such. It’s also 
 part of his rent ‘cause they live here, his family lives here in a little house on our 
 property.” 
 
 “There’s no commitment on either side so that without that surety, no one seems 
 to be much concerned with, say, anything but cash on the barrelhead.” 
 
 “And I have this girl come over once a week to keep me organized. I give her a 
 hundred bucks a day. I guess she’s technically working for me, but she’s doing 
 office work.” 
 
6.3.3.3 Orientation 3: Generosity and Paternalism 
 
 The third of the four dominant stances towards employees which arose in the 
interviews was that of the employee from a superior yet at least somewhat benevolent 
position. The dominant theme was wanting to act in such a way as to assist the 
employee, but with a sense of confidence about what would best accomplish that. For 
example, employer’s wanted:  “to do right by her,” “to help her avoid trouble,” “to make 
sure she didn’t lose any benefits,” and “to not reduce the amount of money she made 
every week.” In the context of nanny tax compliance, employers gave altruistic reasons 
for paying the taxes and for not paying the taxes. 
 Those with this benevolent but superior attitude demonstrated protectiveness and 
sometimes possessiveness. They usually came from a family background of having 
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household employees. There was a sense of responsibility and commitment to the 
perceived welfare of the employee. However, there was also a sense of condescension 
and confidence that they knew best how to benefit their employee. The quotations, 
which follow, demonstrate this:  
 “I care about her enormously. I want her to get enough Social Security to go 
 home, retire, and enjoy her grandchildren. If I had my way [as opposed to his 
 spouse’s way] I would’ve given her all the forms to file self-employment taxes 
 and the money – I know that’s not what we’re supposed to do, but it would 
 actually have been a lot easier for us never mind the ridiculous amount of money 
 [the accountant] got. And she could’ve made her own decision whether to pay 
 the taxes.” 
 
 “[The nanny] needed her retirement benefits just like anyone else. I’m glad I was 
 able to help with that. I wish more people felt like we did.” 
 
 “This woman is worth every penny. She’s been with me for years; she’s a true 
 Christian. What I mean is, she is very serious about her faith, we have that in 
 common. I would do anything for her. I know she would never go for taking 
 money out of her check, and we would never force the issue.” 
 
 “Oh God no! I can pay her so much more if it’s under the table. She’d make like 
 $7 an hour if we did all that. This way she makes $11. I honestly think it’s the 
 best thing to do, for her sake.”  
 
 “Back when [her son and her daughter] were little we had several nannies. I 
think  it would’ve been wrong to ask someone at that low a pay scale to have taxes 
 taken out. So no, we didn’t pay but it was for their benefit.” 
 
 “She was a very decent, hard-working Black woman. She had a bunch of no-
 good people in her family who lived with her, who never worked. I didn’t give 
 her a hard time about it, but you had a feeling that some of that money…If 
 anyone deserved to have Social Security, she did.” 
 
 Hearkening back to the employer-identification theme, these individuals were of 
course strongly identified as household employers. They described the lengths to which 
they had gone to assist their employees. One woman was not paying nanny taxes for her 
employee because “I was too poor at the time”. Later, upon the employee’s retirement, 
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this employer responded to her employee’s requests for financial help. This evolved into 
sending $100 a month for twelve years. In pure dollar terms, this employer paid many 
times her “share” of the employee’s retirement security. 
 What makes a last one an example of paternalistic behavior is the keen sense of 
power and financial imbalance this employer expressed coupled with an ongoing sense 
of responsibility. This was a sense of responsibility for someone who had at one time 
given their all for your household and thereby acquired a certain small but permanent 
claim on the goodwill of the former employer. This was expressed, sometimes quite 
passionately, by four employers I have characterized as paternalistic. It entails a class-
based assumption that the grantor has and will always have plentiful resources; also, the 
claimant is and will always live in scarcity. Three of these paternalistic employers 
described being uncomfortable with some employee who had a more fluid sense of their 
class identity and therefore was not interested in playing the loyal servant role in 
exchange for a vague mutual understanding that they would be protected in financial 
emergencies. The example below is illustrative of this. 
 Another woman related a telling incident in which it was clear that she saw one 
of her employee’s as “a regular employee” and one as having served long and faithfully 
enough to deserve a certain kind of treatment.  
 “I have this woman who irons for me. I’ve had her for years and years since the 
 kids were little. She can hardly do anything anymore, poor thing, but I keep her 
 coming out [to the employer’s house] for her own sake.” 
 
 For example, this woman comes to work for several hours twice a week despite 
her services not being needed. She is in her 80’s and frail and the other, much younger 
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employee does everything else. Many benefits, gifts, and financial safety net items are 
given to the older one, such as car repairs. The younger employee had been jealous for 
some time; she lost her temper one day and insisted on a raise to even things out.   
 The following quote from a different interview illustrates the condescending yet 
financially generous attitude these paternalistic employers have: 
 “One day she came to work and mentioned in that sideways way which isn’t 
 really asking but instead informs you of a great problem because they correctly 
 assume that you do want to know about anything bad that’s happening to them. 
 She needed twelve thousand dollars. It was to make a land purchase in Manila 
go  through. She had twelve thousand in a CD that wasn’t due for some months. I 
 offered to lend her the money. I was following my own rule which is if you can 
 afford to lend it, why not? I wrote her a check at the end of the day – obviously 
 she was really grateful – and I got the money back at the end of the summer. 
 Bear in mind, I only had her word that there was a CD. That’s how much trust 
 there was between us. $12,000. And not so much as a paper IOU!” 
 
 Of course, the large dollar figure involved is not relevant. The same scenario 
could be played out with $1200 or $120. The key element is that the employee knew the 
nature of the relationship. A final quote illustrates this attitude:   
 “We are a literal Social Security system for her. We do what the government is 
 supposed to be doing for these people, and we do it more efficiently, more 
 humanely. If the integrity is there, and the capacity for love, on our part, and the 
 loyalty on their part, then, if those things are in place, then it’s like the Stones: 
 you don’t always get what you want, but you get what you need.” 
 
Some of these employers were nanny tax compliant and some were not. There appeared 
to be nothing in this paternalism that made employers inclined to pay or not to pay. In 
other words, neither a helpful, generous, compassionate, attitude nor its extreme 
version, the financially generous, paternalistic attitude, appeared to correlate with 
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compliance. Of course, the small sample size limits my ability to define a relationship 
between altruism and compliance.  
6.3.3.4 Orientation 4: Respect and Partnership 
 
 The fourth and final way in which employers related to the employees was as a 
partner or peer in running the life of the family. They discussed their employee as a 
colleague in the difficult effort to maintain two high-income jobs while properly caring 
for one or more children. In these cases, the employee had evidently been given and was 
accepting a great deal of responsibility for managing, planning, purchasing, and 
decision-making. Of the six who perceived their employee this way, five were women. 
“[Nanny’s name] is amazing. She is so like me. Her work ethic is amazing. I can 
go in there [points to her home office], shut the door, and ignore everything till 
four o’clock because I know she’ll handle everything just as I would. If she 
weren’t my employee, she and I would probably be best friends.” 
 
“If I just focused on keeping [nanny’s name] going [her well-being], then she 
was able to focus on taking care of [employer’s son]. I knew nothing about 
babies, signs of illness or when they should eat solid food, etc. and I didn’t really 
want to. I was paying her to be the baby expert. On the other hand, I did know 
how to navigate the adult world well enough to solve all of [nanny’s name]’s 
problems rapidly enough that her entire focus would be on our son. I taught her 
to bring all of her outside  problems to me – anything that would keep her 
from work or distract her at work. In the long run, handling landlord problems or 
getting her in to see my dentist right away was a much better deal than losing her 
help while she bumbled around trying to handle stuff herself – which took 
forever. Everything takes so long when you’re poor. I figured if I could keep her 
healthy and unstressed then she could best care for my child. I cared for my child 
most effectively by taking care of my nanny.” 
 
 “Since your nanny is the one taking care of your kids, I’d think you’d want to 
 take care of her.” 
 
 “All of these women are godsends. They know exactly what to do – you really 
 need special training to care for the kinds of special needs our kids have.” 
 
 “I deferred to her a lot. I’d often tell her that she was the expert and that I trusted 
 her judgment more than ours.” 
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 In several of these cases, a partner-like intimacy and affinity seemed to exist 
between the two women working hard to maintain a household – one industriously from 
inside and one protectively from the outside. These study participants granted their 
employees a lot of respect for their capabilities; they also gave them a lot of trust and 
autonomy in decision-making. 
6.3.4. The Household and the Welfare State 
 Finally – although it may sound grandiose and abstract – the household 
employers had definite and divergent opinions about their household in relation to the 
welfare state. That is, they expressed opinions about proper role of the household vis-à-
vis the government and the Social Security system. Some felt civic pride in participating 
appropriately as an employer in providing some income security for their employee in 
retirement. On the other hand, some felt strongly that the government’s request for half 
of the payroll tax was an affront, was ridiculous, was an outrage given the amount of 
goods and services and extra income they were providing their employee with. In other 
words, employers critical of Social Security coverage of domestic employees felt that 
their own household was not only assuming the role of the welfare state, but doing a 
much better job than the U.S. welfare state ever could.  
 Of the thirty participants, twelve volunteered a point of view about the 
government levying Social Security payroll taxes. Four employers were clearly positive. 
They expressed an understanding of the importance of benefits. Two had had experience 
with Social Security Survivors’ Benefits.3 Two referred to a standard of living below 
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which people should not have to live. In all cases, the employer referred to him or 
herself as a reference point for this standard or for the importance of the benefits. None 
of the comments were in the abstract. None used the words ‘welfare state’ or 
‘government’. These quotes illustrate these positive views: 
 
 “I really believe in people getting Social Security. I knew Social Security 
 benefits. I was willing to figure out how to do it. I had had some experience with 
 Social Security myself because my dad died when I was in high school and I got 
 some money each month as survivor benefits. It made me feel good because I 
 knew he’d paid into that his whole working life.” 
 
 “You get out what you put in, sort of. If you don’t do it, you’ll be sorry later. My 
 mom and I were so glad to have my dad’s Social Security check.” 
 
 “There’s no reason her life should be any worse than ours when she retires just 
 because she’s working for a family instead of a company!” 
 
 “I guess I’m partly motivated by wanting social justice.” 
 
 “I pay these people well above the market rate. If I couldn’t afford to do that, I’d 
 do the work myself!” 
 
On the other hand, eight employers were clearly or somewhat negative. The following 
excerpts are from two employers who felt that in their case the taxes were unimportant, 
even superfluous: 
 “Well, her husband has a great job with the county and he’s going to get a fine 
 pension. I’m not worried about her at all. Maybe if they didn’t have that….” 
 
 “It’s not like she’s alone in the world.” 
 
 Likewise, several employers were convinced of the futility of making these tax 
payments and expecting the employee could ever benefit from them: 
 “What rips me is she’ll never get any of it.” 
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 “If I thought these people were ever going to see any of that money, I would 
 gladly pay it.” 
 
 One singled out unemployment taxes (FUTA) in this regard, (as opposed to the 
Social Security part): 
 “Virginia is ridiculous, incredibly strict. We’d be throwing our money away, 
 because she’d never collect anything.”  
 
 In addition, some employers expressed scorn for the government in these 
phrases: “those idiot bureaucrats,” “those pencil-necks,” and “Virginia is vicious like 
that, they’re the second worst in the country for that kind of hassle.” Finally, these 
employers expressed the opinion that they were a far better provider of welfare, that 
they took the employee’s welfare more to heart than the government ever could. They 
felt they should be allowed to “opt out,” as it were, on the basis of their sense of 
commitment and generosity with their resources.  
 “I take better care of her than any pencil-neck bureaucrat would dream of 
doing.”  
One woman simply stated that she resented the intrusion of the government into her 
household. The household was the key element, not the idea of the payroll taxes. 
 “I don’t know. I just feel that the government should stay out of the household 
 and it’s a little weird for me to feel that way because ordinarily I support all 
kinds  of government benefits and support for people.” 
6.3.5 Summary of Employer Results 
 Employers had various levels of identification with the employer role, various 
attitudes towards their employees and various points of view about the government in 
relation to their household. Clearly many employers are not prepared or willing to take 
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on the responsibility of engaging with those they hire to perform household labor. 
Interestingly though, strong identification as an household employer was not connected 
to nanny tax compliance in that there was no apparent difference in compliance 
behavior between the two groups. Liking the employee did not result in higher nanny 
tax compliance. Disliking the employee appeared to predispose employers to evade, but 
for some employers, other pressures made them comply anyhow (e.g., spouse, 
government employment). Finally, all four with a positive regard for  their household’s 
requirement to provide part of the retirement security for their employee through the 
Social Security system did all pay nanny taxes. And of the eight with negative views, 
four did not pay and the remaining four paid under clear duress from an external source 
(a spouse with greater assets or income, their own government employment).  
6.4 Nanny Results 
6.4.1 Why Do Employers Pay? 
 Nannies discussed only four basic reasons for employer compliance: fear of 
getting caught and losing something professionally, personal ethics, feeling pressured by 
someone, and getting a tax break. The first reason, detection probability, was discussed 
by nannies specifically in connection with the employer’s job (7), in connection with the 
employer’s small business (1), as well as in general terms (4). When citing personal 
ethics as a reason for employer compliance, nannies referred both to employer ethics 
regarding the nanny herself (5) and employer ethics regarding the law (3). That is to say, 
some nannies saw employers’ ethical concern for the nanny as driving compliance while 
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others cited the employers’ ethical concerns for lawful behavior in general. The 
following reflect nannies’ responses: 
 
 “To be good to the nanny.” 
 
 “Some employers are responsible employers.” 
 
 “For the nanny’s  future.” 
 
 “It’s the law.” 
 
 “They care about the nanny.” 
  
 “She [the employer] didn’t want to lie to the government.” 
 
 “When I got interview, I ask every time, pay my taxes, pay my health 
 insurance...some nanny doesn’t do this...you ask them [the employer] and if they 
 don’t, then you don’t say you take that one.” 
 
 “They work for the IRS.” 
 
 “Most pay, because we put that on the top.”  
 
 “Most employers are in the government and they go by the book.” 
 
 “It was the right thing to do. Also, concern with me.”  
 
 “It [the employer] was working in the government.” 
 
 
 Two nannies worked for small business owners. Both employers were tax 
compliant, despite not holding a job perceived as vulnerable to discovered tax evasion.4 
6.4.2 Why Do Employers Not Pay? 
 Overall, nannies made it clear that the employer’s government job was the 
reason that taxes were paid. However, when focusing instead on the question of why 
noncompliant employers didn’t pay, nannies dwelt on the idea that employers did not 
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pay when they did not care. The reasons conjectured for employer noncompliance 
included: the employer was a diplomat, the employer did not like the nanny, the 
employer was Jewish; the nanny was not a citizen, the nanny was only a part-time 
worker. 
 
 “[If the] employee only part-time, don’t want to help, extend the hand.” 
 
 “He [the employer] thought because he’s not a citizen he doesn’t owe. Also, he 
is  saying I’m an independent contractor.” [The job was full-time nanny to newborn 
 twin boys.] 
 
Only two of thirty nanny interviewees talked about the employees themselves not 
wanting payroll taxes paid: 
 
 “Younger don’t want to pay. Also, if money is too little.”  
 
 “Sometimes the nanny, housekeeper doesn’t want to pay the taxes. They do it 
 especially if the salary is very small, or if she has a big family in the 
Philippines.” 
 
 
6.4.3 Nanny Ignorance of Filing Requirements 
 There were only four of the thirty nanny interviewees who demonstrated a clear 
misunderstanding of the household employer’s requirement to file payroll taxes. One 
respondent mistakenly thought that the amount she earned per week was too small to 
count for taxes.  
 
 “They have to if you have papers [a green card].” 
 
 “The first family I worked for was diplomatic so they didn’t have to pay the 
 taxes.”  
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6.4.4 Bad Treatment 
 The following employee excerpts describe bad treatment: 
 
 “The first job was live-in for six months. I made $200 a week [in 2000].” 
 
 “Before my green card, I got $275 per week. I work eleven, eleven and a half 
 hours a day. They do not pay taxes. I am filing my own taxes and paying 
 everything.” 
 
 “When I first came here to the U.S., I really disappointed. I am working to 
 Egyptian diplomats. The work it’s 7 a.m. to 2 a.m. a lot....$200 a month, 
 September,1990. I worked to them seven month, I losing weight, got sick, 103 
 lbs to 83 lbs. The kids are 12 and 16 and they spit on me. But, I think of my 
niece  and nephew, their education. One of my friends from church helped me run 
away  and find new family.” 
 
 “My first job is for a doctor. They live in [DC neighborhood]. It’s a live-in. Too 
 busy. Before my green card, it’s $200, $300 after.” [This was in the early 1990s. 
 She had a health emergency, was in the hospital, was not able to work.] “The 
 employer is not good about it. Even there is no salary, the bills keep coming 
 every month.” 
 
 One nanny had a job in Georgia between DC jobs. The employer was a doctor. 
She had to clean his office as well as do the housework. This “let him put me on the 
payroll that way, so I can have Social Security through that.” However, she had to work 
extremely long hours. 
6.4.5 Good Treatment 
 Nannies described good treatment as well. One experience that was valued was 
that of being kept on after children outgrew them. The workload was lighter but the 
salary was the same. Several described being sponsored for their green cards, often with 
the expensive immigration attorney fees paid as well. Health insurance was another 
feature of good treatment. One nanny mentioned that both she and her daughter had had 
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health coverage for twelve years through the employer. Another felt appreciated and her 
value recognized because her employer matched the variations in job difficulty (out of 
town guests, the family needing her to travel with them) with boosts in her weekly pay. 
Overall, nannies often made reference to their own employers’ filing of payroll taxes as 
coming from their employers’ concern about the nannies’ well-being in the future. 
6.4.6 Being a Household Employee 
 One nanny expressed the belief that good, hard work was what leads to kindness 
and fairness from an employer. Her previous employer had “nasty character,” but the 
nanny just “showed kindness anyhow.” A second nanny sometimes advises friends, 
“Just stay for a little while and maybe she’s change the attitude.” Another suggested that 
when you have a “bad employer,” you should “work hard, even when they are not there, 
then I will get their sympathy.”  
 A different respondent told of how her employer used to buy her plane tickets 
home to the Philippines, so she would work parties for them for free out of gratitude. 
However, she cautioned, “Sometimes if you get friendly with them then they get 
abusing.” Others told of employers checking up on housekeeping, leaving long to-do 
lists  when the family was out of town.  
 
 “A lot of people, especially Jewish people, it’s hard to work for them. It’s always 
 like you do this, you do that.” 
 
 “She keep saying from her mouth that she is treating me like family, but you 
have  to show to your nanny that you really care.”   
 
 “What I care about is to have a good relation [with the employer], to treat them 
 as a family, especially if they are live-in. Because my second employer very 
 sweet,  very nice, but then she always looking something from you.” 
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 “I read in Washingtonian magazine, you know that magazine, Washingtonian? 
 They wrote about how Washington families prefer Filipinas. Americans 
 sometimes say Filipinas better because they works not only for the money, but 
 also she would love your kids as her own.” 
 
 Having open and honest communication was highly valued. After a description 
of a challenging set of children and two busy employers, one nanny said, “It’s OK, 
because we have some communication.” However, after one description of a maltreating 
employer, the nanny remarked in perfect seriousness, “But I am thinking maybe the 
Lord has a purpose for sending me to them.” 
6.4.7 Advice 
 A number of nannies talked about the need to ask whether the prospective 
employer was definitely planning to pay nanny taxes. They stressed that their practice 
was to establish this before accepting any job. Nannies referred to giving this advice as 
well as getting it from other nannies. 
 
 “You have to say it at the first.” 
 
 “I know to ask. I learned through friends.”  
 
 “We have to ask as the first thing about the taxes.” 
 
 “I meet somebody, we talking (about taxes) in the bus, she is working, salary is 
 too small. I said, ‘Don’t worry [about how she had to pay taxes] because the 
 salary it’s too small to be a lot of taxes.” 
 
 “I advise [other women] pay the taxes because that is good for us.” 
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6.4.8 The Meaning of Remittances and Social Security 
 In order to understand the meaning of Social Security, it is important to examine 
the meaning of remittance payments. After all, this current support of dependents is 
what will be replaced in retirement. Therefore, the importance of the retirement benefits 
to this population is demonstrated by the following excerpts: 
 
 “You know Philippine culture, our culture, we take care of our people.” 
 
 “It’s all about coming to the United States and sending money home. There is a 
 lot of gold here. The U.S. is the land of milk and honey. You can convert one 
 American dollar to forty-eight pesos, so, one hundred dollars is going to be 
4,800  pesos, and you can buy a lot of things with that money.” 
 
The following quotations are in answer to the question, “Do you send money home to 
the Philippines?”  
 
 “Of course! That’s why we are here. To send money home to the Philippines.” 
 
 “It’s a monthly obligation. I’m the one who is going to give the money.” 
 
 “Oh yes, it never ends until now. I am still doing it. Nephews, my mom, my 
 brother in law, my mother-in-law [mother of her ex-husband].” 
 
 
 When asked about the meaning for them of having their nanny taxes paid, 
respondents showed an understanding of, and an attachment to, their future benefits. 
The following excerpts reflect this: 
 
 “You have something (Social Security), even it’s not a lot.” 
 
 “Later, I will get retirement.” 
 
 “If you declare all of your salary, you are going to pay a higher tax. But if you 
 declare [all of] your salary, you get full Social Security from it.” 
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 “It will pay me back.” 
 
 “It’s good, at least for us who have no other investment, so we can have 
 something at the end.” 
6.4.9 Summary of Nanny Results 
 In the nanny interviews, respondents touched on employers’ motivations for 
compliance and noncompliance as well as on several aspects of having a household for 
a workplace. Nannies shed a good deal of light onto the question of these motives, while 
their experiences simply echo the vulnerable and difficult position of domestic workers, 
especially migrant ones.  
6.5 Conclusion  
 This chapter detailed the interview material from sixty employer and employee 
interviews, exploring possible drivers of household employment payroll tax compliance. 
The employer interviews showed considerable variation in participants’ identification 
with the role of household employer. Surprisingly, neither the strength of this role 
identification nor personal warmth and appreciation towards the employee appeared to 
drive nanny tax compliance. Some employers were critical of the requirement to pay 
payroll taxes for household employees; they viewed it as excessive intrusion into the 
household. Others supported the extension of payroll coverage to domestic workers and 
felt the government, working through the IRS, was justified in expecting nanny tax 
compliance. These positive or negative attitudes about the Social Security payroll tax 
system did seem to affect compliance decision-making. 
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 The employee interviews gave voice to those for whose benefit these payroll 
taxes are mandated, the workers themselves. The thirty Filipina housekeepers and 
nannies interviewed gave the following as explanations for employer tax compliance:  
the fear of being caught in respect to their careers, outside pressure, personal ethics, and 
the attraction of the tax break [which they tended to overestimate]. On the other hand, 
they explained employer noncompliance as the result of the following factors: not 
having a career-related reason to care about getting into trouble with the IRS, not caring 
about the nanny, not considering him or herself subject to payroll tax obligations by 
virtue of being a diplomat or a foreigner working temporarily in the United States, or by 
virtue of having only a part-time employee. Only two of the thirty specified employees 
pressuring the employer to pay under the table as a motivation for noncompliance. It is 
reasonable to assume that this motivation drives some of employer noncompliance 
nationwide. However, this sample of Filipinas is characterized by the value they place 
on retirement benefits; this characteristic benefited the study because of the insight it 
gives us into employer behavior when the employee does desire payroll tax coverage.  
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Notes 
 
1
 This employer had arranged a nanny-share with a friend. 
 
2
 During the time I was researching and writing this dissertation, I had dozens of 
nanny tax conversations with people besides the sixty interview subjects. Many of these 
conversations were with household employers. I would estimate that ninety to ninety-
five percent of them were almost completely uninformed about nanny tax compliance. 
 
3
 Social Security Survivors’ Benefits are paid to the widows, widowers, children 
and dependent parents of a deceased worker who has paid into the system for a 
minimum of ten years. 
 
4
 The tax compliance literature clearly shows a higher audit rate for small 
business owners. So, as a further refinement of the economic model, small business 
owners would seem to face a detection probability falling between virtually zero, as 
faced by ordinary taxpayers and near one, as faced by those whose backgrounds are 
being investigated by the press and by the campaign staff of political opponents. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 COMPLEXITY, ALTRUISM, AND SOCIAL NORMS: 
 AN INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERVIEW MATERIAL  
7.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I analyze the results of the sixty interviews in light of the 
traditional tax compliance model but also put forward a way of viewing these results 
that accounts for the differential impacts of competing motives on the ultimate 
compliance decision. In other tax compliance research compliance or evasion are the 
two possible outcomes of an oversimplified binary construct which is particularly 
unsuited for studying household employer payroll taxes. This study takes advantage of 
the reportage of multi-layered conflict and motive in dozens of interviews with 
household employers to propose a compliance model informed by institutional and 
behavioral economics that moves beyond tax and penalty levels to include a role for 
altruism, for procedural complexity (in addition to cognitive complexity), and for social 
norms. Nanny tax compliance is an excellent example of the behavioral economics 
finding that faced with barriers such as ignorance and complexity, human beings will 
sometimes make irrational economic choices that are not in their best interest.  
 The traditional economic model presents the compliance decision as the 
outcome of the taxpayer’s cost-benefit analysis given clear values for four key variables. 
The interviews in this study, on the other hand, demonstrate the importance of listening 
to the ways people connect or fail to connect to other people, and their perceptions of 
what others are doing. The interviews showed that some employers saw themselves as 
overseeing a staff in order to produce a top-notch household for entertaining or living in 
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style whereas other employers saw themselves as stressed, constantly time-debting, 
corporate executives, political operatives, or other highly-placed professionals fully 
reliant on a nanny for child care. Despite the variation in employer self-concept, nannies 
were often perceived as having the enviable job of ‘spending the day playing with the 
children’ in contrast to the employer’s stressful responsibilities both paid and unpaid. 
This factor clearly worked against the employer acknowledging that their home was the 
workplace of another and that their role as employer was to conform to labor regulations 
nonetheless. 
 Anecdotally, many households pay their workers under the table. When 
household employers do pay taxes, especially for workers with few hours per week, they 
contravene an accepted social norm, at least among those without political ambitions. 
We do not normally expect the average employer of a babysitter or housecleaner to 
calculate and pay these taxes – we might see sticklers for this as being compulsive, 
overscrupulous, overfond of tax preparation as an activity, or at least parting with 
money unnecessarily. Perceptions of what others are doing clearly matter to mass 
marketers, who have harnessed the power of this urge first to know what others are 
doing and then perhaps a bit later, to join in. Perhaps in the same way that established 
suburban neighborhoods can be subtly governed by the collective desire to avoid being 
the neighbor whose dandelion seeds repopulate the adjacent lawns or the family whose 
driveway is dominated by booming car stereos, in the same way, no one wants to be 
thought an overly-anxious buffoon with regard to the IRS. In fact, we are constantly 
bombarded with advice for conducting our financial lives year-round in such as way as 
to minimize the tax due; at tax-time, people do pay for software and services promising 
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to help them pay as little as they legally can. Furthermore, professional tax preparation 
services boasting about the size of potential tax refunds drown out civic discussion of 
the need to finance public goods and services through legislated tax payments. These 
perceptions and concerns about tax compliance may drive some amount of household 
employer tax evasion. 
 An approach informed by institutional and behavioral economics can better 
account for the interview results Chapter 6 presented. Moving beyond the maximization 
of self-interest, this approach takes into account change over time in the taxpayer’s 
universe of competing claims and interests. I argue that these costs and benefits are, like 
so much else, socially constructed; a full analysis of any kind of tax compliance 
demands a look at such things as social norms. Employment taxes – which always 
involve another party, the employee on whose retirement behalf the taxes are paid – 
especially demand consideration of how we take into account the well-being of the 
other.  
 To some extent in this chapter I use the term altruism as shorthand for the sort of 
personal connection and empathy that can foster altruism in dealing with another, 
although in general I do mean the inclusion of the economic welfare of the other person 
when considering one’s economic options, to the extent of valuing it equally or above 
that of oneself. I found it interesting that some employers were motivated to pay this tax 
on behalf of all employees prior to meeting and hiring them, that is, on principle, 
whereas others came to their concern and willingness to pay only after they had hired a 
flesh-and-blood employee. The economic result was the same: altruism was playing a 
  166
role. The employer was no longer maximizing their own financial self-interest in 
making tax compliance decisions. 
 The confounding nature of Schedule H and its state-level counterparts also 
requires that we acknowledge the operation of complexity as a barrier whose mitigation 
should be a key policy goal. Complexity comes closest to fitting within  a cost-benefit 
paradigm. Clearly, the household employer is weighing the time and energy costs of 
learning how to comply properly and then the costs of continuing to perform these 
actions. Mitigating the complexity barrier is one of the easiest, most implementable 
policy prescriptions. 
 Although the two employer compliance barriers of ignorance and complexity 
each imply information costs, they are not they same thing; one revolves around the 
employer while the other inheres in the tax system. Ignorance refers to the lack of 
awareness on the part of the employer – once addressed, the obstacle vanishes. 
Ignorance about, for example, the amount of wages that trigger employer tax obligation 
or the consequences to the employee of not paying the tax, blocked compliance all by 
itself in some cases. Some employers, once educated, would then pay because the other 
motivating factors would then be decisive factors. Complexity, on the other hand, 
represents an ongoing challenge. Complexity ordinarily works as a drag on the pro-
compliance factors in a given employer scenario. Reducing compliance would likely 
improve the likelihood of filing of each employer; whether it would create enough of a 
difference for all employers is an open question.  
 One of the most important features of the chapter is the force-field analysis I 
conduct on five distinct employer situations drawn from the interview material. In the 
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interviews, some employers told stories which could best be represented as a movement 
along the compliance-to-evasion spectrum which was significant enough to alter their 
eventual decision. Other employers figuratively moved along the spectrum but did not 
cross the midpoint. They experienced forces pushing in both directions. My 
interpretation of the results suggested this force-field analysis as a way of making plain 
the apparent internal process which seemed to be part of the employer stories. The value 
of thinking in these terms is the space it opens up for creative policymaking. Although 
easing the overall psychic discomfort of taxpayers is a worthy policy goal, simply 
understanding their mixed feelings and their sticking points will allow closely-targeted 
policy interventions that move the “almost compliant” taxpayer over the line to 
compliance – at least long enough to file each quarter. 
 Complexity, altruism, and social norms all stood out as non-traditional drivers of 
compliance. Employers were daunted by the difficulties of this tax. Some were paying 
state-level but not federal-level taxes (or vice versa), declaring half-measures better than 
none. At every step of the way, the complexity of these taxes combined with and 
contributed to lack of knowledge and awareness to form a barrier to compliance. Neither 
employers nor employees singled out ethics per se as a motivation for compliance 
behavior. However, both employers and employees often pointed to individual-
employee-specific altruism. As further evidence of a role for altruism, employers varied 
in their compliance behavior across different employees, even contemporaneous 
employees. In fact, employers’ compliance was affected by their attitude towards each 
specific employee working in their household. Distinct orientations included active 
resentment of worker as intruder, refusal to acknowledge the existence of the employee, 
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feeling in partnership with the employee, altruism, and paternalism. Some employers 
had strong, primarily negative opinions about the authority of the government to compel 
them to pay taxes on money they pay people who work in their homes. Employers who 
had a positive attitude towards the U.S. system of public retirement benefit provision 
and the employer’s contributing role were tax compliant. Social norms were associated 
with compliance behavior, in the sense that compliant employers appeared to have 
compliant peers and noncompliant employers appeared to have noncompliant peers. 
Networks of people are the infrastructure of social norms construction. Few employers 
could remember talking to work or social friends about nanny taxes, except generally in 
relation to news items. Within a household, spouses sometimes disagreed about the 
compliance decision; the spouse with greater earnings or greater assets made the final 
decision. 
7.2 Categorizing Employer Compliance 
 In the discussion, I refer to compliant and noncompliant individuals. In order to 
categorize employer compliance, I must first define it, a task more difficult than it might 
initially seem because it describes a range of possibilities rather than a simple binary.  I 
define compliant as either sometimes-compliant or always-compliant. This is because 
the two groups labeled sometimes-compliant (11) and always-compliant (5) were not as 
different from one another as they were from the group labeled never-compliant (14). I 
tried several schemes of categorizing compliance, including grouping employers by 
starting /stopping behavior. Among the sometimes-compliant (11), there were those 
who paid the tax but then left off paying it. These were labeled Stoppers (4). Also 
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among the sometimes compliant, there were those who had begun paying after some 
time. These were labeled Starters (7). (None of the employers I interviewed were on-
again, off-again payers.) Therefore, I divided the Sometimes Compliant into Stoppers or 
Starters. In future research, I might focus specifically on those who did pay 
intermittently (rather than lump them in with Starters) because they had at one time been 
aware that they must pay and had known how to pay the tax but then chosen not to. 
Finally, I found it meaningful to recombine the categories into Noncompliant (the Never 
Compliant) and Compliant (the Stoppers, the Starters and the Always Compliant). Note 
that the Stoppers are the only group who can be said for certain to be consciously 
evading nanny taxes, because the never compliant include some who did not know that 
they owed. Table 19 below shows the steps in this process. This allows me to examine 
the group of employers who have had some compliance, regardless of how incomplete, 
in comparison with employers who have never filed. There would be other ways of 
categorizing compliance: state vs. federal return compliance, state unemployment tax 
vs. state income tax compliance. However, my research did not gather explicit 
information on which forms were filed in all cases.  
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Table 16: Extent of Employer Compliance 
 
How 
Compliant? 
Never 
Compliant 
Sometimes Compliant Always 
Compliant 
Number of 
Employers 
14 11 5 
How 
Compliant? 
Never 
Compliant 
Stoppers Starters Always 
Compliant 
Number of 
Employers 
14 4 7 5 
How 
Compliant? 
Noncompliant Compliant 
Number of 
Employers 
14 16 
7.3 Interview Subject Explanations for Compliance and Noncompliance 
 I used my own judgment and drew inferences about each respondent’s 
motivations based on the totality of the interview results for each respondent. However, 
I also recorded the reasons each respondent gave for complying or not complying. I 
coded responses into categories; interview excerpts with exact wording can be found in 
Chapter 6). Reasons employers gave for not paying were: ignorance (10), complexity 
(10), peer norms (8), disapproval of the collection of taxes from household employers 
(9), low probability of getting caught and no career consequences (9). Reasons 
employers gave for paying included: peer norms (5), altruism (5), support for aims of a 
payroll-tax-funded system of Social Security (5), high probability of getting caught 
connected to possible career consequences (6), high probability of getting caught 
connected to ownership of a small business that was vulnerable to audit (2).  
 How did nannies perceive and respond to their employers’ tax compliance 
decisions? The nanny interviews did confirm one of the chief results from the employer 
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interviews, which in turn confirmed the prediction of the basic tax evasion model, that 
is, the role of detection probability and penalty (when penalty is broadly interpreted as 
grave career consequences). The nannies were very clear about the role of the 
employer’s job as being the most important factor in compliance. Nannies overall 
reported that in their experience the employers paid nanny taxes when the employers 
held jobs which required that no tax wrongdoing ever come to light. Specific examples 
included the IMF, the World Bank, the IRS, and the INS. Some of their employers 
simply held government jobs at a level that required avoiding tax evasion and in some 
cases entailed increased tax scrutiny. Some held prominent political jobs or simply had 
high political hopes that required they maintain a perfect tax track record, especially 
concerning the hot-button Senate-confirmation issue of nanny taxes.  
 On the subject of detection probability, two nannies also told of small businesses 
owned by their employers as the only reason their employer (or former employer) was 
nanny tax compliant. This result speaks to the importance and efficacy of increased IRS 
scrutiny, as these employers perceived and responded to the increased general tax 
scrutiny of small businesses. 
 Many reported that they respond to the employer’s position of compliance or 
noncompliance by deciding not to work for the employer, if no taxes will be paid. The 
Filipina interview subjects value the Social Security benefits they expect to receive and 
see an employer who pays taxes properly as essential to their planning.1 Perhaps this is 
due to the fact that the Philippines has long had a Social Security system modeled on 
ours; this would increase their awareness of the system and increase their expectations 
of it. Pressure from employees themselves was not a factor. No respondent reported ever 
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asking an employer to pay the taxes once they were employed. At least five employees 
reported that they always asked about taxes upfront during the employment interview 
and that they made it clear that they would not work unless the payroll taxes were 
properly paid.  
 Why would I think that the nannies’ perceptions are accurate? One could 
question whether the employees were correct in their assessment of the employer’s 
motives. I did not necessarily think that the employee interviews would yield accurate 
information about employers’ motives for nanny tax compliance or noncompliance, 
although I acknowledge the earlier appearance of this implicit assumption. I conjectured 
that interviews with employees might uncover new anecdotal evidence of motives that I 
had not observed, or heard of, up to that point in my ethnographic research with 
employers. 
 Here is an example of a misguided employee-side attempt to explain 
noncompliance. Two employees separately told me that their employers did not pay the 
payroll taxes because their employers were Jewish. Now, the employees are observing 
noncompliance and drawing a conclusion based on their own prejudice. They obviously 
possessed and deployed an ethnic stereotype of stinginess to explain their intermediate 
perception. In each of the two cases I explored this response by asking for clarification 
rather than accepting the words at face value. The two respondents (separately) 
explained to me that Jewish households were “stingy” or “tight with the money.”  
 The following is another example of employees perhaps being mistaken in their 
interpretation of employer motives for compliance. The employee interviews contained 
a clear theme of employers “caring about the nanny” and her future and therefore paying 
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the taxes. They drew a connection between an employer’s solicitous attitude towards the 
employee and the employer’s tax compliance. At this point, let me remind the reader 
that this sample was not representative of all household employees in the area. They 
were a community of full-time, documented immigrant Filipina nannies and 
housekeepers who belonged to an informal social network based on their Filipina 
identity. They remitted a large percentage of their earnings to the Philippines for the 
support of numerous dependents. They tended to expect to return to their home country, 
where their husbands, children, and in some cases, grandchildren lived, rather than settle 
in the U.S.  They envisioned and spoke of their future Social Security benefits as 
replacing their support of their families.2 Therefore, they especially valued building their 
Social Security credits and might be mistakenly interpreting their employer’s payment 
of the taxes as concern for their well-being. On the other hand, based upon my 
experiences with the interview subjects, my personal experiences, and my ethnographic 
work among both employers and employee, I do give credence to the employee 
interpretation on the whole. This is particularly based on my analysis of the overall 
failure of the putative tax break for child care expenses (requires paying on the books) 
to offset the payment of payroll taxes over a threshold amount which is well below the 
average salary commanded by the specific nannies and housekeepers interviewed. 
7.4 Evaluating the Basic Model of Compliance 
 Traditional models of tax behavior consider evasion a risky asset in a 
household’s portfolio (in risk theory, assets lie on a spectrum from risky to non-risky). 
The expected utility function modeling tax behavior depends on the four components of 
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Becker’s propensity to commit a specified criminal act. These are detection probability, 
penalty, and income and tax size. The following specification represents the probability 
that a taxpayer will evade:3 
 
 E  =  β0 + β1d + β2p + β3i + β4t       
 
where E is the probability of evasion, d is detection probability, p is penalty, i is 
income, and t is the size of the tax. The first-order conditions are:  
 
 δE/δd  < 0, 
 δE/δp  < 0, 
 δE/δi   < 0,  and 
 δE/δt   >  0. 
 
 A taxpayer, all else equal, will be more likely to evade paying a tax as the 
detection probability falls, as the penalty falls, as income falls, and naturally more likely 
to evade as the size of the tax rises. In the general case – as opposed to the household 
payroll case – these variables and the signs of their first derivatives are intuitive. This 
approach is a useful starting point, but incomplete in the case of household employment 
payroll taxes in that all four variables behave somewhat differently. The detection 
probability and penalty variables do not operate independently; they have either high or 
low values depending on career of employer. In addition, the first-order conditions on 
the third and fourth variables are not consistent in sign with the general model.  
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7.4.1 Two Levels of Detection Probability and  Their Associated Penalty Levels 
The results of this study confirm the importance of the first variable, detection 
probability, as well as its sign:  
 
δNTE/δd <  0,  
 
where NTE is nanny tax evasion and d is detection probability. Although it was not an 
operative factor for all of those interviewed, it is fair to say that the level of detection 
probability mattered in many cases. There are in effect two different levels of d, or 
detection probability. It was very high for those individuals whose current or future job 
depends upon maintaining perfect adherence to the law and whose primary avenues of 
detection include the media and staff members of political opponents. The qualitative 
findings from both the employer and the nanny interview material indicate that for these 
individuals compliance is driven both by detection probability and by the “penalty” of 
career consequences, which would follow on the heels of detection. In contrast, the level 
of d was very low for individuals whose only potential agent of detection was the IRS 
itself. 
 Remember that among the household employer interviewed, none had any 
personal experience of being caught, nor had they heard of any friends or acquaintances 
being caught. In fact, they had not heard a single anecdote of a household employer 
caught evading nanny taxes, save for stories in the media. Individuals who were not 
involved with government or politics perceived and experienced a detection probability 
of virtually zero. For these individuals, naturally, neither detection probability nor fear 
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of the IRS penalty was an important issue. The single exception to this an employer who 
complied due to advice from a friend who worked as an IRS agent. Even in that case, 
the concern was with being sued by a former employee rather than being in trouble with 
the IRS. 
 I argue that this situation would best be modeled by the following two equations, 
the first for high detection probability, and the second for low detection probability. In 
the first case, the other factors of income and tax size, whatever their values might be, 
would be far less salient, making the model for HDP individuals essentially: 
 
 NTEHDP  =  β0 + β1d + β2p. 
 
In the second case, the compliance of individuals with Low Detection Probability can  
be better modeled without d and without p, leaving just income and tax size as 
variables: 
 
 NTELDP  =  β0 + β1i + β2t. 
 
Both High Detection Probability (HDP) individuals and Low Detection Probability 
(LDP) individuals face the same IRS rules, and therefore the IRS penalty is the same in 
both cases. However, the HDP individuals also face an informal “penalty” of career 
consequences. These employers face job-loss or the loss of a presumably quite desirable 
prospective job. For them, the niggling IRS penalty is nothing compared to the 
cancellation of a confirmation hearing or the loss of a federal worker’s pension 
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prospects. These consequences are of course perceived and valued differently and 
subjectively by each person, however, any model of nanny tax compliance must account 
for the impact of the deterrent effect of such a non-IRS penalty. On the other hand, for 
LDP individuals, only the penalty levied by the IRS would be operative. Therefore, with 
this broader definition of the penalty for nanny tax evasion, the results of the study do 
confirm the importance and the sign of the penalty variable as well, 
 
 δNTE/δp  > 0. 
 
7.4.2 Taxpayer’s Income 
 The taxpayer’s income is another variable in the traditional model. As income 
increases, according to the model, the taxpayer will be more likely to pay the taxes 
owed, which is intuitive. The expected effect is that as income is greater, there is more 
tax compliance: 
 δE/δi  >  0. 
However, with nanny tax compliance, this seems to operate only at very low levels of 
income. Several employers reported limited income as their motive for not paying 
despite other motivating factors such as altruism, ethics, and detection probability. 
Several employers referred to income constraints being a factor early in their careers in 
their decision not to pay, whereas now they are compliant. Perhaps the change is due to 
the employer’s accumulation of professional experience as time passes, rather than 
simply due to their higher income later in life. At any rate, at higher levels of income 
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there seemed to be no correlation between employer income and compliance behavior. 
Therefore, based on the interview results, I cannot state categorically that increasing 
levels of income are associated with increasing levels of compliance, as the general 
compliance model states. That is, I found  δNTE/δi  to be of indeterminate sign. 
7.4.3 The Size of The Tax 
 The general model of tax compliance holds that, as is intuitively clear, the higher 
the tax bill, the more attractive tax evasion becomes: 
 
δE/δt  < 0,   
 
where t is tax size. However, among the employers interviewed, the size of the tax did 
not apparently decrease compliance at all. Those facing a small tax did not seem more 
motivated to pay than those facing a bigger tax. Ironically, the results indicated that 
employers facing a larger tax were more likely to pay than those facing a small tax. One 
interpretation of this result is that for part-time or occasional employees, the tax may be 
low, but the employer might be less likely to know about the tax liability. On the other 
hand, the employer of full-time workers might be more likely to perceive, and therefore 
respond to, the tax obligation. That is, it might be the case that the bigger tax bites, 
measured in the thousands of dollars, are perhaps more frequently paid than the two-
figure and three-figure amounts of tax that employers may owe, but do not realize that 
they owe. 
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 Three pieces of qualitative evidence lead me to challenge the importance of tax 
size in the traditional model. First, no employer ever referred to the size of the tax as a 
factor in their decision to pay or not. Second, employers who were compliant at least 
some of the time were usually quite off in their guesses as to the size of the payroll tax 
they owed. Third, a rough comparison of never-compliant employers with these 
sometimes-compliant ones showed that their tax size guesses were no closer to the 
mark. In other words, being relatively less aware or more aware of the tax size did not 
appear to be associated with either compliance or evasion. Based on this, I suggest that 
the tax size is not a significant driver of compliance behavior. 
 The size of the nanny tax is proportional to the size of the gross wages paid 
during the year. According to the model, we would expect the compliance to fall as the 
size of the tax rose. However, the household employers demonstrated no sense that their 
compliance hinged on or was even affected by the size of the tax. employers never 
mentioned the size of the tax as a factor in their decision not to comply. In fact, 
employers – even compliant ones – were fairly ignorant of the amount of the payroll tax 
rate, as we shall see later in the chapter.  
7.5 Other Tax Issues 
7.5.1 Third Party Information Reporting 
 Supportive of my hypothesis regarding information reporting, the interview 
results showed that all households owning a small business were, in fact, paying their 
nanny taxes. My hypothesis was that due to no third party information reporting, nanny 
  180
tax evasion was likely quite high. There were two employers and two employees who 
described the role that business ownership played in their decision to pay nanny taxes 
properly. Remember, this represents four separate households: none of the employees 
interviewed had ever worked for any of the employers interviewed. It is well known 
among small business owners that the IRS has recently been focusing audit attention on 
their enterprises. Therefore, the detection probability faced by these employers is higher 
than it otherwise would be. 
7.5.2 Does DC Matter? 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Bloomquist and An found that the filing rate (defined 
as Schedule H’s filed per 100,000 income tax returns in a given area) varies widely 
across the U.S. Washington, DC residents file the most of all. They file six times as 
many nanny tax returns as does the rest of the country. Also, IRS workers (studied by 
Bloomquist and An as an example of government workers) filed many times more 
returns than would be expected for their income and demographic profiles. My results 
confirm this finding. Six employers and twelve employees indicated that the 
consequences of detection on higher-level government employment affected compliance 
in their household. None, however, spoke of DC culture itself having an effect on their 
decision, e.g., having had bureaucratic experience in the past, or having acquaintance 
with Justice Department or Treasury Department officials (the IRS is part of Treasury), 
for example, giving them a greater sense of obligation to pay payroll taxes. This leads 
me to conclude that the nature of the market for professional labor in Washington is so 
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dominated by government and politics that it shows up in increased scrupulousness 
regarding nanny taxes.  
7.6 Lack of Employer Payroll Knowledge 
 Interview questions explored employer knowledge of certain aspects of payroll 
taxes: the size of the tax, the amount of time an employee needed in order to qualify for 
Social Security, and whether foreigners could receive benefits even if they returned to 
their home country (see Table 20). In the interviews I attempted to gauge employer 
knowledge of both the specifics of the process and the importance of doing it. Results 
confirmed both of my hypotheses regarding employer payroll knowledge: (1) that 
employers lack basic payroll knowledge and (2) that employers fail to recognize the 
consequences to the employee of unpaid payroll taxes. 
Table 17: Employer Payroll Knowledge 
 
Question Correct Incorrect No Answer 
Payroll Tax Size 3 14 13 
Quarters Needed 3 9 18 
Non-Citizens’ 
Eligibility 
9 4 17 
Identification of 
EITC 
17 8 13 
 
 During the interviews, I asked the employers four questions about Social 
Security payroll taxes:  
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 (1.) What is the size of the employer’s share of the payroll tax? In other words, what 
percentage of the employee’s paycheck is owed by the employer in payroll tax?  
(Answer: 7.4%.)  
(2.) How many quarters of Social Security credit does an employee need in order to 
qualify for benefits when they retire?  
(Answer: 40.)  
(3.) Can non-citizens qualify for Social Security if they return to their own countries 
when they retire?  
(Answer: yes.) 
(4.) What is the Earned Income Tax Credit?  
(Answer: Paid out through the tax system as a refundable credit, it partially refunds 
payroll taxes to low-income workers to mitigate the regressive effects of the payroll 
tax.) 
 This last question is connected to payroll tax matters in that employers 
sometimes justify paying under the table by pointing to the unfairness of taking taxes 
from low-income people. In fact, especially when the taxpayer has dependent children, 
the EITC can effectively make the net wage rate as much as 120% for a low-income 
worker. 
 Of the seventeen employers who gave an answer to the question “What is the 
size of the employer’s share of the payroll tax?”, three knew the size of the tax (7.4%) 
and six were within a percentage point. The other eight responses ranged from a low of 
1.2% to 12.5%. Some employers stated that they did not know the answer and did not 
want to take a guess. Some employers took a guess but stated that they did not know the 
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answer but were willing to take a guess. Of the 12 who tried to answer the quarters 
question, only 3 were correct, answering 40 quarters. The other nine guesses averaged 
25.3, (which is off by 37%!), with a low guess of one quarter and a high guess of one 
hundred quarters. These two questions alone should indicate a lack of payroll 
knowledge among the household employers I interviewed. Thirteen employers hazarded 
an answer on the foreigner-eligibility question. 9 were right, responding that yes, non-
citizens could not only qualify for Social Security, but could receive the benefits outside 
of the United States in retirement. Four answered incorrectly. The fourth and final 
question asked for an identification of the Earned Income Tax Credit. Fifteen employers 
knew something about it; fifteen did not. 
7.7 The Connection between Employer Ignorance, Tax Complexity, and Social 
Norms 
 In their study of the financial aid application process, Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton (2007)  explain how its complexity stymies and discourages many low-income 
students and their parents. Parallels with nanny tax compliance are obvious: some 
would-be nanny tax filers are motivated to file but experience complexity as the 
decisive obstacle. Ultimately, for the rational person, the upfront cost in discomfort and 
time required should be outweighed by the benefit – financial aid in the financial aid 
application case and a clear conscience and peace of mind, etc, in the nanny tax case. 
However, apparently it is not, resulting in economic losers, among employers and 
workers alike.  Respondents did testify as to the time-consuming nature of nanny tax 
compliance. The IRS estimate of three and a half hours for handling yearly federal 
nanny taxes is an underestimate. As could be seen in the previous chapter, employers in 
  184
this study complained about the hours lost to record keeping and arguing with tax 
officials. Dynarski and Scott-Clayton also point out that many of the students that need 
financial aid are not culturally set up to access it (e.g., familiarity with formalized 
interactions with a benefit – or opportunity – administering system.), given the very 
steep learning curve of the student financial aid application process, which is 
analogously steep compared to that of the nanny taxes. There are two paths: ignorance 
about these things can be continued and supported by peer norms of not learning about 
it, or remedied by interactions with peers who do have the expertise. The nanny tax 
compliance analogue would be business experience or exposure to tax compliance 
procedures beyond individual income tax preparation such as non-profit administration. 
In the present study, most employers bemoaned their skill-mismatch with the nanny tax 
compliance challenge. However, those employers with some of these skills were more 
comfortable and more likely to meet the demands of nanny tax compliance filings.  
 Besides their verbal reports, further evidence that complexity is a deterrent is 
that some employers are offering health insurance as an alternative to filing the taxes. 
Three employees had  experienced this or told me of other employees experiencing it. In 
the employer group, several respondents said they had heard of health insurance being 
offered instead of payroll tax coverage, although none had this arrangement themselves. 
(Neither group was asked specifically about health insurance; these comments were 
volunteered, so I do not have a complete picture of how extensive this is within my 
sample.) Paying a monthly premium is easier than calculating and filing ongoing payroll 
taxes. But imagine a corporation dodging payroll taxes because they offer insurance 
instead! 
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 As discussed in the literature review, there is evidence that social norms affect 
moral behavior in financial matters (Keller, 1997). Hardin (2000), a legal ethicist, 
theorized that nanny tax evasion among individual who are otherwise scrupulous and 
concerned with peer approval undermines the notion of a generalized norm of tax 
compliance. On the other hand, National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olsen, in an address 
to the 2007 IRS Research Conference observed that overall, the fortunately high level of 
general tax compliance in the United States probably results from a social norm of 
taxpaying rather than from enforcement. Interestingly, my results indicated that the 
degree to which an employer identified with the role of employer did not matter, nor did 
growing up with a full-time employee working for their household seem to matter. 
However, their current peers’ behavior did matter – excerpts from interviews in Chapter 
6 make this clear – thus strengthening the case for overall social norms as an important 
determinant of nanny tax compliance. The results of this study indicated that when 
interview subjects had active networks and used them purposefully to acquire 
information, then they learned quickly. This was true of both employees and employers. 
Two respondents told of sending out emails to friends who had already returned to work 
(asking what they did about nanny taxes) and one told of asking all her friends for 
advice about whether to pay. However, none of the subjects reported awareness either of 
a negative consequence to non-payment, nor even a detection event, so it was 
impossible to explore the journey of such a report through a social network.  
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7.8 Household Issues 
 The results of this study illustrate the ways the household differs from the 
marketplace as a result of features such as privacy, autonomy, personal intimacy, and 
uniqueness or individuality. It is a place where personal relationships are more likely to 
affect labor relations than in market enterprise workplaces. Admittedly, this can have 
positive as well as negative effects, but the interview material provided many examples 
of the downside for household employees. For example, some household employers 
seem to feel labor laws and payroll tax obligations are  optional. (Recall the 
“substitution” of health insurance for payroll tax coverage.) Many respondents do not 
identify as household employers; that is, they feel estranged from that role and from its 
responsibilities. Third, they display attitudes towards their employees that often 
appeared to be governed more by personal feelings than by professional objectives.  
 Three study participants reported occasionally hiring people known to them in 
order to help them out financially. They conceived the desire to help the person 
financially first, then looked around their household to come up with some work that 
needed doing. Finding an acceptable and dignified way of benefiting the individual held 
priority over getting the household work done. Yet these jobs still represent household 
employment, and create payroll tax obligations. These three employers, two partially 
compliant and one never compliant, were especially resistant to the idea that they owed 
Social Security payroll taxes on these wages; they protested that they were providing a 
dignified hand-out and were offended that the government would levy taxes on that 
money. 
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 7.8.1 Caring Labor 
 As discussed in the literature review, caring labor – care giving to children, 
elders and the ill and disabled – is undervalued in our society economically (wages for 
these types of labor are not what they should be) as well as undervalued in terms of 
appreciation and respect. Nonpayment of household employment payroll taxes – 
whether by accident or on purpose – reflects this undervaluation.   
 The language used by the some employers reflects the lack of respect for nannies 
and housekeepers: some employers used the words “split,” “share” and “give,” when 
talking about their employees. This objectification of the employed person carries an 
overtone of possessing not just that person’s time but the person as well. In addition to 
the direct ways of not respecting these caregivers, the employers indirectly disrespect 
the labor of domestic workers by failing to carry out the responsibilities incumbent on 
them as employers. The interview results excerpts given in Chapter 6 are replete with 
examples of how employers failed to take the time and energy to focus on the domestic 
worker’s presence and to handle ordinary employer responsibilities. All of this indicates 
the low regard in which the occupation is held. No in-home speech therapist, visiting 
nurse, or personal trainer would suffer or allow such disregard. Twenty six of the 
household employees I interviewed (almost ninety percent) reported suffering 
unpleasant or unjust treatment, usually earlier in their experience in the U.S. but 
occasionally with their current employer. Examples include being hit with a stick by a 
child who was not scolded, being spat on by teenage children, and having their job 
given away while visiting the Philippines despite having made proper arrangements. 
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7.8.2 Bargaining 
 Analyzing a married couple’s decision to comply – to spend the household’s 
time and money on tax compliance – means thinking about two individuals who may 
not agree about how to maximize the household’s utility. Household bargaining models 
hypothesize that when two spouses disagree, the spouse with the higher income or the 
greater assets has greater bargaining power (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). My interview 
results provide anecdotal support for this hypothesis: among those interviewed, the 
higher earning or greater asset owning spouse did make the decision in disagreements 
over whether to pay the nanny taxes. Disagreements were reported in three couples. This 
includes husband-wife pairs of interviewees as well as couples only one of whom was in 
the study. In the first situation, A had a much lower level of assets than B both coming 
into the marriage and during it as well. Although A is not fond of the household 
employee and is uninterested in her pay arrangements, the employee’s taxes are paid as 
a result of B’s decision to do so, which arises primarily from B’s concern for the 
employee’s well-being.  
 The household of C and D provides a second example. Here too,  one partner  
clearly held  greater assets. One spouse, C, had a history of not paying nanny taxes when 
single and did not want to as a couple, either. The other spouse, D, had a history of 
paying nanny taxes when single, wanted to continue being nanny tax compliant, and the 
couple did pay nanny taxes.  
 A third example is E and F. In that case, one spouse earned far more. They 
disagreed, with F, motivated by ethical concerns, wanting to pay. E did not want to, due 
partly to the difficulty of doing so and partly out of feeling it was an unreasonable 
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governmental demand on the household. Yet F had decided to pay and had done the 
necessary research. Only the refusal of crucial employees to continue working if taxes 
were paid blocked his intention. The experience of three couples is not a basis for 
generalization, but it is an interesting result.  
7.8.3 Pressure 
 Another gender-based difference in nanny tax behavior that emerged clearly was 
that the only reported pressure on employers came from nannies’ male relatives, rather 
than from the nannies themselves. In two cases, a nanny’s individual male family 
member – one a son, one a husband – successfully pressured the employer to start 
paying nanny taxes. Furthermore, one employer experienced a male member of their 
own family unsuccessfully agitating for nanny taxes to be filed based on his concern for 
his own political future. Surprisingly few employees reported self-advocacy after the 
fact of employment. Five employees reported being resolved at the outset not to accept a 
job offer without agreement that nanny taxes would be paid. Among themselves they 
urged one another to ask about taxes during employment interviews. However, no 
employee reported pressuring employers to pay; no employee reported asking employers 
to initiate payroll coverage after the fact. Of thirty employers, only two said that an 
important reason for employers’ noncompliance overall (not for themselves specifically) 
was a worker not wanting coverage. However, all thirty of the employees I interviewed 
wanted coverage themselves. The employees did not point to an employee’s wish to be 
paid under the table as a noncompliance factor for the employers they were familiar 
with. Being undocumented was the only related reason employees gave as an employer 
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noncompliance factor. Remember, they were a loose affiliation of Filipina immigrant 
nannies working in an affluent neighborhood in Washington, DC, where this sort of tax 
compliance is entwined with career ambitions. However, even more importantly, they 
all understood, valued, and discussed the future stream of retirement income that would 
come to them in the Philippines as long as they had ten years of covered employment. 
The perceived value of the benefit stream is affected by their assumption that they will 
retire to be with the rest of their family in their home country, where the lower cost of 
living increases the purchasing power of the funds.  
7.8.4 The Mini-Welfare State 
 Three employers firmly stated that they well understood their obligation to 
contribute to the well-being of those less fortunate, that in fact they had hired these 
people as a favor to them in the first place. Those employers were attempting to be 
mini-welfare states: they created a job and in some cases provided other safety-net items 
such as emergency health care. When employers hired people known to them with the 
primary purpose of putting money in their pockets, they were then especially resistant to 
nanny taxes. They felt that they were already providing plenty of social welfare. Few 
people have a small business that they can use to give someone a job, but many people 
have a bit of household work or yard work that they can use to help out someone else 
financially. However, these employers are still liable for payroll taxes on this largesse. 
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7.9 Force-Field Diagrams and Analysis  
 One way of analyzing an employer’s ultimate tax decision is by representing this 
yes-no decision as the sum total of opposing forces. A force-field diagram can capture 
the conflict between combinations of these motives for a given individual. This requires 
thinking of the employer’s final position on the payroll tax question as lying along a 
continuum between enthusiastic compliance and whole-hearted tax evasion.  That is, the 
outcome of the conflicting motives can be modeled as the mathematical sum of assorted 
positive and negative vectors. As vectors have both direction and length, the graphical 
representation of each motive or force influencing the decision has two components. 
One is a direction (towards compliance or towards evasion); the other is a length, 
connoting the strength of that particular force. To demonstrate this analysis, I first 
discuss and then diagram five actual payroll tax decisions drawn from the interview 
material. An “I” represents the halfway mark between the two “poles” of completely 
motivated to comply and completely motivated to evade. An “X” marks the 
approximate final position of the particular employer on this continuum. 
 The five force-field diagrams below represent five episode-specific nanny tax 
compliance decisions taken from the interview material. The examples represent five 
distinct employers, but as employers changed their behavior between employees and 
over time, they are snapshots in time and not necessarily representative of the 
employer’s tax decisions over time. 
7.9.1 Force-Field Analysis of Several Employers’ Nanny Tax Decisions  
Employer #1:  
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 This foreign employer would have risked the loss of her husband’s very good 
job, which could jeopardize their stay in this country, if they had evaded. Her battle with 
nanny taxes involved her dislike of her employees and her feeling that they did not 
deserve anything more from her than their minimum wages. Fear of detection 
probability trumped dislike of employee and complexity. 
 
EVASION-----------------------------|----------X------------------COMPLIANCE 
               ------------------dislike of employee 
               -------------------complexity 
fear of detection------------------------------- 
 
Employer #2:  
 This employer was also not very fond of her employees, and felt they took 
advantage. However, she faced no such detection-probability-and-penalty combination, 
as did Employer #1. Despite having been compliant in the past for an employee she 
cared about and admired for her work ethic, the complexity and difficulty combined 
with a sense, “Why should I have to do it when no one else does?” easily won out over 
pressure to pay from a family member. She was quick to point out how no one she 
knows pays. Note that ignorance was not a factor. 
 
EVASION------------X-----------------|----------------------------COMPLIANCE 
family pressure  ---     
                                 --------------------------------------------- complexity 
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                      --------------------------------------------- social norms                  
 
   
Employer #3:    
 Employer #3’s determination to learn to pay nanny taxes was fueled by her 
personal connection with her nanny. She also felt strongly about her own retirement 
income security and this translated into concern for the nanny’s Social Security benefits. 
This single, gay woman learned how to do nanny taxes and was motivated to keep 
going. 
 
EVASION-----------------------------|-----------------X-----------COMPLIANCE 
              -----------ignorance  
              ----------- complexity  
altruism -----------------------------------------------  
 
Employer #4:    
 This employer, who was also a single new mother, cared about her nanny and 
was concerned with her well-being. Her political values were quite progressive and 
worker-oriented, apart from the specific employee. For Employer #4, altruism was the 
major reason she did not pay the taxes. Despite some concern about being different from 
her very law-abiding, affluent family and their tax-paying norms, this employer did not 
want to pay payroll taxes for the nanny because it would be “taking money away from 
her.”  
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EVASION-------------X----------------|----------------------------COMPLIANCE 
social norms-------- 
            ----------------------------------------------altruism 
 
 
 
Employer #5:    
 Employer #5 reported knowing other mothers who were paying their nanny 
taxes. However, she did not receive information or assistance from them and had to 
overcome the barrier of ignorance in figuring out how to file properly. Her awareness of 
her peers’ compliance behavior combined with her concern for her employee’s 
retirement security to propel her over the line into compliance. 
EVASION--------------------------------|--------------------X-------COMPLIANCE 
                    -----------ignorance  
social norms------------------------------------------------- 
altruism------------------------------------------------------ 
7.9.2 From Conflict to Moral Development 
 Long-standing political views about the importance of welfare state provision 
for the poor and old compelled one male employer to pay for each of his employees. 
Although the important legislative branch post he held would have made a different 
person pay as readily, this individual was governed by an attitude about the nation’s 
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responsibility to a retiring employee. At the same time, he made the most bilious 
remarks among thirty interview subjects about bureaucrats administering the tax system.  
Another example of competing pressures was a man who gave patronizing but lavish 
financial support to his employees. He was in conflict between his contempt for the 
household payroll tax  and persistent pressure to pay the nanny tax from a male relative 
of his housekeeper.  
 Some women described a sense of mastery, of victory, which they enjoyed as a 
result of figuring out the taxes. It was “about them,” rather than, “about their 
employees.” Their ethical motivation to file the taxes was in conflict with their 
temptation to quit in the face of a payroll tax system geared towards businesses and 
difficult for amateurs to navigate. On the other hand, several knowledgeable employers 
felt pricks of conscience about the tax evasion they practiced, but soothed themselves 
with the assurance that no one else in their circumstances – no one they knew, at any 
rate – was fooling with these taxes. Another was badgered by a politically ambitious 
relative to get compliant, but she referred to the prevailing social norms among her 
affluent (and retired) friends when explaining her resistance to that pressure.  
 A key insight from this research has been that the analysis cannot be left at the 
level of conflicting motives. This is because pairs of employers were seen to do the 
same thing (e.g., evade) for different reasons, as well as being driven to different 
decisions by the same motive (e.g., altruism). For example, altruism strongly motivated 
many employers to pay (e.g., Employers #3 and #5 in those examples), but two 
employers were restrained from paying by their altruism (e.g. Employer #4 in the 
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examples). Both are at the “noblest” level of moral development because they are 
guided by their own principles, regardless of the law or of others’ influence.  
 A second example would be social norms pushing Employer #2 to evade and 
Employer #5 to pay. Here, the employers are functioning in Kohlberg’s second stage, 
where social approval drives moral decisions. Yet they made opposite choices. 
Policymakers have an opportunity here to shape these social norms so that the more 
“easily led” employers will pay.  
 Most interesting for our purposes is the fact that some people at each stage are 
paying and some are not. For example, Employer #1 was motivated to pay by her fear of 
detection. Employer #2 was motivated to evade by the low odds of being detected. 
Presumably, Employer #1 would not pay if her husband had a low-profile job. 
Presumably, Employer #2 would pay  – despite her perception that her same-age 
neighbors do not  – if she had some chance of being considered for high federal office.  
 At the second or “conventional” stage, Employer #5 was influenced by the norm 
of paying among her fellow new moms,  while others were quick to justify their 
noncompliance by pointing out how no one they knew was paying. At the third or “post-
conventional” stage, Employer #3’s and Employer #5’s concern for welfare of employee 
motivated her to be compliant, whereas Employer #4’s altruistic motivation (which was 
in conflict with the social norm she perceived around her of taxpaying) led her to evade. 
In other words, under the current circumstances, people who are more “mature” or at a 
higher stage of moral development, can actually be found on both sides of the 
compliance fence. Likewise, people who are a little more likely to follow the crowd in 
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making moral choices, are also to be found both evading and complying, whichever 
their peers tend to do. 
 Of course, there is a distinction between those who paid out of concern for a 
specific employee versus those who referenced ideas of social justice, a commitment to 
social welfare, or an appreciation for the Social Security system. However, both 
positions involve ethical stances whether situation-specific or of long standing. I 
consider the two together not just because they are both at Kohlberg’s third stage, but 
also because from a practical point of view policy-makers are just as incapable of 
influencing directly either a person’s altruistic approach to an individual or a 
philosophical point of view towards social provision. 
7.10 Summary 
 A behavioral economics approach to tax compliance clearly offers insights that 
go beyond the simple cost-benefit analysis implied by ordinary tax compliance models. 
Compliant household employers certainly make economically irrational decisions when 
they file payroll taxes. The odds of getting caught, as discussed in the first chapter, are 
exceedingly low. Something else is driving their compliance. Policymakers need to 
capitalize on this insight when seeking to turn up the heat on noncompliant taxpayers.  
Behavioral economists have also demonstrated that bureaucratic barriers to successful 
participation in an overly complex process can create program failure, despite a 
motivated target audience. Nanny tax evasion exemplifies this behavioral economics 
finding. The employer interview material in this study demonstrated that many 
motivated employers were disappointed and frustrated by their failure to succeed in 
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filing nanny taxes. These were not heedless or stingy families; rather, the process is 
time-consuming, frustrating, designed for businesses not households, and needlessly 
complex. My ethnographic research over a two-year period, which included sixty 
interviews with direct participants in household employment, demonstrated roles for 
ignorance of the law, difficulty, social norms and interpersonal relations, and altruism. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the material highlighted the problem of the household as an 
virtually unregulated workplace. The next chapter will discuss implications of these 
findings, present some policy recommendations, and give several suggestions for future 
research.  
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Notes 
 
1Although subjects were legal to work at the time of the interviews, this is not to 
say that all respondents had always been documented. Some reported having worked for 
years in the U.S. prior to obtaining their green cards.  
 
2
 Chapter 3 contains details about their remittance amounts and frequencies as 
well as the number of people to whose support they were contributing. 
 
3Evasion is the event modeled, but since prob (E) = [ 1 – prob (C) ], where E is 
evasion and C is compliance, the subsequent discussion of compliance factors is simply 
the mirror image of evasion factors. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
 The results of the present study have important implications for the economic 
modeling of tax compliance, for household theory, and for public policy. 
Underreporting is a serious problem. My quantitative results establish a lower bound for 
the nanny tax evasion rate. For the year 2006, I calculate the lowest possible evasion 
rate, based on government labor statistics for household workers, to be 70.0%. This is a 
conservative estimate because we know that so many domestic workers go uncounted. 
General income tax evasion rates for individual taxpayers are ten times lower. The 
analysis of IRS tax return data on household employers yielded the finding that very few 
households paid large wage bills. In 2006, 98% of household employers filing returns 
paid under $25,000 in household wages; in fact, 25% paid under $4000. In addition, I 
found that only 48.4% of Schedule H filers have at least one child in the home and/or 
take the Child and Dependent Care Credit, suggesting that perhaps as much as half of all 
household wages are paid for tasks other than childcare or dependent care. For the 
employers of paid caregivers, filing payroll taxes is coincidentally offset by use of the 
Child and Dependent Care Credit, but at higher levels of wages paid, this credit is 
outweighed by the money potentially saved by evading.  
 The several years of background and ethnographic research surrounding this 
dissertation indicated that in general household employers lack awareness of the 
(currently $1600) threshold and of the strict tax definition of household employment. 
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Even some of the well-educated professionals I interviewed in Washington, DC, 
remained ignorant on the subject to a surprising extent. In addition to simple lack of 
information, the ongoing correct filing and payment of annual federal and quarterly state 
household employment payroll taxes represent one of the most daunting household 
administrative challenges around. Ignorance and complexity are helped along by 
prevailing social norms of not paying these taxes, unless foreseeable career 
consequences exist.  
 Certainly some people skip payroll taxes if they think they can get away with it. 
The traditional model components of detection probability and of penalty level certainly 
apply to the special case of nanny taxes, with two provisos. We must understand 
detection probability as referring as well to non-IRS pathways, such as research by the 
politically-motivated and by the media. In the same way, we must understand the 
penalty level as including career foreshortenings as well as IRS tax penalties and fees. 
However, personal ethics and altruism play a fascinating role in that they can both 
promote and retard household employer payroll tax compliance. Conversations with the 
interview subjects convinced me that ethics and altruism sometimes constrained 
employers from paying a tax they felt would not be in the best financial interest of their 
low-income employee. At the same time, other employers insisted that it was their 
personal ethics and/or their strong desire to promote the retirement well-being of their 
employee that determined them to overcome all state and federal obstacles to paying 
their payroll taxes.  
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8.2 Implications for the Traditional Model 
 A close analysis of the qualitative results leads to three observations in 
connection with models of tax compliance. First, individuals who had government 
employment or aspirations to a political future did experience detection probability and 
its associated career-related “penalty” as compliance drivers. However, for nanny tax 
evasion, there are only two levels of detection probability – very high or very low. Both 
levels are associated with a specific penalty. The high probability of detection by media 
scrutiny is associated with a substantial career impact penalty, a significant and effective 
deterrent to payroll tax evasion. For these individuals the detection probability and 
threat of the career penalty are large enough to render the two variables – income and 
tax size – irrelevant. The low probability of detection by the IRS is associated with the 
ordinary IRS financial penalty for income tax delinquency. It is not different in character 
from income tax penalties and fines; it is also one that the employers interviewed 
seemed more than willing to risk. These individuals perceived neither a detection 
probability nor a penalty that was sufficiently high to deter their evasion, all else equal.  
 The second implication for tax modeling was that the income variable appeared 
to behave as it does in the general model at low levels of income, but not at higher ones. 
I attribute this partly to the fact that although income taxes are proportional to income 
earned, nanny taxes are proportional only to wages paid. Although household wages 
paid would certainly have some relationship to the household’s budget constraint, taxes 
due on wages paid are only a function of the employee wages, not a function of the 
employer’s income.  
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  Finally, nanny tax compliance among employers appeared to be unaffected by 
the magnitude of the tax, which is the fourth and final of the traditional compliance 
variables. In fact, there was some evidence showing that, when employers were divided 
into compliant and non-compliant groups, the non-compliant were no more likely to be 
acquainted with the actual size of the payroll tax they were supposed to pay than were 
the compliant. This implies that the size of the household payroll tax owed was not a 
driver of compliance behavior.  
8.3 Conflict 
 Individuals make their economic decisions in dynamic environments and 
experience multiple constraints on their choices. Inside the individual employers 
interviewed, bureaucratic difficulty warred with altruism, personal ambition warred with 
ignorance, dislike for a housekeeper warred with anxiety over becoming another rising 
star cut off by unearthed payroll tax evasion. In three out of the three cases of intra-
household disagreement studied here, the more affluent spouse chose how to resolve his 
or her own tax conflict. The most interesting feature of the interviews was the variety of 
experience and the human weaknesses confided in anonymity.  
 Altruism motivated employers: the welfare of the employee entered the utility 
function of the employer in many cases. This requires an analytic approach that 
transcends an individual-centered and self-interest-based model. Furthermore, altruism 
seems to motivate both compliance and noncompliance; as discussed in the previous 
chapter, this depends on the employer’s interpretation of the employee’s best interests 
rather than always resulting in tax payments. As was demonstrated in the force-field 
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analyses in Chapter 7, some household employers experienced a great deal of conflict as 
they were pushed towards or pulled away from their natural choice to comply or evade 
payroll taxes by other factors. Some would have evaded except for fear of detection or 
another pressure. Some would have paid except for obstacles they could not or would 
not overcome, problems that outmatched their commitment to pay. Others were able to 
gain the information and skills needed, develop a tolerance for state unemployment tax 
systems and end up in an equilibrium position of ongoing, quarterly compliance. Using 
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development as a classification system, I was able to identify 
employers all the way up the ladder from obedience to tax law out of fear of the 
consequences to obedience to the tax law because it was in agreement with deeply felt 
ethical positions. Interestingly, I was also able to identify employers who were evading 
for reasons of stinginess or laziness as well as employers who evaded after careful moral 
reasoning about the well-being of the employee.  The main implication of Chapter 7’s 
force-field  analysis of tax compliance decisions is that there was often a close contest 
between opposing motives. Therefore, just reducing a barrier a little bit, or boosting a 
motivating factor a little more could turn defiance into compliance.  
8.4 Implications for Household Theory 
 Nanny tax compliance is a good example of the need for researching and 
analyzing the household  as distinct from the marketplace. The caring labor taking place 
in households is a special category and is especially tinged with the disregard our 
society seems to have for non-market activity. The study’s results showed that some 
employers objectified their employees conceptually to a disturbing degree. As noted in 
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Chapter 7, employers used language such as “splitting,” “giving,” and “sharing” in 
reference to people. To illustrate this point, consider the fact that although a household 
may have non-domestic help in the form of “our tile guy,” or “our computer person,” 
that sense of possessiveness that comes from the word “our” is nothing compared to the 
ownership implied by being able to “split a nanny” with someone, or to “give you our 
housekeeper while we’re out of town.” Such language used by the employers studied 
here reveals the possibility of a domestic worker occasionally being considered a 
possession or asset of the household. 
8.4.1 Isolation 
 Part of the problem is that the household  itself and therefore employment in a 
household is characterized by isolation and particularity. Recall Hagan’s (1998) 
sociological study of the male/female differential in successful amnesty applications 
because the men worked in companies and the women worked in private homes. 
Companies were routinely able to give the workers documentation of their work and 
wages. The largely female household employers were less able or willing to provide 
similar proof of work and wages. I would argue that being a household  employer could 
be challenging for amateurs and being a household employer trying to follow the rules is 
harder. There did not seem to be any sort of network of fellow household employers 
whose experience a new employer could draw on as there might be in the business 
community.  
 This isolation and non-standardization of the household  also arises from the fact 
that the household  is not a professional employer. This causes a lack of payroll skill and 
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payroll focus. The household employee suffers as each household employer sufficiently 
motivated and interested in complying reinvents the wheel teaching themselves basic 
payroll procedure. (Compare this with a company, which ordinarily does not ask itself 
whether it is “motivated and interested” in complying!)   
 An additional implication is the importance of time lost to household employers 
(and the value of that time) as they struggle with the taxes. To some extent, the 
employer suffers as well from their amateur status. A good deal of time is expended in 
compliance. Although my study did not ask employers to estimate the time consumed, 
over half of the at least sometime compliant employers referred to the time used up. 
Others focused on the cost of purchasing help. Three specifically reported that the taxed 
owed were laughably low compared to the cost of the extra hours billed by their tax 
accountant. Three other sometimes-compliant employers reported that they used the 
(much cheaper) specialty nanny tax companies and did not mind the expense; one 
reported a ghastly experience with taxes left unpaid by such a company.  
8.4.2 Privacy, Autonomy, and Interpersonal Relations 
 The household  is also private, autonomous, unregulated, and unsupervised, with 
real consequences for domestic workers. These range from the cases of human 
trafficking, slavery, and sexual abuse to cases of emotional abuse and other forms of 
personal disrespect and mistreatment. It is fair to say that, on average, household 
employers have fewer checks on their behavior than they would in non-household 
places of employment.  These homes-as-workplaces and often amateur employers do 
not have enforceable worker protections.  
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 A corollary to this is that the household employment relationship is more 
personal and less formal than a marketplace one. This adds to the difficulties a domestic 
worker faces. Salazar Parreñas’ (2000, 2001a) research documents the vulnerability of 
the worker – in her case the domestic Filipina worker – to the “behind closed doors” 
whims, neglect, and criminal behavior of household employers the world around. Of 
course, this intimacy with the employer can have positive as well as negative aspects; 
the interview excerpts in Chapter 6 include instances of significant assistance to 
employees in crisis.  
 Does the tax treatment of nannies differ from that of other household workers 
perhaps because of a greater emotional connection to the family? My results did not 
indicate any difference. I believe this is because – speaking strictly of those employees 
interviewed – these  women were nannies when young children were present and were 
housekeepers (maids, that is, not managers of a staffed household) in the absence of 
children. The employees defined themselves as nannies first, but accepted housekeeper 
status when necessary. From the employers’ point of view, I discerned no difference in 
felt intimacy or felt obligation towards different types of employee, with the exception 
of groundskeepers, who did not evoke either strong negative or strong positive emotions 
in the employers interviewed. In fact, surprisingly, the “housekeepers” were often highly 
prized by employers and energetically retained through good treatment and benefits 
because they were needed for the dogs in the household. Two employers described the 
housekeeper as being there first and foremost for the care of the dogs. During this 
research, I heard of instances of the nanny being contacted while the employer was 
traveling internationally in order to hear “how the dogs were doing.”  
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 As reported in Chapter 7, four distinct employer orientations towards employees 
emerged in the interviews. The first was an active resentment of worker as intruder into 
the household . The second was a refusal to acknowledge the existence of the employee, 
a refusal that was sometimes due to extreme social or career time pressure. The third 
was a sense of partnership in a common domestic effort to produce a quality household  
for a purpose such as childrearing or entertaining. The fourth orientation was an 
altruistic response towards the worker, a response that can verge on paternalism. At the 
paternalistic end of the spectrum would be such as excessive interference or control 
coupled with the extension of extra material benefits or protection, use of employers 
influence, etc. Several employers with this fourth attitude towards their employees 
expressed undying commitment to the well-being of former employees and enjoyed in 
return a particular kind of subservient positive regard and loyalty from them. This 
paternalism on occasion can be beneficial to the employee but may come at an 
emotional price because it is not an exchange among equals. My research did not 
explore what factors underlay the strength of employer’s identification with the 
employer role. However, there was a clear association between the employer’s parents 
ever having had a full-time employee and the now-grown employer identifying with the 
role themselves. 
 In their article on geographic variation in household employment payroll tax 
filing rates, Bloomquist and An (2006) suggest that an important determinant of 
compliance is likely to be the presence of a large undocumented worker population 
available to do domestic work. Because of increasing awareness and enforcement 
regarding undocumented workers, employers might be less willing to gamble on an 
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employee’s veracity concerning their immigration status. Employers may be reluctant to 
link themselves with immigrant workers through payroll tax returns. One employer 
interviewed refrained from paying taxes exactly because of anxiety that INS trouble 
might ensue despite the employee’s insistence that she was here legally. This study did 
not address the issue of undocumented labor as an alternative labor pool, so these results 
cannot be used to address that question. Future researchers should also ask whether the 
increase in undocumented workers is lowering the tax compliance morale of those who 
employ legal workers. 
 The social norm of devaluing and disrespecting paid domestic workers is evident 
in the laxity of domestic labor regulation. Unpaid payroll taxes are a key feature of this 
laxity.  The interview results illuminate what a slippery slope the household can be 
when it is someone’s workplace and someone else’s private, unregulated, autonomous 
“castle.” Household employees  cannot defend  clear personal boundaries, feel confident 
about upholding them, or  insist that others respect these boundaries unless a  social and 
legal framework backs them up.  
8.5 Policy Recommendations 
 One important implication of this research is that several different approaches 
are required in order to bring different types of taxpayers into the fold. According to 
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development framework, factors affecting an employer’s 
motivation to comply – fear of being caught, peer influence, and concern for the well-
being of employees – are at work at every level of ethical functioning. These motives 
should be encouraged to work in the desired direction, that is, towards paying. The 
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following recommendations respond to the identified compliance determinants of 
extremely low detection probability level, tax complexity, lack of employer awareness, 
poor social norms regarding paying one’s nanny taxes, personal ethics.  
 (1.) Change Form 1040 to include a checkbox about household employees. 
In order to increase awareness and increase the penalty of household payroll tax evasion, 
one line on the Form 1040 should include a required checkbox which attests that the 
taxpayer has not paid any one person more than $1500 that year to perform labor in their 
household, including all cleaners and babysitters and lawn care workers. Line 62 asks 
for the total amount calculated on Schedule H, but does not inform the taxpayer about 
household employer payroll taxes. In other words, the taxpayer would have to take a 
positive action (checking a box) to indicate they did not pay a household employee more 
than the threshold amount. This would inform people of the definition of household 
employee and tax threshold. It would also require those evading household payroll 
taxes to make a specific dishonest statement on this issue by checking the box. Raising 
the issue on the tax form itself would galvanize the professional tax preparation 
community, which exhaustively tracks and scrutinizes changes to each year’s tax forms. 
Raising the issue on the tax form would also spark a brief hour of media interest, as it 
would signal a new enforcement emphasis on the part of the IRS. It would get the 
attention of both the intentional and the accidental nanny tax evaders.1 
 (2.) Simplify the tax code. Some incremental changes include (a.) drop the 
requirement to file quarterly state returns, given that staff fluctuations are far lower in 
households than in businesses (b.) drop the state-by-state adjustment of FUTA 
calculation on Schedule H, which accounts for over two thirds of the lines on the form. 
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A radical option would be to shift to a stringent system in which all household staff 
would have to be officially registered as such in order to facilitate government oversight 
of their payroll taxes In principle, the IRS, the state legislatures, and Congress could 
increase nanny tax compliance with tax simplification. In practice, the task of overall 
simplification is unrealistic as it would require significant inter-governmental 
collaboration. However, some incremental household payroll tax reform opportunities 
stand out. At the state level, perhaps treat households as a special category of employer, 
perhaps even drop the requirement to file every quarter, moving to an annual system, as 
the IRS did in 1996.  
 (3.) Target delinquent employers with a public information campaign. We 
must raise household employers’ awareness of their legal obligations and partial 
responsibility for the retirement income security of their employees. Such a campaign 
would explain the similarities between household employers and employers in the 
marketplace, who already face a norm of paying payroll taxes. Teen fathers provide a 
good policy analogy to household payroll tax evasion. Urban social scientists are 
concerned with building up low-income, absentee fathers’ sense of responsibility for 
their children. The problem involves social norms as well as a skill and resource deficit. 
Policy programming aimed at teen fathers uses awareness interventions that aim to 
change norms as well as to provide resources, in order to benefit their children. In the 
same way, targeting household employers directly will aid the household employees. 
 (4.) Teach household employers how to file these taxes. The isolation and the 
non-market nature of household activity creates barriers to learning general payroll tax 
knowledge, skills as well as the procedures specific to nanny tax payments. However, 
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these are communicable skills. The greatest drawback to IRS materials remains that they 
must cover all scenarios and must also avoid presenting taxpayers with loopholes and 
therefore are constrained from presenting a simple roadmap which would be sufficient 
to guide the large majority of household employers. 
 (5.) Increase private tax accountants’ knowledge of household payroll tax 
rules. Given the key role of professional tax preparation, particularly for affluent 
households, it would be good to enlighten accountants so that they might pass that 
information and awareness along to their clients. At lower income levels (and 
correspondingly lower levels of household payroll tax owed), simply intervening 
successfully in this manner with such companies as, for example, Turbo Tax and H&R 
Block, with their national coverage and market penetration, would significantly raise the 
number of household employers paying properly. At present, they do not educate either 
their employees or their clients regarding the definition of a household employee nor 
regarding the low threshold wage amount which triggers the tax obligation. 
 (6.) Boost detection probability by increasing audit attention to household 
payroll taxes. According to both household employers and household employees, the 
possibility of detection and consequent job loss or consequent foreclosure of high-
profile government career opportunities drove a great deal of household employment 
payroll tax compliance. Therefore, boosting detection probability for households 
without political ambitions is a key policy recommendation. Unlike ordinary income tax 
evasion, there is a party – the employee – who often has an economic interest in 
enforcement. Hence an effort to educate workers and their advocates to alert state-level 
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employment commissions anonymously about non-compliant employers might produce 
results.  
 (7.) Broaden the range of jobs that can generate this same kind of concern 
over detection probability to include non-government jobs. Corporate policy can 
affect nanny tax compliance. For example, this researcher was told by an anonymous 
industry expert that a certain investment bank has implemented an unprecedented policy 
of requiring high-level employees to sign a statement that they are tax compliant in all 
ways, including compliant with household payroll taxes.  
 (8.) Increase IRS scrutiny of household payroll tax evasion. The IRS could 
target likely household employment payroll tax evaders based on tax return information. 
The IRS could search for two high-income parents of children from birth to school age 
who do not take the child care credit (which is available even to affluent families albeit 
at a reduced level). This profile might indicate an employee being paid under the table. 
 (9.) Teach household employees the basics of payroll taxes. At least make any 
decision to work under the table an informed decision.  Teach domestic workers the 
benefits of building retirement credits and encourage them to insist on payroll tax 
coverage at the initial interview. Give them resource materials to enable first-time 
employers to register as household employers and organize their paperwork. 
 (10.) Raise awareness about the EITC as a mechanism for returning payroll 
taxes. Because some employers shy away from filing household payroll taxes due to 
concerns about the employee needing all of the money, we also need to raise awareness 
of the EITC as a mechanism which returns payroll taxes collected from low-income 
workers.2 Many employers do not know that the EITC does not have to be a once-a-year 
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refund but rather folded in with each paycheck. Specifically, we need to connect 
domestic worker labor organizations with ongoing efforts to promote filing for the 
Earned Income Tax Credit among low-income workers 
 Naturally, these proposed policy changes would have different employment and 
earnings effects on household workers. These effects would differentially impact those 
who work on the books, off the books, and without papers. Perhaps undocumented 
workers would face a harder time obtaining domestic work. Ideally, however, an overall 
move towards greater enforcement, alterations in social norms towards payment, and 
higher compliance rates would aid in professionalizing the industry as well as bring 
more low-income workers within the protections of the U.S. social insurance system. 
8.6 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 If anonymized household-level IRS data on payroll tax filings became available 
to researchers, one promising direction would be to extend current quantitative work on 
nanny taxes by exploring the effects of demographic and income characteristics on the 
amount of nanny tax paid. The limitations of existing data prevented me from analyzing  
the effects of such demographic variables as marital status, number of children, AGI, 
and other variables on payment of household employment taxes.  I am convinced that 
analysis at this level would yield information useful for enforcement purposes. 
 There were only sixty participants in the qualitative portion of this study, thirty 
household employers and thirty employees. Future qualitative research should include 
greater numbers of participants. It would also be informative to conduct research on the 
compliance behavior of employers living in other parts of the country, especially in 
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areas where the domestic labor market is not dominated by migrant workers, either legal 
or illegal, in order to investigate the household employment issues separately from the 
migrant worker or nationality issues. Because the interviews were conducted in 
Washington, D.C., the results are especially not generalizeable to the rest of the country, 
due to the unique administrative and political features of that labor market. Furthermore, 
the small sample size and the case study nature of the research prevents the employer 
results from being generalizeable even within the city of Washington. It should also be 
noted that the employees discussed by employers in employer interviews were not, by 
the same token, representative of all employee experiences.   
 Likewise, the employee-based results are not to be taken as representative of the 
experiences of domestic workers of all nationalities in the Washington, DC, area, nor 
even of all Filipina domestic workers in the area. By design, the sample of household 
employees included only legal Filipina workers. Future research on household payroll 
tax compliance could address compliance among employers of legal migrant workers of 
other nationalities as well as of American domestic workers. Note however that in 
studying undocumented workers, the issue of working without papers would likely 
confound the issue of employer tax compliance unless handled very carefully.  
 It would also be interesting to study workers with children living with them, as 
their tax behavior might well be affected by the significantly larger incentives for low-
income parents to file income taxes as opposed to non-parents. Few workers in this 
study had children living with them, but workers with children might be easier to 
engage in a push for employer payroll compliance due to the size of the EITC for low-
income mothers and fathers.  
  216
 This dissertation drew upon both quantitative tax data and qualitative research 
with sixty human subjects. As with other interview research, the conclusions reached 
here can be only as accurate as the responses obtained in the course of the research. 
Researching tax evasion – both accidental and purposeful evasion – entails discussing 
the possibility of illegal actions and ethical shortcomings. This researcher took pains 
while recruiting, enrolling, and interviewing each employer and employee respondent to 
imbue the process with patience, with respect, and with the spirit of positive human 
inquiry; the final results however are only as accurate as the self-reported experiences of 
the interview subjects.  
 Finally, given the insights gained through this study’s qualitative methodology, 
future tax research utilizing interview research might well expand our understanding – 
and therefore our ability to reduce – other types of tax evasion. Tax evasion being both 
dishonest and illegal, interview subjects are rightly concerned with the ramifications of 
participating in such a study. Future researchers would be wise to emphasize the 
promise of confidentiality, the building of rapport, and the intimacy of the in-depth 
interview (in contrast to a focus-group methodology) when undertaking qualitative tax 
compliance research.  
8.7 Conclusion 
 There may be an apparent disjuncture between Chapter 7’s behavioral 
economics concerns with psychological motivation, personal tax ethics, or peer 
influences on noncompliance and Chapter 8’s concerns with the uniquely American 
social welfare programming context in which individual employers make their decisions 
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as well as with the interview material in Chapter 6 touching on the issue of the 
household’s relation to the government insofar as that household may have Social 
Security payroll tax obligations to employees. However, as we saw in both Chapters 4 
and 5, the overall institutional context of these household employment payroll tax 
decisions includes an Internal Revenue Service which managed to catch only 0.2% of 
evaders during a recent audit research study while refunding 87% as much paid in error 
on its overly complex Form 1040 Schedule H form as it collected after audits. This 
institutional context also shapes the operations of a Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor 
which do not appear to have reliable and consistent counts of  private household 
workers. The tax system is complex. Domestic work and the people who do paid 
domestic work do not show up well on our regulatory or census-taking radar. These 
government agencies in turn are a reflection of a larger social context of racism and 
sexism in which domestic work – poorly paid and ineffectively-regulated – will 
logically be over-represented among those urban workers who are typically 
undercounted. In other words, the low-status and low-pay of domestic work overall are 
partly to blame for the difficulty of both obtaining proper data to study the problem as 
well as the difficulty of ensuring the taxes are properly paid. 
 T. H. Marshall (1950) argued that societies should progress to a stage of 
providing minimal economic support in old age or poverty as one’s right as a citizen, a 
citizenship-based entitlement in the manner of libraries or other public goods as 
opposed to a more contingent form of entitlement, such as means-testing. Gordon and 
Fraser’s (1992) development of his ideas and their application to the development of the 
U. S. welfare state make clear that our system of social provision has historically 
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rejected citizenship-based entitlements – e.g., universal free daycare and early childhood 
education – opting instead to means-test most social support programs (“welfare”, 
housing, medical care for those under 65). Social Security (with its companion program 
Medicare) is unique in its universality, however, it is not an entitlement, but rather tied 
to years of documented payment of payroll taxes by both employer and employee.  
 I have concluded that these unique features of our social welfare system are part 
of the larger institutional or social influences on these sometimes unwitting household 
employers studied in this dissertation. These employers do not (a) see themselves as 
employers because they are still in their own houses (b) see the individual whom they 
are paying as a worker whose presence in their home is governed by a great deal of labor 
regulation not to mention tax regulation (c) perceive – whether they approve of it or not 
– their financial obligation, their financial role (however minute) in providing for the 
future retirement security of retiring workers who have labored for them. These three 
individual failures are at the heart of nanny tax nonpayment. I believe that these 
individual failures arise from the institutional characteristics of our overall system of 
social provision. 
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Notes 
 
1
 This suggestion came from an anonymous participant in the household 
employer interviews. In and of itself, this idea demonstrates the value of fieldwork with 
those directly concerned with and affected by a tax policy issue. 
 
2
 Of course, if the domestic worker is married, their spouse’s income might push 
them beyond the income eligibility limit, eliminating the usefulness of the EITC as an 
incentive to participate appropriately in the payroll tax contribution system. 
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMED CONSENT LETTERS 
Information for Household Employer Interviews 
 
Thank you for considering being part of my study! 
 
I am a graduate student writing my thesis on nanny taxes. I am doing interviews with 
people who hire nannies and housekeepers about the payroll taxes their employers are 
supposed to be paying for them. 
 
The purpose of my research is to gather opinions and experiences about these household 
employment payroll taxes. I am talking to people who hire household help about how 
they feel and think about these taxes. 
 
Because the interview involves talking about paying and not paying taxes, it is 
important to understand that there is some small risk of sharing that information with 
me. It is my firm intention to safeguard this information very carefully. I will not use 
your, or anyone else’s, real name in writing up my research. I will not use any details 
that could be used to identify you. No one besides me will ever have access to the data. 
 
Many household employers (as well as their employees) are frustrated with the nanny 
tax situation. By helping me research the topic, you will be contributing towards 
improvements in the employment tax system that could result from this research.  
 
If you have questions or concerns, even well after the interview is complete, please feel 
free to contact me anytime. My phone number is (202) XXX-XXXX.  
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Information for Household Employee Interviews 
 
Thank you for considering being part of my study! 
 
I am a graduate student writing my thesis on nanny taxes. I am doing interviews with 
people who work as nannies and housekeepers about the payroll taxes their employers 
are supposed to be paying for them. 
 
The purpose of my research is to gather opinions and experiences about these household 
payroll taxes. I am talking to people who work in households about how they feel and 
think about these taxes. I am also asking about how they think their employers see these 
taxes. 
 
Because the interview involves talking about paying and not paying taxes, it is 
important to understand that there is some small risk of sharing that information with 
me. It is my firm intention to safeguard this information very carefully. I will not use 
your, or anyone else’s, real name in writing up my research. I will not use any details 
that could be used to identify you. No one besides me will ever have access to the data. 
 
Many household employees (as well as their employers) are frustrated with the nanny 
tax situation. By helping me research the topic, you might well be contributing towards 
improvements in the employment tax system that could result from this research.  
 
If you have questions or concerns, even well after the interview is complete, please feel 
free to contact me anytime. My phone number is (202) XXX-XXXX. 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The interviews unfolded in various ways. Like many other ethnographic researchers, I 
attempted to allow the interview subject to govern the direction of the conversation. 
There was almost always a balance in the long run – over several hours or even several 
days – between free-ranging discussion and structured collection of demographic and 
payroll tax detail.  
EMPLOYEE QUESTIONS 
1. Where are you from? 
2. What kind of education or training do you have? 
3. What did you do before coming here? 
4. How many years have you been in the U.S.? 
5. Would you be willing to tell me how old you are? 
6. Do you have any children? 
7. Where do they live? 
8. What kinds of work have you done here in the U.S?  
9. How long have you worked for your current employer? 
10. Have any of your employers paid your payroll taxes? 
11. Does your current employer pay these employment taxes? 
12. Why do you think they do (or don’t) pay them? 
13. Think of some of your previous employers. Can you tell me why you think they 
did or didn’t pay? 
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14. Do YOU want them to be collecting the tax money from you and adding their 
share in order to pay your employment taxes?  
15. Why or why not? 
16. Has this changed over the years? 
17. Do you know how long does an employee have to work (overall, counting all 
jobs held) in order to qualify for Social Security and Medicare benefits? 
18. Do you know how many years of Social Security credit you have? Or, how close 
you are to having enough Social Security credit to qualify for benefits when you 
retire? 
19. Do you know anyone who is still working in the U.S. just in order to finish 
qualifying for Social Security? That is, some older people would like to stop 
working, but they continue just in order to finish getting their ten years of Social 
Security credits. Do you know anyone like that?  
20. In addition to Social Security benefits, these tax payments made now will also 
qualify you for Medicare insurance coverage as well. Are you familiar with what 
Medicare does? 
21. Unemployment benefits are the third thing you qualify for after paying 
employment taxes for a certain period of time. Do you know what these do? Do 
you have any friends who’ve ever collected unemployment benefits? 
22. Does thinking about Medicare and unemployment insurance change the way you 
feel about paying employment taxes? 
23. How do you think employers in general see those taxes? 
  224
24. Can you tell me what you know about what kinds of taxes the employer is 
supposed to pay, and how the employee benefits from that? 
25. Can you remember them ever saying anything about them? 
26. How did you learn about payroll taxes and the choice that employers make? 
27. Does it ever come up in conversation with your friends? What do people say?  
28. Some people like to have cash at the end of the week. On the other hand, some 
people would rather have their employers pay tax and withhold part of their 
wages so they can have benefits when they retire. Which do you prefer? Why? 
29. Would you rather have all your pay in cash now, or would you rather have less 
money now and be able to look forward to getting a monthly Social Security 
check when you stop working? Why? 
30. Do you think that most of your friends would answer the same way? 
31. Did you know that, for people who don’t make a lot of money, having taxes 
withheld and filing a tax return in April can actually give them extra money, that 
is, they can come out ahead? 
32. Do you know how much money a person with no children living with them can 
make without having to pay income tax on it? 
33.  Do you know what the Earned Income Tax Credit is? 
34. Some people file a tax return even if they make too little money to owe taxes. 
They do this partly to get their paycheck witholdings returned as a refund. But 
another reason is to take advantage of the Earned Income Credit, especially if a 
person has children living with them in the U.S. (If they don’t file taxes: Would 
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you be interested in filing a tax return to receive this money?) (If they do file 
taxes: Do you remember if you’ve ever gotten this credit before as a refund?)   
35. Have you ever asked an employer to pay your employment taxes, and they 
wouldn’t? 
36. What reason did they give? 
37. Have you ever NOT wanted them paid, but an employer insisted? 
38. What reason did they give? 
39. If you were an employer would you pay taxes? Why or why not? 
40. Can you tell me about some of the experiences friends of yours have had with 
nanny taxes? 
41. Have you ever tried to get an employer to change their minds one way or 
another?  
42. Have you learned anything over the years from other nannies and housekeepers 
about how to change an employer’s mind about something?  
43. What advice about how to deal with employers would you give a young woman 
coming here to work for the first time? 
EMPLOYER QUESTIONS 
1. Where are you from? 
2. What kind of education or training do you have? 
3. What do you do? What kinds of work have you done? 
4. Would you be willing to tell me how old you are? 
5. How many children do you have? 
6. Do you have a household employee right now? 
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7. How long have you had them? What kind of work do they do for you? 
8. Have you had any other household employees? 
9. Were any of them full-time? 
10.  (if there is no current employee, ask the next six questions in the past tense, 
“Did you pay...” etc.) 
11. Do you pay household employment taxes? 
12. Has this changed over the years? Why do you pay, or not pay, them? 
13. Does your employee want you to be paying household employment taxes?  
14. Why or why not? 
15. Has this changed over the years? 
16. Can you tell me a little bit about what’s involved in paying employment taxes? 
For example, how often they are due? Who exactly is collecting them? 
17. Can you tell me what fraction, roughly, of an employee’s gross pay the employer 
has to send in as actual household employment taxes (as opposed to the 
employee’s own income tax withholdings)?  
18. Are part-time employers supposed to pay also?  
19. What if the person works only once a week?  
20. How do you know if you have to pay or not? 
21. Can your employee collect Social Security even if she is not a citizen? 
22. How long does an employee have to work (overall, counting all jobs held) in 
order to qualify for Social Security and Medicare benefits? 
23. What is your understanding of how your employee benefits (would benefit) from 
your paying these taxes? 
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24. Do you know how long a person has to have these taxes paid before that worker 
qualifies for Social Security taxes? 
25. How long have you had a household employee? 
26. How many employee have you had? 
27. Did you pay nanny taxes for them? 
28. Think of one of them and tell me why you think they did or didn’t pay. 
29. How do you think household employers in general see those taxes? 
30. When the subject comes up among your friends who have household help, what 
kinds of things do people say? 
31. Have you ever asked to pay taxes for someone and they resisted? 
32. What happened? 
33. If you were an employee would you want your employer to pay taxes? Why or 
why not? 
34. Can you tell me about some of the experiences friends of yours have had with 
nanny taxes? 
35. Has a nanny ever tried to get you to change your mind about something? 
36. In your experience, how do household employees try to get you to decide 
something in their favor, regarding work circumstances? 
40. What advice would you give someone hiring a household employee for the first 
time? Would you advise them to pay employment taxes? Why or why not? 
41. I am going to ask you to consider your household’s overall income from last 
year. Without telling me the amount, please tell me which of the following ranges it 
fell into: less than $100,000, between $100,000 and $150,000, or over $150,000. 
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42. Now I would like you to consider all of the different sources of income your 
household received last year. Think about how large a part of that income came 
from bank interest or stock dividends as opposed to other sources, such as wages, 
salaries, pensions, or a business you own. Would you estimate that your interest and 
dividend income made up less than a third, between a third and two thirds, or over 
two thirds of your total income for the year? 
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APPENDIX C 
SCHEDULE H OF FORM 1040 
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